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lntroduct Lon : 
The purpose of thLs paper Ls to exomLne the 
reLotLonshLp between the Most Favoured NotLon prLncLpLe , as 
codLfLed by the lnternotLonoL Low CommLssLon , and the European 
CommunLtLes . A fundamental problem exLsts Ln thLs reLotLonshLp . 
The creotLon of the European CommunLtLes hos resulted Ln the 
denLoL of most favoured notLon benefLts under the muLtLtude of 
comme r cLoL treotLes whLch Lts LndLvLduoL members moLntoLned wLth 
thLrd States . ThLs fact alone appears to LLmLt the usefulness of 
the Most Favoured NotLon prLncLple , sLnce the European CommunLtLes 
ore the Largest trodLng bloc Ln the world . The European CommunLtLes 
ore not however on Lsoloted phenomenon; the process of regLonoL 
Lnteg r otLon Ls beLng experLmented wLth throughout the world , a 
trend that hos LntensLfLed Ln the 1970's . If , therefore , regLonoL 
economLc LntergrotLon results Ln the denLoL of most favoured 
notLon benefLts under the commercLoL treotLes whLch Lts LndLvLd-
uoL portLcLponts moLntoLned wLth thLrd states , the present 
usefulness of the most favoured notLon clause appears greatly 
LmpoLred . If , as Ls the case, the process of regLonoL LntegrotLon 
Ln proctLse results Ln the excLusLon of the Most Favoured NotLon 
prLncLpLe , Lt Ls sLgnLfLcont to determLne on what Legal found-
otLon , Lf any , thLs proctLse Ls based . The determLnotLon of thLs 
questLon wLLL be therefore the LmmedLote concern of thLs paper . 
The case example used Ls that of the European CommunLtLes, sLnce 
Lt Ls the most Lmportont , and certoLnLy the most sop~LstLcoted 
of such regLonoL groups . In one respect, the answers orrLved at 
specLfLcoLLy Ln reLotLon to the European CommunLtLes ore ocodemLc 
sLnce, Ln proctLce, theLr reLotLonshLp wLth, the MFN prLncLpLe hos 
now Long been settled . ThLs does not dLscount the utLLLty of 
resoLvLng the Legal posLtLon Ln that these answers orrLved at Ln 
reLotLon to the EC ore oppLLcobLe to other regLonoL groups and 
more Lmportont, to future experLments Ln regLonoL LntegrotLon , 
whLch ore LLkeLy to be numerous Lf present trends ore onythLng to 
go by . 
There Ls , however, another major Lssue roLsed by thLs 
reLotLonshLp , Lndependently of the Legal verdLct, one whLch 
hos a dLrect beorLng on the Lnvolvement of the lnternotLonoL 
Low CommLssLon Ln the topLc commanded as Lt Ls by ArtLcLe 1 of the 
Statute of the lnternotLonoL Low CommLssLon to promote "the 
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1 . 
HLsto rL col Backg r ound to the Most - Fovoured - NotLon claus e : 
DespLte 
Lts a ppea r anc e of contempo r oneLty , the Most - Fovoured - NotLon clause 
hos on old and noble pedLgree . It con be traced bock to the 
eleventh centu r y as the French and SponLsh trodLng cLt Les eyed the 
North AfrLcon market domLnoted by the dynomLc VenetLon trade r s and 
proposed , Ln overtones of LnsLstence, to the ruLLng Arab prLnces 
that the t r eatment accorded to French and SponLsh merchants should 
be not LnferLor to that already beLng accorded to the VenetLons . 1 . 
The Ldeo of the Most Favoured NotLon was thus born . The pledge was 
Lncorpo r oted Ln the fronchLse gLven to the newly orrLved traders 
to ope r ate . 
cLty stat e s fo r the commerce of the MedLterroneon bosLn Ln the 
twe Lth century r esulted Ln on LncreosLng use of the clause by 
whLch a f r amewo r k whereLn trade could be conducted was estoblLshed . 
CertoLn common cho r octerLstLcs of these orLgLnol clauses emerged : 
the rLghts accorded were reduced to wrLtLng , normally beLng Lncorp -
oroted Ln the state ' s f r onchLse , ono though on offshoot of trodLng 
octLvLtLes , the r Lghts g r anted to foreLgn merchants related to 
theL r persona l rLghts and jurLsdLctLonol favours rather than re -
LotLng dL r ectLy to the wa r es they dealt Ln ; they were unLLoterol 
pledges on the port of the market place outhorLtLes wLthout a 
correspondLng pledge by the grantees ; Lastly , they specLfLcoLLy 
envLsoged the treatment accorded to other specLfLc states as the 
standard expected . By the end of the fLfteenth century , the clause 
become composed predomLnontly of bLloteroL promLses , and sLmply set 
up the t r eatment gLven to any foreLgn notLon as the relevant stan -
dard . The clause become popular durLng the seventeenth century , 
though Lts structure was modLfLed Ln the eLghteenth century wLth the 
seporotLon of the poLLtLcoL and commercLoL Lnterests served by the 
clause . RepeotLng theLr foLlure to secure a monopoly of t r ade Ln 
West AfrLco Ln the eleventh century Ln AsLo Ln the seventeenth 
The Lntense competLtLon between the North ltolLon 
and eLghteenth centurLes , the European powers ogoLn settled on the 
Most Favoured NotLon clause as on acceptable standard of securLty . 
1 . - Yearbook of the I nternotLonol Low CommLssLon 1969 Vol . I I p 159 
LAW LIBRARY 
VICTOR!; UNIVE~SITY OF WE:LLINGTON 
• • • 
2 • 
The clause went through subsequent mutotLons , It becom e o 
feature o treotLes of copLtulotLon; by t eLr nature , these we re 
unLLoteroL . By the eLghteenth century , clauses were e mployed 
that clos e ly resembl e t e odern or oft e clause . An e xample 
of such o claus e Ln the commercLoL fLeld Ls provLded Ln ArtLcLe 8 
o f t e Treaty of Utr e cht 1713 concluded between England and Fr on ce . 
I t stLpulot e d : 
11
' It Ls furt er agreed and concluded , os o General rul e, th a t 
all and sLngulor t e subjects o& eoc KLngdom , s all , Ln oLL 
Countrys and Places , on bot 
som e PrLvLLeges , LLbertys and 
sLdes , ave and enjoy ot Least th e 
lmmunLtys , as to all Dutys , lmposLt -
Lons or Customs w otsoever , relotLng to Persons , Goods and 
er chondLzes , ShLps , FreLght , Seamen , ovLgotLon and Commerce ; 
and shall hove t e LL e Favour Ln all thLngs as the subjects of 
Fronc e, or any ot er f oreLgn otLon , t e most fovour ' d ave , 
possess and e njoy or ot any tLm e thereafter may hove , possess 
o r e njoy "' 2 . 
Such o clause waste orerunner oft e modern commercLoL 
clause Ln Lts uncondLtLonol form . Te eLg teent century also 
sow the emergence oft e condLtLonol clause , fLrst Lntroduced Ln 
the treaty concluded bet een Fronce and t e UnLted States of 
ArnerLco Ln 1778 , w Le become t e standard form oft e clause fo r 
all commercLoL treotLes concluded byte UnLted States . ArtLcLe 
I I o & t e 1778 treaty bet~een Fronce and t e USA provLdes o 
typLcoL example of sue o condLtLonoL clause : 
11 ' T e ,ost C rLstLon Lng and t e UnLted States engage mutual -
Ly not to grant ony portLculor &ovour toot er notLons , Ln respect 
of commerce and novLgotLon , Le s oLL not Lm edLotely become 
corn on tote otrer Party w o s all enjoy t e some ovour , freely , 
Lf t e concessLon was freely ~ode , or on ollowLng t e some compen -
sotLon Lf t e concessLon was condLtLonol'" 3 . 
In act , t e UnLted States , untLL 1923 , Lnterpreted all MF 
clauses os condLtLonol , t e most conspLcuous example beLng Lts 
Lnt e rpretotLon oft e LouLsono Pure ose where o condLtLonol Lnt er -
pr e totLon was plac e d on t e standard 11 s all be treat e d upon th e 
2 . 
3 . 
/ 
- Yeorboo oft e lnternotLonol ~ow Co~ LssLon 1969 Vol . p 160 
LoLd ot p 161 quotLng ro II reotLes Con nt er notLon oL 
Acts , Protocols and Agreements bet een t e UnLt e d S t a t e s o f 
ArnerLco and ot er Powers 17 - o Q" . M. oLLo Vol . I p 468 
• 
3 . 
footLng of the most favoured notLon" despLte the apparent 
uncondLtLonolLty of the clause . Europe Lndeed endorsed such 
on approach untLl 1860 , from when the uncondLtLonol clause 
reLgned supreme . By 1909 the uncondLtLonol MFN hod goLned 
such populorLty that on AmerLcon commentator could confLdently 
assert that Lt represented "the cornerstone of all modern commer -
cLol treotLes" 4 . 
The FLrst World War , and Lts aftermath, proved a mLxed 
blessLng for the clause : the polorLzotLon of the developed 
world Lnto hostLle foctLons proved on unsuLtoble theatre Ln 
whLch on economLc concept based on extensLve and frLendly 
LnternotLonol contact could operate . The clause was eclLpsed -
portly to ovoLd LndLrect Lmports or exports to the enemy , and 
portly Ln the Lnterests of the war effort . Others emerged from 
the Great War denouncLng torLff dLscrLmLnotLon more vehemently , 
even cLtLng Lt as a cause of the war, and turned to the most 
favoured notLon concept for solvotLon . Lukewarm adherence to 
the clause dLd resurface Ln the LmmedLote Lnter war years , thLs 
perLod also beLng notable for the obdLcotLon by the UnLted States 
of the condLtLonol form Ln favour of the uncondLtLonol form . The 
League of NotLons lnterotLonol EconomLc Conference Ln 1027 re -
newed Lnterest Ln the clause . Such tentotLve resurqence of 
populorLty was soon dashed however by the grLm reolLtLe s of the 
LnternotLonol economLc order from 1929 onwards when on unprece-
dented downturn Ln the economLes of all the major states produced 
a hostLle clLmote to the prLncLple on whLch the clause Ls based 
L. e . that of trade lLberolLzotLon . In fact the clause and trade 
lLberolLzotLon do not necessorLly go and Ln hand; Lndeed, trade 
restrLctLons may be equally processed by the clause as trodLng 
favours . However , the dromotLc drop Ln the number of F treotLes 
entered Lnto Ln thLs perLod Ls LndLcotLve of states' acceptance 
of Lts trodLtLonol ossocLotLon wLth trade lLberolLzotLon : 90% of 
commercLol treotLes concluded before 1931 contoLned Lt, compared 
to only 42% after 1931 . By 1931, 26 major trodLng notLons hod 
Lntroduced dLscrLmLnotory Lmport and exc onge controls : perhaps 
4 . - AmerLcon Journal of lnternotLonol Low Vol . 3 No . 2 1909 p 395 
per S . K. Hornbeck 
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the nodLr of the clause was represented by the TorLff Truce 
Conferences of 1930 and 1931 . ExLled from the real world , 
the most favoured notLon prLncLple become predomLnontly on 
ocodemLc Lnterest dLscussed by Lawyers and economLsts wLth o 
trace of nostolgLo , much as sunshLne Ls remembered Ln the mLdst 
of o bLtter wLnter . But the experLence of the DepressLon Ln 
oddLtLon hod produced o doctrLnol reoctLon ogoLnst the concepts 
of free trade and the clause , by ossocLotLon, suffered corres -
pondLngly . The vLews of John Maynard Keynes goLned currency ; 
on excerpt from NotLonol Self SuffLcLency Ls LndLcotLve of the 
hostLlLty wLth whLch free trade come to be regarded : 
" Let goods be homespun whenever Lt Ls reasonably and con -
venLently possLble ... We do not wLsh .. . to be at the mercy of 
world forces " 5 . 
OffLcLolly government pronouncements endorsed the prLncLples 
of free trade but controdLcted these prLncLples Ln theLr octLons . 
As succLnctly put by CloLr WLlcox : 
" Each for hLmself and the devLl take the hLndmost become 
the general rule " 6 . 
The sole exceptLon to thLs trend was the newly estoblLshed 
SovLet RepublLc whLch Lncorporoted most favoured notLon treatment 
Ln the Treaty of Ropollo wLth Germany , concluded Ln 1922 and 
expanded on Ln the subsequent treaty wLth Germany Ln 1925 . 
DespLte these setbacks, the oppeol of the prLncLple persLsted: 
the Preparatory CommLssLon of Experts odvLsed the World Monetary 
and EconomLc Conference convened Ln London Ln 1933 that the most 
favoured notLon prLncLple should, under normal condLtLons, form 
the bosLs of LnternotLonol commerce . LLkewLse, the Seventh 
lnternotLonol Conference of AmerLcan States declared Ln 1933 : 
"AccordLngly, they undertake that whatever agreements they 
enter Lnto shall Lnclude the most favoured notLon clause Ln Lts 
uncondLtLonal and unrestrLcted form , to be opplLed to all types 
of control of LnternatLonol trade" 7 . 
Such fLne sentLments were tentatLvely translated Lnto actLon 
Ln the perLod before the Second World War , the UnLted States con -
5 . - otLonal Self SuffLcLency : Yale RevLew Vol . XXI I Summer 1933 
6 . - A Charter for World Trade p 5-9 
7 . - Yearbook of the ILC 1969 Vol 2 p174 
• • • 
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cludLng MFN agreements wLth 20 notLons. Stronger notLonoLLst 
forces operated, however, to hLnder any wholesale return to 
LLberoLLzed LnternotLonoL trodLng. 
But the sLmple fact remoLned that the measures of trade 
restrLctLon and dLscrLmLnotLon persued durLng the DepressLon 
hod not worked and thLs reoLLzotLon domLnoted post-war thLnkLng. 
The restored favour whLch trade LLberoLLzotLon experLenced was 
expressed Ln the CommercLoL Polley Chapter of the lnternotLonoL 
Trade OrgonLsotLon, whLch flatly prohLbLted proctLcoLLy every 
form of trade restrLctLon, though Ln fact the ITO Charter hos 
also been vLewed as embodyLng the concept of the supremacy of 
notLonoL octLon ogoLnst the Lnterest of LnternotLonoL co-oper-
otLon . In any event, the ITO Charter was not rotLfLed by the 
negotLotLng countrLes and "soon collapsed of Lts own weLght" 8 . 
However, Lts commercLoL poLLcy rules dLd survLve, thanks to theLr 
LncorporotLon Ln the General Agreement on TorLffs and Trade 1947, 
Ln Ltself orLgLnoLLy o temporary subsLdLory of ITO but after the 
Latter's demLse, rose, phoenLx-LLke, to becomLng the prLncLpoL 
forum of LnternotLonoL trade negotLotLon; the text of the Agree-
ment conspLcuously enshrLnes the most favoured notLon clause as 
the bosLs of commercLoL relotLons between the ControctLng PortLes 
Ln ArtLcle 1 . ThLs general revLvoL of acceptance of the clause 
was reflected Ln the codLfLcotLon of Lts prLncLpLes by the 
lnternotLonoL Low CommLssLon, completed Ln 1978, reflectLng Lts 
Lmportonce as one of the domLnont prLncLples of LnternotLonoL 
relotLons. 
8 . - R.N. Gordner SterLLng-DoLLor DLpLomocy 1956 p 379 
• • • 
CHAPTER 2 
6. 
General OvervLew of the Most Favoured NotLon clause: 
The bosLc 
Ldeo underlyLng the Most Favoured NatLon clause LS a relatLvely 
sLmple one . The clause sets up a standard of treatment Ln the 
relotLonshLp between two or more states ; one state undertakes 
on obLLgotLon towards another state to treat the Latter's goods , 
notLonoLs or any aspect of theLr mutual relatLons encompassed by 
the treaty, as the case may be, on a bosLs not LnferLor to the 
treatment Lt accords to whLchever happens to be the most favoured 
thLrd state Lt deals or wLLL deal wLth Ln that fLeld . TrodLtLon -
oLLy the clause hos operated Ln the context of LnternotLonoL 
commerce , estobLLShLng a regLme on customs dutLes for example , 
but certoLnly Lts operotLon Ls not LLmLted to thLs fLeld; Mr 
Endre Ustor as SpecLoL Rapporteur on the topLc, LdentLfLed the 
foLLowLng areas whLch hove been governed by a most favoured notLon 
clause : 
11 (0) lnternotLonoL regulotLon of trade and payments 
(b) Treatment of foreLgn means of transport 
(c) EstobLLshment, personal statute and professLonoL 
octLvLtLes of foreLgn physLcoL and jurLdLcoL persons 
(d) PrLvLLeges and LmmunLtLes of dLpLomotLc , consular 
and trade mLSSLons 
(e) Intellectual property 
(f) RecognLtLon and executLon of foreLgn judgements and 
orbLtroL awards" 1 . 
Thus, although thLs paper wLLL be c o ncerned wLth the oper-
otLor of the clause moLnly Ln the context of LnternotLonoL trade, 
because that fLeLd Ls the clause's most Lmp o rtont alleged coptLve, 
one should bear Ln mLnd Lts multLtude of subject matter . SLmLLor-
Ly, one should also, at the outset, quoLLfy the expressLon "the" 
most favoured notLon clause; though Lt Ls true that most clauses 
ore SLmLLor enough Ln wordLng and objectLve, Ln settLng up a 
sLmLLor t ondord of treatment Ln any one fLeLd to generoLLze about 
them, nevertheless every clause bears the LndLvLduoL LmprLnt of 
1 . - Yearbook of the lnternotLon Low CommLssLon 1968 Vol . I I p 167 
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Lts creators L. e . the portLes to Lt ; hence to the extent that 
th e portLes dLffer , the clauses they enter Lnto wLLL dLff er. 
As Schworzenberger hos poLnted out : 
"SpeokLng strl..ctly , there Ls no such thl..ng as the most 
favoured notLon clause ; every treaty requLres Lndependent 
ex omLnotLon " 2 . 
It Ls therefo r e open to the portLes to determl..ne the type 
of most favoured notLon obLLgotl..on and rLghts beLng entered 
Lnto . ThLs quoLLfLcotLon does not detract from the LdentLty 
of rotl..onole LyLng behLnd oLL MFN clauses , and Lt Ls on thLs 
Ld e ntl..ty , on whLch th e coLLectLve Lobel most favoured notLon 
c l ause Ls justLf Led , that the foLLowLng generoLLzotLons wLLL 
be bas e d . 
In thl..s port of the paper , o seLectLon of defl..nl..tLons of 
th e MFN clause Ls offered , followed by o brLef descrLptLon of 
th e effects of Lts operotLon Ln the ' real world' . In order to 
hLgh LLght Lts features by way of contrast , o comporLson between 
the MFN prLncl..pLe and sLmLLor concepts wLLL then be drown , poy -
Lng Lndl..vLduol ottentLon to l..ts reLotLonshLp wLth the prLncLpLe 
of non - dLscrLml..notLon . From thl..s perspectLve , we turn to the 
Legal LngredLents of the MFN clause LtseLf : the dLscussLon 
fo l lows o chronoLogLcoL order , outLLnLng the Legal LngredLents 
of Lts creotLon , L~ Legal structure once estobLLshed - LncLudLng 
on outLLne of the types of clauses commonly employed today - and 
concLudLng wLth o descrLptLon of how rLghts enjoyed under on MFN 
t r eaty ore termLnoted . 
DefLnLtLons of o " Most Favoured NotLon clause" : 
There would 
appear to be almost as many defLnLtLons of MF clauses as there 
ore clauses themselves ; Ln many respects , thLs Ls hardly sur -
prLsl..ng , sLnce each clause dLffers from the other . There l..s no 
one " standard " clause , and hence no one standard defLnLtLon that 
wLLL serve oLL clauses equally adequately . However , to the exte n t 
that the generoLLzotLon ' the MF clause' Ls voLLd , and Lt Ls , th e 
2 . - lnternotLonoL Low and Order (1971) p 138 
• • • 
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foLLowLng defLnLtLons ore o f f e red . 
Usenko defLnes Lt thus : 
" Under the MFN prLncLpLe Ls understood the stLpuLotLo n 
contoLned Ln LnternotlonoL treotles occordlng to whLch each 
cont r octLng party Ls obLLged to grant the other controctLng 
pa r ty Ln a ce r toLn domoLn of theLr mutual reLotLons defLned 
Ln the t r eaty the some r Lghts , advantages , prLvLLeges and 
favours as Lt grants or wLLL grant Ln the future to any th Lrd 
state " 3 . 
D. VLgues puts forward a sLmpLer defLnLtLon : 
" The most favoured notLon clause Ls a pr o vL s Lon Ln a treaty 
whe r eby a State g r ants another State such advantages as Lt hos 
a lready g r anted or may subsequently grant to any other State " 4 . 
GLven Lts Lmportonce and susceptLbLLLty to Lndependent 
tr eatment Lt ls often consLdered wLse to defLne commercLoL MFN 
clauses sepa r ately . 
po r tLcuLor specLes : 
C. Hyde ' s defLnLtLon Ls geared toward thLs 
" BrLefLy defLned , the most favoured notL o n clau s e Ls sLmpLy 
a pledge of non - dLscrLmLnotLon ogoLnst the commerce of the othe r 
party equal l y favoured wLth any thLrd party . The customary word -
Lng howeve r, hos been a pledge to grant to the other party treat -
ment not Less favourable than may be granted to the " most favour -
e d " among other countrLes " 5 . 
FLnoLLy , the SpecLoL Rapporteur ' s defLnL t Lo n Ls offered : 
" Most Favoured NotLon treatment Ls treat ment accorded by the 
g r ontLng state to the benefLcLory s ta t e or to per s on s or thLngs 
Ln a determLned reLotLonshLp wLth t hat s tat e no t Le ss favourable 
than treatment ex t ended by the grontLng st a t e to a thLrd state or 
to person s or thLngs Ln the some reLotLon s hLp wLth a thLrd state " 
Draft ArtLcLe 5 . 6 . 
CertoLn themes recur thr ough all these defLnLtLons ; at the 
heart of a MFN clause LLes the Ldeo of a standard beLng estobLLsh ed 
3 . - Forms of the ReguLotL o n o f the So cLoLL s t l nternotLonoL 
DL v LsLon of Lab our , 1965 p 22 6 ouo~nrl Ln Yearbook 
4 . - " Lo clause de Lo 'ln Lon Lo plu s fa o rL s ee et s o protLque con -
temp o roLre " Rece vL L des Cour s d e c.. ' c odemLe de droLt Lnte r-
notLonol de Lo HcJ 1971 Val 130 p 213 
5 . - " I nternotL onol Lo w c hLefly as Interpreted and ApplLed by the 
US " 2nd Rev . Ed . 194 7 Vol . 11 p 1503 
6 . - Report of the lnternotLonol Low CommL s sLon 1978 p 41 
9 . 
below whLch o state may not Legally be treated . The standard 
LS dynomLc Ln so for as Lt LS determLned precLseLy by r eference 
to the g r ontLng state ' s treatment of oLL other states Lt hos dea l-
Lngs wLth who ore not portLes to that clau s e . ThLs Lndependent 
c r Lte r Lon of comporLson necessorLLy fluctuates SLnc e the claus e 
Lts eLf places no fetters on how the grontLng state wLLL t r eat 
th Lrd states Ln th e f uture . ThLS dependent orLentotLon o n 
uLterL o r facto r s Ln many ways chorocterLzes the clause . 
How th e MFN clause wo r ks : 
The poLLtLcoL and economLc aspects 
of most favoured notLon clauses ore the subject of proLLfLc 
boo ks a nd o r tLcLes , due Ln port no doubt to Lts LnvoLvement Ln 
the o l d debate on free t r ade . It LS outsLde the context and 
c ompete nce of thLs paper to consLder tho s e a s pects except 
brLefLy to summorLze the operotLon of the clause Ln the ' real 
wo r ld ' as on OLd to opprecLotLng Lts Legal a s pects . 
The entrenchment of the clause as the bosLs , obstensLbLy , 
o f Ln ternotLonoL t r ade hos proved to be Lts mo s t SLgnLfLcont 
ossocLotLon , so Lt LS to thLs portLcuLor ' real world' that 
ottentLon wLLL be focused . One may be f o rgLven f o r ossumLng 
o natural kLnshLp between the MFN clau s e and the LLberoLLzotLon 
of trade , because thLs LS accepted generally as Lts usual effect 
and Lt LS trodLtLonoLLy ossocLoted wLth LLberoLLzLng LnternotLonoL 
trade by LowerLng customs torLffs and re s trLCtLons . CertoLnLy 
ArtLcLe 1 of the GATT proceeds on thLs ossumptL o n . Unfortunately 
the MFN clau s e guarantees no thLng of the so rt; Lt merely guarantees 
the r elevance and occountobLLLty of octL o n by the grontLng state to 
the states Lt hos promLsed MFN treatment to; Lt do e s not , on the 
other hand dLctote what that octL on to thLrd s tates wLLL be . The 
grontLng state , after hovLng entered Lnto on MFN treaty , remoLns 
perfectly free to regulate the treatment Lt accords to thLrd 
states from among whom the "most favoured notLon " wLLL eme r ge ; 
ogoLnst those thLrd states Lt LS perfectly entLtLed to roLse 
~o r Lffs as hLgh as Lt pleases , and thLs wLLL be the Lev el the 
• • • 
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benefLcLory wLLL hove to accept . Indeed , the clause generoLLzes 
on Lncreose Ln the Level of o torLff , thereby LncreosLng the 
general Le vel of torLffs . The comtemporory LnterpretotLon of 
the clause , as o favourable Lnfluence on the LLberoLLzotLon of 
trade , hos not always been shored by post generotLons ; as re -
mLnded by Gerard Curzcn , commentLng on the Lnter war years : 
" The most favoured notLon clause , under these cLrcumstonces 
(of LncreosLng torLffs) reLnforced protectLonLst tendencLes . 
Even Less favourable theorLes come to be evolved durLng thLs 
perLod whLch went so for as to accuse the clause of fovourLng 
the hLghest torLffs" 7 . 
Indeed, the SpecLoL Rapporteur starkly confessed : 
" It con be LLnked to the most dLverse systems of economLc 
poLLcy , to free t r ade as well as to protectLonLsm " 8 . 
However, the type of clause entered Lnto does carry wLth Lt 
some Lnherent effect; Lf o state sees Ltself as prLncLpoLLy o 
successfu l exporter , Lt naturally Looks to the uncondLtLonoL MFN 
clause to moxLmLse the reoLLzotLon of Lts potentLoL . As the 
UnLted States' experLence LndLcotes . the condLtLonoL form of the 
clause , or Lndeed, the absence of any clause at oLL , Ls notur LLy 
LLnked wLth protectLve economLes . 
The sLgnLfLconce of the clause appears to be , therefore , 
not that Lt necessorLLy Leads too further LLberoLLzLng of 
trodLng relotLonshLps (whLch Ln Ltself Ls accepted as o good 
thLng , but Lts natural ossocLotLon wLth the clause , Lt Ls sub -
mLtted , mLsconceLved) but rather that Lt estobLLshes some sort 
of framework Ln whLch the LnternotLonoL relotLonshLp of these 
two or more states may be governed . As the SpecLoL Rapporteur 
commented Ln quoLLfLcotLon of the above occusotLon of phLLO-
sophLcoL promLscuLty : 
" The most favoured notLon clause hos o hormonLzLng and 
LeveLLLng effect ... Lt renders the conclu Lon of new LndLvLduoL 
agreements superfluous ... Lt creates favourable condLtLons for 
the development of mutual commercLoL relotLons between states . 
It consLsts of two moLn factors : the grontLng of favours and 
the eLLmLnotLon of dLscrLmLnotLon" 9 . 
7 . -" MultL CommercLoL DLpLomocy " '1965 p 59 
8 . - Yearbook '1968 Vol . 11 p '168 
9 . - LbLd 
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CertaLn l y Lt Ls true that the clause wLLL , by Lts ve ry 
nature , operate to eLLmLnate dLscrLmLnatLon . The subsequent 
actLons by th e grantLng state to thLrd states , whLch wLLL 
determLne the content of the clause , may , however , straLn the 
normal meonLng ottrLbuted to the word ' favour' ; Lt cannot , for 
example , always be equated wLth the reductLon of tarLffs , sLnce 
the g r antLng state may Lnc r ease them agaLnst thLrd partLes , 
creatLng a margLn Ln whLch the tarLffs agaLnst that benefLcLa r y 
state may , under the MFN treaty , actually be Lncreased . No 
doubt thLs may stLLL be regarded as o ' favour ' but one whose 
content may f l uctuate ; Lts meonLng Ls quaLLfLed Ln that the 
treatment the benefLcLary state gets may be worse after the MFN 
t r eaty the n Lt had been prevLously . Such a fluctuatLon Ls 
Lnherent Ln the MFN clause . As RossLLLLon expLaLns : 
" The clause can be pLctured as a float , whLch enables Lts 
possessor to maLntaLn Ltself at the hLghest Level of the obLLg -
atLons accepted towards foreLgn states by the granter state ; Lf 
that Level falls , the float cannot turn Lnto a balloon so as to 
maLntaLn the benefLcLary of the clause artLfLcLaLLy above the 
gene r al Leve l of the r Lghts exercLsed by other states " 10 . 
The MFN clause compared wLth sLmLLor concepts : 
The basLs of 
the MFN clause Ls Ln the promLse to grant MFN treatment . Other 
forms of expressLng thLs promLse may be employed to convey the 
same Ldea; LLkewLse , a sLmLLar form to the MFN clause may be 
employed to express a promLse Ln dLfferene cLrcumstances from 
the tradLtLonoL spheres embraced by MFN clauses . As on aLd to 
understandLng the structure of on MFN clause, Lt Ls proposed 
to compare Lt to these sLmLLar promLses . 
The tradLtLonaL MFN clause promLses MFN treatment . Othe r 
"most favoured notLon " phrases do exLst , however , expres~Lng 
essentLaLLy the same Ldea . The MF 'standard ' Ls employed 
sometLmes ; Schwarzenberger beLLeves thLs to mean sLmply the 
standard of most favou~ natLon treatment 11 . (The Latter hos 
10 . - " Lo clause de Lo natLon Lo plus fovorLsee dons Lo jurLs -
prudence de Lo Cour lnternotLonale de JustLce " J . D. I. de 
ParLs 82nd Year No . 1 p 106 
11 . - lnternotLonaL Low and Order " (1971) p 118 - 9 
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already been defLned . '12 . ) ThLs may be contrasted wLth other 
standards Ln LnternotLonol Low , such as the MLnLmu m Standard , 
the standard of preferentLol treatment, the standard of Ldent-
Lcol treatment , the standard of equLtoble treatment, the standard 
of the open door , the most favourable condLtLons standard (granted 
by the French Government to the LnternotLonol orgonLzotLon UNESCO) 
and the standard of notLonol treatment . The Lost deserves specLoL 
ottentLon because MFN treatment Ls often coupled wLth notLonol 
treatment , LnvolvLng a comporLson of the standards concerned . 
Schworzenberger exploLns the dLstLnctLon : 
" whereas the MFN standard oLms at foreLgn porLty, the object 
of the notLonol standard Ls Lnlond porLty . " '13 . 
The SpecLol Rapporteur recognLsed the ossocLotLon between 
the two by LncludLng two Draft ArtLcles coverLng theLr relotLon-
shLp . Draft ArtLcle '18 confLrms that the grant of notLonol porLty 
to a thLrd state Ls certoLnly one of the rLghts processable by 
the MFN clause whLch the benefLcLory may cloLm; ArtLcle '19 deals 
wLth the sLtuotLon where the benefLcLory hos been granted both 
notLonol treatment and MFN treatment "or other treatment" by the 
grontLng state : the Draft ArtLcle allows the benefLcLory to 
elect whLch treatment Lt prefers occordLng to whLchever Ls most 
advantageous to Lt . A grant of notLonol treatment dLffers from MFN 
treatment Ln that the former exLsts Lndependently of treatment 
the grontLng state confers on thLrd states: Lt Ls therefore a 
dLrect, substontLoL grant, gLvLng the benefLcLory outomotLc rLghts , 
because a government always hos deoLLngs wLth Lts notLonols, 
whereas, of course, MFN treatment Ls on empty grant tLLL gLven 
content by the grontLng states' deoLLngs wLth a thLrd state . '14 . 
'12 . - p 9 
'13 . - op cLt 
'14 . - As the BrLtLsh delegotLon argued Ln the Anglo- I ran Lon OLL ,, 
Company case before the lnternotLonoL Court of JustLce : 
"Lt ocquLres Lts content only when the granter state enters Lnto 
relotLons wLth o thLrd state, and Lts content Lncreoses whenever 
fresh favours ore granted to thLrd states"- Report of the I LC '1978 
P uotLng I CJ PleodLngs, Anglo-lronLon OLL Co case '1952 p533 . In 
fact! the potentLoL emptLness of the MFN clause Ls never fully 
reoLLzed because every state, to voryLng degrees, hos relotLons wLth 
other states sLmply through LnhobLtLng a common planet. In relotLon 
o t e specLfLc subject matters of the MFN clause, however, 0 
grontL~g state may Lndeed ho~e no deoLLn~s wLth a thLrd state : Ln thLs 
SLtuotLon, Que to the o~erotLon of the eJusdem generLs rule the MFN treo~y remoL0s empty p~ content as Long os o LsoLotLon L~ the portLcuLor fLeLd persLsts . 
• 
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The MFN clause , based as Lt Ls on o comporLson, hos 
cousLns of o dLfferent sort - related not on conceptual grounds, 
but due to the context Ln whLch they operate . An example of 
these Lnclude 'most favoured orgonLzotLon ' clauses , created 
usually between o state and on LnternotLonoL orgonLsotLon . The 
promLse Ls LdentLcoL too MFN clause, except the standard 
Lncorporoted Ls that of the most fa voured " orgonLzotLon ". 
ArtLcle VI I I, paragraph 4 of the FAO constLtutLon provLdes on 
example of such o most favoured orgonLzotLon clause" : Lt 
stLpulotes Lnter oLLo : 
"Each Member Not Lon and Assoc Late Member undertakes ( .... ) 
to accord to the DLrector General and senLor staff dLpLomotLc 
prLvLLeges and LmmunLtLes and focLLLtLes whLch may hereafter 
be accorded to equLvolent members of the staffs of othe r pubLLc 
~nternotLonoL orgonLzotLons ." 15. 
Other examples ore clauses relotLng to oLrcroft, whLch dLffer 
from o normal MFN clause sLnce the standard envLsoged Ls the 
state ' s treatment of Lts own oLrcroft Le notLonoL treatment . 
AgoLn notLonoL treatment fLgures sLgnLfLcontly as the 
standard Ln the fLeld of pledges between states relotLng 
to shLppLng . The other standards employed Ln thLs fLeld ore 
those of most favoured notLon, or sLmply o promLse of non 
dLscrLmLnotLon . 
The Most Favoured NotLon clause and the prLncLple of non-
dLscrLmLnotLon : 
The status of the MFN clause Ln LnternotLonoL Low 
15 . - Yearbook of the ILC Vol . 2 p 214 
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brLngs Lnto focus Lts relotLonshLp wLth the estobLLshed prLncLp le 
of non - dLscrLmLnotLon . · The two Lndeed ore LntLmotely LLnked to 
such on extent that Lt Ls o matter of conjectu re whether Ln fact 
one Ls not merely o portLculor monLfestotLon of the other . Indeed 
the lnternotlonol Court of Justlce hos descrLbed the Lntentlon of 
on MFN clause Ln general terms that appear to odmLt thLs Lnter-
pretotlon - " to estobllsh and moLntoln at all tlmes fundamental 
equoLLty wLthout dLscrLmLnotLon among all of the countrLes con -
cerned" '16 . Clearly the two , closely ossocLoted as they ore, wo rk 
to ochLeve sLmLLor re sults . The chLef consequence of occeptLng 
the two as the some Ls that Lt elevates the MFN clause , Lf on 
LngredLent of the prLncLple of non-dLscrLmLnotLon, Lnto o general 
prLncLple of LnternotLonol Low . The Speclol Rapporteur r ejected 
thLs vLew , moLntoLnLng that the two were dLstLnct from each other : 
"The close relotlonshLp between the MFN clause and the gene ral 
prLncLple of non-dLscrLmlnotLon should not blur the dLfferences 
between the two notLons" '17 . 
He went on to dLstLnguLsh : 
"The obvLous r ule , whLLe States ore bound by the duty orLsLng 
from the prLncLple of non-dLscrLmLnotLon, they ore nevertheless 
free to grant specLol favours to other States on the ground of 
some speclol relotlonshLp. In other words , the prLncLple of non -
dLscrLmLnotLon may be consldered as o general rule whLch con al -
ways be Lnvoked by any state . But o State cannot normally Lnvoke 
the prLncLple ogoLnst another State whLch hos extended portLculorly 
favourable treatment too thlrd State, provlded that the State con -
cerned hos Ltself receLved the general non-dlscrLmlnotory treat -
ment on a par wLth other states" '18 . 
The CommLssLon Lllustroted the dLfference by reference to 
the VLenno ConventLon on DlplomotLc RelotLons , ArtLcle 47 of whLc h 
provLdes : 
"'1. In the oppLLcotLon of the provLsLons of the present 
conventLon the receLvLng state shall not dLscrLmLnote as between 
states. 
2 . However , dLscrLmLnotlon shall not be regarded as tokLng 
'16 . " RLghts of NotLonols of the USA Ln Morocco " ICJ Reports '1952 
p '192 
'17 . - Yearbook '1976 Vol . 2 Port 2 p 8 
'18. - LbLd 
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place: 
(b) Where by custom or agreement states extend to each 
other more favourable treatment than LS requLred by the provLsLons 
of the present conventLon" 19 . 
The rLght to such "more favourable treatment" must be based 
on on expLLcLt commLtment of the state grantLng the favours - such 
as on MFN treaty . Clearly, however, Lf MFN treatment Ln a portLc-
ular SLtuotLon LS Ln fact LdentLcoL to the Level of "general non 
dLscrLmLnotory" treatment, the MFN treaty Ls rendered unnecessary 
as the benefLcLory WLLL have on Lndependent rLght to such treat-
ment . To what extent the ~wo prLncLpLes wLLL overlap Ls dubLous 
Ln fact, due to the LLmLted and un~ertoLn scope of the prLncLple 
of non dLscrLmLnotLon . As one representotLve of the SLxth CommLttee 
observed: 
"It followed from the content of that provLsLon (ArtLcle 47) 
that Lts purpose was the general observance of the obLLgotLons 
stLpuloted by the conventLon for all States . By stLpulotLng those 
obLLgotLons as a mLnLmum standard Ln dLpLomatLc reLotLons, the 
VLenno ConventLon mode Lt possLble for States to grant each other 
brooder advantages, for example, Ln the form of the most favoured 
notLon clause . However , such a standard dLd not exLst Ln other 
fLelds , portLcuLorLy Ln the commercLaL-poLLtLcoL fLeld" 20 . 
CreotLon of the clause : 
As the hLstorLcoL LntroductLon suggests 
the MFN clause LS very much a product of the world of LnternotLonaL 
commerce, fLrmLy rooted Ln the proctLse of states . It emerged Ln 
response to a need to estobLLsh a framework wLthLn whLch contact 
between states could be stobLLzed and mode a LLttle more predLctable . 
Today, MFN clauses ore always created by theLr LncorporatLon 
Ln a wrLtten treaty negotLoted by subjects of LnternotLonaL Low . 
It Ls quLte true that theoretLcoLLy on MFN clause could be created 
orally - the requLrement that Lt be reduced to wrLtLng cannot 
therefore be consLdered a defLnLtLonaL pre-requLSLte; however, 
oral MFN clauses ore today so rare, Lf exLstent at all, that they 
19 . - Report of the I LC 1978 p 16 
20. - Report of the SLxth CommLttee 1978 p 17-8 A/33/419 
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may safely be dLsregorded . LLkewLse , the typLcoL subject of 
LnternotLonoL Low creotLng the clause today LnvorLobly Ls the 
state , though as wLth MFN clauses , Lt Ls possLble that other 
subjects of LnternotLonoL Low , such as on LnternotLonoL orgon -
LsotLon , could become o party too treaty LncorporotLng such o 
c l ause , and thLs does happen . Though the clause Ln fact Ls a l-
most always created when one state grants Lt to another state 
pursuant too wrLtten treaty , thLs does not represent the only 
context Ln whLch Lt may operate . Draft ArtLcLe 4 of the Draft 
ArtLc l es 21. p r oduced by the I nternotLonoL Low CommLssLon spec -
Lf Lco LLy excludes oral MFN clauses , and those LncludLng o subject 
o f Lnte r notLonoL Low other than o state from the provLsLons of 
the Draft Ar tLcles , but does not Ln any wo~ undermLne the voLLd -
Lty of such clauses outsLde the s c ope of th e Drnfr Arri rLPs (LLmL -
ted by Draft ArtLcles 1 and 4 t o wrL t ten MFN clau s e s contoLned Ln 
o t r eaty concluded between states) - Lndeed , Draft ArtLcle 3 Ls 
expressly Lncluded to negate thLs sugge s tLon . These LLmLtotLons 
were conscLously desLgned to ru n parallel ,u Lth the VLenno 
ConventLon on the Low of TreotLe s , fr om whLch s tudy the Ldeo of 
codLfyLng the Most Favoured NotLon clau s e was born . From the 
outset the commentary acknowledges the ossocLotLon between the 
two studLes : Ln r elotLon to Draft ArtLcle 1 the SpecLoL Rapporteu r 
exploLned : 
" ThLs ortLcle corresponds to ortLcle of the VLenno ConventLon " 22 . 
AgoLn Ln reLotLon to Draft ArtLcle 3 : 
" ThLs ortLcle Ls drafted on the pattern o f ortLcle 3 para -
graphs (o) and (b) of the VLenno Co nventL on" 23 . 
The attempt t o moLn t oLn the s ymmetry bet ween the Draft 
ArtLcLes o n the MFN clau s e and the VLenno Co nventL on o n the Low 
of TreotLes re s ultLng Ln the exclu s Lon of s ubjects of LnternotLono L 
Low other than states from thLer operotLon Ls fundamental to theL r 
relotLonshLp wLth the European Communlty . 
The context Lt hLn whLch MFN clauses may be created vo r Les ; 
the most com~on context Ls that of one state grontLng Lt to anoth er 
state Ln o treaty to whlch both ore portLes - thLs Ls Labelled o 
" bLLoteroL clause ", sLnce two states ore the controctLng po r t Les . 
21 . - Report of the lnternotLonoL Low CommLssLon 1978 p 33 
22 . - LbLd p 28 
23 , - LbLd p 32 
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However, o state may conclude o MFN clause wLth two or more other 
states - such o context Labels Lt as o ' muLtLLoteroL clause', 
the most conspLcuous example beLng ArtLcLe 1 of the GATT 24 . 
In Legal terms, LLttLe turns on the context , bLLoteroL o r muLtL -
LoteroL, Ln whLch the clause LS created; thLS LS recognLsed Ln 
Draft ArtLcLe 17, estobLLshLng the LrreLevonce of the context Ln 
whLch the clause LS created . The unLLoteroL form of the clause 
was excluded from the Draft ArtLcLes because today Lt Ls hardly 
ever em p loyed; theoretLcoLLy, Lt represents o pe rfe ctly voLLd 
f orm of the MFN clause . It does , however , Lock that element of 
formal re cLprocLty that exLsts Ln both bLLoteroL and muLtLLotero L 
clauses whe re MFN treatment Ls accorded to , and by , the portLes 
to the treaty . ThLs recLprocLty hos been descrLbed as ' the 
clause ' s essentLoL LngredLent' 25 . Merely stLpuLotLng the condLt-
LOn of offerLng recLprocLty Ln o unLLoteroL clause costs no 
obLLgotLon on the benefLcLory to grant recLprocoL treatment -
whLch Ls the case unde r bLLoteroL clauses ; foLLure to do so by 
the benefLcLory sLmpLy jeopordLzes the MFN treatment granted to 
Lt by the grontLng state . 
The Most Favoured NotLon clause Ln LnternotLonoL Low : 
ThLs Lntro-
ducto r y perspectLve Ls requLred LnLtLoLLy to understand the prLncL -
pLes governLng on LndLvLduoL clause . As o result of Lts over -
wheLmLng popuLorLty Ln the proctLse of states , the possLbLLLty 
exLsts that today the clause hos been elevated too prLncLpLe of 
LnternotLonoL Low, os opposed to beLng governed by such prLncLpLes . 
On thLs, the SpecLoL Rapporteur endorsed the estobLLshed vLew ; 
the foLLowLng quote Ls proctLcoLLy LLfted out of Schworzenberge r: 
"Although the grant of most favoured notLon treatment Ls 
frequent Ln commercLoL treotLes , there Ls no evLdence that Lt 
hos developed Lnto o rule of customary Low" 26 . 
Thus MFN treatment orLses where Lt hos been expressly agreed 
on ; overwheLmLngLy , thLs agreement Ls enshrLned Ln o treaty con -
cluded between states , though theoretLcoLLy agreement could stLLL 
24 . - The General Agreement on TorLff and Trade , 30th October 1947 
25 . - Yearbook 1976 Vol . 2 Port 2 p 27 per SpecLoL Rapporteur 
26 . - Schworzenberger : lnternotLonoL Low and Order p 138-9 (1971) 
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voLLdLy be concluded orally; LLkewLse "b LndLng resoLutLons of 
LnternotLonoL orgonLsotLons" and "Legally bLndLng unLLoteroL 
acts" 27 could provLde the source of such agreement . The 
prLncLpLe of LnternotLonoL Lo compeLLLng observance of the 
clause when Lt Ls Lncorporoted Ln a tre ~Y Ls that of pocto sunt 
servondo . Because LnternotLonoL Low Lmposes no obLLgotLon 
Lndependently of the agreement of states to grant MFN treatment , 
Draft ArtLcLe 7 merely stated that MFN treatment was bound to 
be accorded where Lt was based on a Legal obLLgotLon . 
The source of the rLght to MFN treatment : 
The typLcoL pattern 
followed Ln the mojorLty of MFN clauses comprLses a promLse on 
the port of the grontLng state to accord the benefLcLory state 
MFN treatment; Lt Ls thLs promLse of MFN treatment that gLves 
the phrase promLsLng Lt the Lobel "most favoured notLon clause" . 
The content of such a promLse Ls shaped by the subsequent octLons 
of the grontLng state to a thLrd party - the most favoured notLon . 
ThLs poses a LogLcoL questLon: where Ls the foundotLon of the 
benefLcLory's rLght to MFN treatment Ln the orLgLnoL treaty , or 
Ln the subsequent octLons or treaty of the grontLng state to the 
most favoured notLon? To thLs questLon, the lnternotLonoL Court of 
JustLce Ln the AngLo-lronLon OLL Company case answered unequLvocoLLy : 
"The treaty contoLnLng the most favoured notLon clause Ls 
the bosLc treaty ... It Ls thLs treaty whLch estobLLshes the jurL-
dLcoL LLnk between the UnLted KLngdom (the benefLcLory state) and 
a thLrd party treaty and confers upon that state the rLghts enjoyed 
by the thLrd party " 28 . 
Clearly thLs VLew Ls now accepted , and LS reflected Ln Draft 
ArtLcle 8('1) . If, however, one accepted the MFN clause as beLng 
on exceptLon to the rule that treotLes only produce effects as 
between the controctLng portLes, as contended by FauchLLLe 29 , 
then one hos to concede the LogLc of the BrLtLsh posLtLon : 
"A most favoured notLon clause Ls Ln essence by Ltself a 
clause WLthout content; Lt Ls a contLngent clause ... It acquLres 
27 . - Yearbook '1976 Vol . I I p 20 
28 . - /CJ Reports '1952 o '109 
29 . - FauchLLLe : TraLte de droLt LnternotLonoL p 359 
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lts content only when the grontor state enters lnto reLotlons 
wlth o thlrd state , and lts content lncreoses whenever fresh 
favour s ore granted to thlrd states " 30 . 
From that onoLysls , lt ls eosler to regard the beneflclory 1 s 
rLghts as beLng founded Ln the treaty or octLons granted to the 
thLrd state . However, such o vlew soon runs lnto dlffLcuLtl es 
where the favour granted to a thlrd party ls not pursuant too 
treaty, o r even on agreement, the orlglnol treaty clearly emerges 
as the bosls of the beneflclory 1 s rLght , ln that the only compet-
lng source ls slmply the fact of the favour hovlng been granted, 
and consequently, not nearly as compeLLlng as a " source " of that 
rlght; ln Lagle , thls may be so ; ln Legal terms , lt ls not . 
Furthermore , boslng the obllgotlon ln the orlglnol treaty con-
forms to the rule s of the Low of treotles concernlng the effect 
of treotles o n states not portLes too portlculor treaty . In 
concluslon, Slr Ge rold Fltzmaurlce 1 s descrLptlon of the relotlon-
shLp appears opt : 
11 If the Lotter treaty con be compared to the hands of o clock 
that polnt to the partlcular hou r, Lt ls the eorller treaty whlch 
constLtutes the mechanlsm that moves the hands around " 31 . 
Legal Natu re of a Most Favoured Notlon clause : 
The lnternotLonoL 
Low Commlsslon completed lts codlflcatlon of the rules relotlng 
to MFN clauses ln 1978 . The draft rules produced hlghllghted the 
Legal prlncLpLes governlng thelr operotlon once an MFN clause 
has been concluded . The apparent slmpLlclty behlnd the ldea of 
an MFN clause conceals lt pecuLlar Legal structure . Te bosls 
of thls pecuUorlty stems from the fact that the content of the 
treaty ls totally dependent on the treatment that the grontlng 
state accords o non party l . e . the thlrd state . 
Rapporteur polnted out : 
As the SpecloL 
" The effect of the MFN process ls by means of the provlslo ns 
of one treaty co attract those of another" 32 . 
Reference to that treDty ltseLf may prove probLemotlcoL; lts 
30 . - ICJ Reports 1952 p 533 
31 . - " Law and Procedure of the !CJ" 1951 - 4 ; BYIL . 32 . 88 
32 . - Yearbook 1976 VoL 11 p 32 :·. Thls expLanotlon of the MFN process 
ma~ be o LL tLe mLsLeadlnq; lt ls fundamental to the nature 
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translated Lmpoct on the treaty determLnLng the corpus of that 
treaty Ls even more complex . It Ls thLs aspect of the clause to 
whLch we now turn . 
Scope of o most favoured notLon clause: 
ObvLously the substontLol 
contents of o MFN clause ore LndLvLduolly dLstLnct , Ln thLs respect 
the LndLvLduolLty of the clauses Ls domLnont. Nevertheless, 
certoLn generolLzotLons about the operotLon of Lts substontLol 
13 . - Contd : of on MFN clause that Lt Ls the fact of o favour beLng 
granted too thLrd state (provLded, of course, Lt be ejusdem generLs 
to the subject matter of the MFN treaty) that confers on the 
benefLcLory state the rLght to that favour - unless the MFN treaty 
Ls expressly LLmLted to favours granted too thLrd state 
orLgLnotLng from o treaty . As the SpecLol Rapporteur exploLned 
Ln relotLon to Draft ArtLcle 5 defLnLng "Most Favoured NotLon 
treatment" : 
" It Ls not necessary for the begLnnLng of the operotLon of 
the clause that the treatment actually extended too thLrd state ... 
be based on o formal treaty or agreement . The mere fact of 
favourable treatment Ls enough to set Ln motLon the oper tLon 
of the c louse . " Report of the I LC 1978 p 45 . 
The SpecLol Rapporteur subsequently commented on thLs poLnt 
Ln relotLon to Draft ArtLcle 8: 
"Lf there LS no treaty or other agreement between the 
grontLng State and the thLrd state , the rule stated Ln the 
ortLcle LS even more evLdent . The root of the rLght of the bene-
fLCLory state LS obvLously the treaty contoLnLng the clause . 
The extent of the favour s to whLch the benefLcLor~ of that clause 
may Loy cloLm wLll be determLned by the oct11nl fovours extended 
by the grontLng state to the thLrd state . " f?eport of the I LC 
1978 p 55 (emphosLs mLne) 
Clearly therefore, the comment beLng dLscussed LS only 
accurate where the favours granted to the thLrd state ore pursuant 
too treaty - and even Ln thLs context, Lt Ls the fact of o favour 
actually beLng granted that octLvotes the MFN treaty . 
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aspects ore volLd , and Lndeed , form the corpus of the prLncLples 
gove r nLng MFN clauses . ThLs does not hLde , however , the sLmpl e 
fact that these generolLzotLons do operate on the frLnges o f the 
clause; the core of Lt Ls created by the LndLvLduol cont r octLng 
portLes . 
It hos already been poLnted out that Lt Ls the promLse of 
MFN treatment accorded to one state by another state that gLves 
the benefLcLory hLs rLght to MFN treatment . (The subsequent 
act Lons of the grontLng state gLve vLtolLty to the MFN clause) . 
The MFN clause wLll descrLbe the benefLcLory of the promLse -
eLther the benefLcLory state , or persons or thLngs Ln a deter -
mLned relotLonshLp wLth Lt . Here ogoLn, the wLll of the controct -
Lng portLes Ls domLnont ; the MFN clause Ls always created , despLte 
the Lnhe r ent generolLty of the concept , Ln relotLon to a portLc -
ulo r fLeld - for example , shLppLng , commerce or estoblLshment . 
The scope of the p r omLse mode however Ls one aspect of the MFN 
c l ause whose unLversolly accepted delLmLtotLon Ls o product of 
the jurLsprudence of LnternotLonol trLbunols, notLonol courts 
and dLplomotLc proctLse . 33 . ThLs defLnLtLon Ls the " ejusdem 
gene r Ls " rule . The essence of the rule Ln relotLon to MFN clauses 
Ls that the promLse Lnvolved " con only operate Ln regard to the 
subject matter whLch the two states hod Ln mLnd when they Lnserted 
the clause Ln theLr treaty" 34 . 
The CommLssLon of ArbLtrotLon Ln the "AmbotLelos Cose" 35 , 
recognLsed thLs rule as the prLncLple governLng MFN clauses : 
"The commLssLon holds that the most favoured notLon clause 
con only attract matters belongLng to the some category of subject 
as that to whLch the clause Ltself relates" 36 . 
The SpecLol Rapporteur moLntoLned the opplLcobLlLty of thLs 
rule to all MFN clauses - commercLol or otherwLse : 
" Unless thLs process Ls strLctly confLned to coses where 
there Ls a substontLol LdentLty between the subject matter of the 
two sets of clauses concerned , the result Ln a number of coses may 
be to Lmpose upon the grontLng state oblLgotLons Lt never contemp -
.loted " 37 . 
33 . - Yearbook '1976 Vol . 11 Port 11 p 29 
34 . - A. D. McNoLr "The Low of TreotLes " p 287 
35 . - ICJ Reports '1953 p '10 
36 . - UN Reports of lnternotLonol Arbl..tral Awards Vol . XII p '1 0 7 37 . - Yearbook '1976 Vol . 11 p 32 
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As reflected Ln Draft ArtLcles 9 and 10, the ejusdem 
generLs rule pervades the LnterpretotLon of any MFN clause. 
Its most sLgnLfLcont results ore : 
- The restrLctLon of any rLght able to be cloLmed by the 
benefLcLory state to " those rLghts follLng wLthLn the scope 
of the subject matter of the clause" - Draft ArtLcle 9 . 
- The restrLctLon of persons or thLngs able to cloLm such o 
rLght to those specLfLed or LmplLed from the subject matter 
o f the clause . 
ThLs governs what rLghts may be cloLmed, and who these 
rLghts may be cloLmed by . The Lnfluence of thLs rule goes 
beyond thLs however . It dLctotes the actual rLghts the 
benefLcLory Ls entLtled to , and ogoLn, who actually Ls entLtled 
to cloLm them , sLnce Lt Ls only the rLghts and favours granted 
to the most favoured notLon by the grontLng state hovLng o 
substontLol LdentLty wLth those stLpuloted Ln the MFN clause that 
may be cloLmed by the benefLcLory state . Hence , Ln commercLol 
MFN clauses , the complex questLon of 'lLke products ' developed , 
representLng perhaps the most obvLous monLfestotLon of thLs rule . 
The SpecLol Rapporteur reduced the potentLolly unlLmLted complex -
Lty Lnherent Ln thLs comporLson to the sLmple explonotLon : 
" If the most favoured notLon clause promLses most favoured 
notLon treatment solely for fLsh , such treatment connot be cloLmed 
under the some clause for meat" 38 . 
However , the opplLcotLon of the eju s dem generLs rule hos Lts 
lLmLtotLons; despLte Lts LnsLstence on lLmLtLng the scope of the 
clause to sLtuotLons where o suffLcLency of LdentLty between the 
rLghts, persons or thLngs contemplated Ln the MF clause and the 
treatment accorded to the thLrd party, such LdentLty Ls not re-
quLred when comporLng the "prLce" poLd , Lf any, by the thLrd state 
to secure that treatment that the benefLcLory hos cloLmed for Lt -
self . ThLs , at any rote , Ls Ln the opLni.,on of the Sped .. ol 
Rapporteur , the conclusLon of modern thLnkLng on the i.,ssue ; thi.,s 
vLew Ls c odLfLed Ln Draft ArtLcle 15 whLch states that the bene -
fLci.,ory state Ls not affected by the questLon of whether the 
38 . - LbLd 
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treatment accorded by the grontlng state to a thlrd state hos 
be e n extended ogolnst compensotlon " 39 . Thls opplles to al l 
uncondltlonol MFN clauses , as well as to MFN clauses sllent on 
the subject of condltlons; the questlon does not orlse ln r ega r d 
to clousesexpress l y stlpuloted to be subject to a condltlo n of 
compensotlon . 
Llkewlse , the MFN clause operates Lndependently of any 
rest r lctlons agreed upon by the grontlng state and the thlrd 
pa r ty state ; desplte the populorlty and Llmlted recognltlon 
glve n to " clauses reservees ", whlch controdlcts thls prlnclple , 
the Lagle of more compelllng Legal prlnclple, namely the gene r al 
r ule r ego r dlng thlrd states of the Vlenno Conventlon (Artlcles 
34- 35) and the fact that the Legal source of MFN treatment ls the 
orlglnol MFN clause, force the concluslon that the MFN clause 
operates lndependently of certolnly any subsequent, and probably 
p r ecedent , r estrlctlon ag r eed upon by the grontlng state and a 
thl r d state . 
The dlffe r ent types of most favoured notlon clauses : 
Conslderlng 
the va, -Letv of MFN clauses that'. do exlst , Lt ls remarkable how 
slmllor ln fact thelr structure remolns - moklng Lt posslble to 
develop Legal prlnclples governlng the lnterpretotlon of thls 
structu r e . The slmllorlty between the clause extends even to the 
actual words employed . The dlvlslons that do exlst ore brood , and 
hence folrly eoslly recognlsoble . The MFN clause , though ln lt -
self a slngle Ldeo, ln fact con be bro en down lnto a varlety of 
subspecles . They ore : 
(a) The " condltlonol" MFN clause : 
Thls slngle descrlptlon ls lt -
self sllghtly deceptlve slnce a vorlety of condltlonol clauses 
exlst . They ore : 
- The "Amerlcon " condltlonol clause, called thls because of that 
state ' s unquollfled devotlon to lts prlnclples untll 1923 . The 
.essence of such a clause was that the grontlng state , afte r a MFN 
39 . - Report of the ILC p 90 - Draft Artlcle 15 
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treaty hod been concluded , stLLL was not requLred to treat 
the benefLcLory state equally wLth the most favoured notLon 
t L L L t ha t b e n e f L c La r y s ta t e g r o n t e d " c o n c e s s Lo n s 1e q u L v a Le n t ' 
to the cori.cessLons mode by such thLrd party " 40 . At the heart 
of thLs LnterpretotLon Loy the Anglosaxon concept of consLde r-
otLon, resultLng Ln the vLew of on uncondLtLonol clause as 
" gLvLng somethLng away for nothLng". The hallmark of such a 
clause was the standard Lnserted freely, Lf the concessLon was 
"freely mode or on ollowLng the some compensotLon or the 
equLvolent Lf the concessLon was condLtLonol" 41 . Even Lf the 
treaty was sLLent on the questLon of condLtLons the UnLted States 
untLL 1923 construed a treaty as condLtLonol . Draft ArtLcle 11 
now provLdes that unless on MFN clause Ls mode subject to a 
" condLtLon of compensotLon " a term defLned Ln ArtLcle 2, the 
clause wLLL be Lnterpreted uncondLtLonolly . ThLs then creates 
a p re sumptLon of uncondLtLonoLLty Ln the absence of condLtLons 
stLpuloted Ln the MFN treaty or outsLde Lt . 
Draft ArtLcles 12 and 13 ore both concerned wLth condLtLonol 
MFN clauses . Draft ArtLcle 12 estobLLshes the general rule: 
" If a most favoured notLon clause Ls mode subject to a 
condLtLon of compensotLon , the benefLcLory state ocquLres the 
rLght to most favoured notLon treatment only upon occordLng the 
agreed compensotLon to the grontLng state" 42. 
QuLte clearly, the condLtLon stLpuloted Ls not necessorLLy 
Lncorporoted Ln the MFN treaty; all that Ls requLred Ls that Lt 
be agreed upon by the grontLng and benefLcLory states. The 
SpecLol Rapporteur exploLned : 
"Such ... condLtLons hove to be Lnserted Ln the clause, or Ln 
the treaty contoLnLng Lt , or be otherwLse agreed between the gront -
Lng and the benefLcLory states" 43. 
The portLculor condLt[ons ~hLch the benefLcLory may be subject -
ed to may be quLte Lncepe ~dent of the favoured treatment envLsoged 
wLthLn the MFN treaty, such as economLc advantages ( a Long term 
Loon for example) or poLLtLcol advantages . Draft ArtLcle 13 
deals wLth MFN treotLes stLpulotLng a specLfLc type of compensotLon , 
40 . - Report of the I LC 1978 p 73 quotLng UnLted States of AmerLco 
Deportment of State BulletLn 58 1940 
41 . - LbLd p 72 quotLng Treaty between USA - Fronce - W.M. Molloy 
TreotLes ConventLons 
- Report of the ILC 1978 p 72 
- LbLd p 82 
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that of "r ecLp r ocol treatment "; the benefLcLory state Ls only 
e nt Lt le d to MFN t re atment f r om the g r ontLng state once Lt hos 
a cc o r d e d to that g r ontLng state the some or equLvolent treat -
ment g r a n t e d by the grontLng state to the thLrd state . CondLt -
Lono l c la us e s subj e ct to recLprocol treatment ore LnvorLobly 
emp l oy e d Ln relotLo n to consular rLghts and prLvLLeges , prLvote 
Lnt ernotLo no l Low and estobLLshment matters . The SpecLol 
Rappo r t eur e xp l oL ned why thLs type of condLtLonol clause was 
s Ln g le d out fo r LndLvLduol treatment : 
"The Co mmLssLon deemed Lt opproprLote to provLde separately 
fo r t h Ls typ e of condLtLon Ln vLew of Lts beLng the most commonly 
fo un d a mo ng t he possLble condLtLons of compensotLon . The rule of 
o r t Lcle 1 3 Ls o n oppLLcotLon of the general rule contoLned Ln 
o r t Lcle 1 2 to the specLfLc case of most favoured notLon clauses 
subj ec t to the condLtLon of recLprocol treatment " 44 . 
Thus Dr aft ArtLc l e 12 estobLLshes the general rule oppLLc -
oble to all MFN t r eotLes subject to any condLtLon of compensotLon , 
wh LLe Dr aft Ar tLc l e 13 deals specLfLcolly wLth those subject to the 
c ond LtLo ns of r ecLprocol treatment . 
(b) th e un condLtLonol clause : 
of the c l ause today . 
ThLs represents the domLnont fo r m 
Draft ArtLcle 11 provLdes : 
" If a most favou r ed notLon clause Ls not mode subject to a 
condLtLon of compensotLon , the benefLcLory state ocquLres the 
r Lght to most favoured notLon treatment wLthout the obLLgotLon 
to accord any compensotLon to the grontLng state" 45 . 
Thus the uncondLtLonol clau s e Ls created Ln the absence of 
a condLtLon of compensotLon , a term defLned Ln ArtLcle 2 as "a 
condLtLon provLdLng for compensotLon of any kLnd agreed between 
the grontLng state and the benefLcLary state , Ln a treaty contoLn -
Lng a most favoured not Lon clause or otherwLse " 46 . It Ls Lnter -
estLng that the prevLous Draft ArtLcle estobLLshLng uncondLtLonol 
clauses Ln 1976 was more dLrectl~ concerned to stLpulote expressly 
the p r esumptLon of uncondLtLonoLLty orLsLng Ln the absence of 
ag r eed condLtLons . Draft ArtLcle 8 provLded : 
44 . - LbLd p 87 
45 . - LbLd p 72 
46 . - LbLd p 29 
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"A most favoured natLonaL clause Ln a treaty Ls uncondLtLonaL 
unless that treaty otherwLse provLdes o r the partLes otherwLse 
agree" 47 . 
In contrast, the presumptLon created by Draft ArtLcLe 11 Ls 
much more LndLrect. 
Whereas the condLtLonaL form of the clause sets up fuLfLLment 
of the condLtLons stLpu Lated as the vehLcLe of MFN treatment , an 
uncondLtLonaL clause Ltself operates as the vehLcLe of such 
favoured treatment . The f oLLowLng desc r LptLon of the Latter's 
op eratLon conveys well the LmmedLate effect produced upon the 
concLusLon o f an MFN treaty Ln the commercLaL context . 
"T he unc ondLtLonaL form of the MFN clause provLdes that any 
advantage, fa vou r, prLvLLege o r LmmunLty whLch one of the partLes 
may accord to the goods of any thLrd country shall be extended 
LmmedLateLy and uncondLtLonoLLy to the LLke goods orLgLnatLng Ln 
the country of the other party " 48 . 
A sLg nLfL cont dLfference between the condLtLonoL and uncondLt -
LonaL clauses arLses Ln reLatLon to when the rLght of the bene-
fLcLa r y state to MFN t re atment commences ; under the uncondLtLonaL 
form of the clause, the benefLcLary ' s rLght to MFN treatment comes 
to maturLty LmmedLateLy the grontLng state accords a relevant 
favour on a thL r d state ; Ln reLotLon to a condLtLonaL clause 
sub j e c t to a co n·d Lt Lon of comp en sat Lon o r re c L p r o c a L t re a t men t , 
the rLgh t of the benefLcLary state to MFN treatment orLses at the 
moment when the relevant treatment Ls extended by the grantLng 
state to a thLrd state or to persons or thLngs Ln the same reLatLon-
shLp wLth that thLrd state (as wLth on uncondLtLonaL clause) but 
subject to the oddLtLonaL test of when " the agreed compensatLon Ls 
accorded by the benefLcLory state to the grontLng state" 49 or 
"the agreed recLprocaL treatment Ls accorded by the benefLcLory 
state to the grantLng state " 50 respectLveLy . ThLs Ls the regLme 
estabLLshed under Draft ArtLcLe 20 ~ AgaLn Lt may be contrasted 
wLth Draft ArtLcLe 18 of the 1976 Draft ArtLcLes whLch set up the 
communLcotLon by the benefLcLory state to the grontLng state of the 
farmer's consent to accord " materLaL recLprocLty" as the cr Lte rLon 
47 . - Yearbook of the I LC Vol . 2 Port 2 p 22 
48 . - supra , footnote 40 
49 . - Report of the ILC 1978 p 122 
50 . - Lb Ld 
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on whLch the benefLcLary's rLght to MFN treatment was to be 
determLned as havLng arLsen. 
TermLnatLon or SuspensLon of Most Favoured NatLon Treatment: 
Draft ArtLcLe 21 estabLLshes 3 rules reguLatLng the termLnatLon 
or suspensLon of rLghts enjoyed by the benefLcLary under a MFN 
clause. Paragraph 1 stLpuLates the general and obvLous rule that 
the rLght of the benefLcLary state to most favoured natLon treat-
ment Ls termLnated or suspended Lf the grantLng state termLnates 
or suspends the relevant treatment to the thLrd state . ThLs 
rule appLLes to condLtLonaL and uncondLtLonaL MFN clauses; the 
former however, may Ln addLtLon be termLnated Ln the manner pre-
sc rLbed Ln paragraphs 2 and 3. Paragraph 2 stLpuLates that a 
MFN clause subject to a condLtLon of compensatLon may be "equally 
termLnated or suspended at the moment of termLnatLon or suspensLon 
by the benefLcLary state of the agreed compensotLon". A MFN 
clause subject to the condLtLon of "recLprocoL treatment" Ls 
"equally termLnoted or suspended at the moment of termLnotLon or 
suspensLon by the benefLcLory state of the agreed recLprocaL 
treatment" 52. 
A possLbLe problem may orLse Ln reLatLon to the crLterLon 
estobLLshed under paragraphs 2 and 3 "at the moment of termLnotLon .. 
of the agreed compensotLon" and " at the moment of termLnotLon ... 
of the agreed recLprocoL treatment" respectLveLy. When, precLseLy , 
Ls that moment? When the benefLcLory state termLnotes compLLance 
wLth the condtLon> or when such termLnotLon Ls communLcoted to the 
grantLng state? The words employed Ln each Lnstonce suggest that 
the former tLme Ls envLsoged "at the moment of termLnotLon" . The 
commentary to these Draft ArtLcLes on the other hand LndLcate~ that 
the Lotter tLme Ls envLsaged by the use of these words : 
"Ln such coses the rLght of the benefLcLory state ... wLLL also 
be termLnoted ... at the tLme when the benefLcLory state wLthdrows 
Lts consent to accord the agreed compensotLon or recLprocoL agree-
ment" 53. 
51 . - Report to the ILC 1978 p 129 
52. - LbLd 
53. - LbLd p 133 
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Such an LnterpretatLon Ls Ln fact consLstent wLth the 
1976 Draft ArtLcles whLch expressly stLpulated Ln Draft ArtLcle 
18(2) communLcatLon to the grantLng state by the benefLcLary of 
the Latter's wLthdrawaL of consent to comply wLth the condLtLon 
as the tLme when the benefLcLary 1 s rLght to MFN treatment was 
termLnated . 
• • • 
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ExceptLons to the OperotLon of the Most Favoured NotLon clause : 
The hLstorLcoL LntroductLon to the development of the MFN clause 
concentrated excluslvely on lts posltlve development - Lts evoLv -
Lng st r ucture due to Lncreo slng popuLorLty and oppLLcotLon . The 
pLctu re LS Lncomplete, however, Ln that Lt takes no account of 
the negotLve consequences of such o development - the emergence 
and estoblLshment of exceptLons to the operotLon of the MFN clause . 
The sLgnLfLconce of these ' exceptLons ' cannot be underestLmoted; 
normally one could assume that the exLstence of exceptLons , by 
theLr ve r y nature, would Leave the general rule Lntoct . ThLs LS 
not necessorLLy the case here . Undoubtedly , the exceptLons to 
the MFN rule form as much on Lntegrol port of Lts uLtLmote defLnL -
tLon as Lts posLtLve statement . ConsLderLng the apparent SLmplLcLty 
and generolLty of the posLtLve MFN rule , Lt LS perhaps not surprLs-
Lng that o number of exceptLons should exLst , restrLctLng, or 
LendLng precLSLon to the oppLLcotLon of the bosLc rule . The 
SLg nLfLconce of the present exceptLons goes beyond thLs howev~r , 
and appears to threaten the survLvoL of the rule Lt self . It LS 
proposed to concentrate chLefly on the ' customs unLon' exceptLon -
because Lt LS at present the most Lmportont, and because Lts 
operotLon , Lt LS soLd , threatens to empty the MFN prLncLple of 
any meonLngfuL purpose. It LS precLsely because of thLs possLbLLLty 
that on LnquLry Lnto the exceptLons to the MFN prLncLple takes on 
added sLgnLfLconce - Lndeed, o wLdely held VLew moLntoLns that the 
MFN prLnCLple survLves today only Ln the opplLCOtLon of the except-
Lon to Lt . 
Though thLs paper wLll concentrate moLnly on the customs unLon 
exceptLon, Ln the Lnterests of completeness, and portly ln order 
to put the customs unLon exceptLon Ln perspectlve , the other 
'r ecognLsed ' exceptLons WLll be summorlsed . 
From the outset, the SpecLol Ropportuer LdentLfLed the foLlow -
Lng possLble exceptLons : 
11 
( L) Customs Un Lons 
(LL) FrontLer TroffLc 
• • • 
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( L L L) 
(Lv) 
Interests of deveLopLng natLons 
Interests of pubLLc poLLcy and securLty
 of the 
cont r actLng partLes 
(v) Other exceptLons " '1 . 
The SpecLaL Rapporteur ' s "hunch" proved
 a LLttLe premature 
however ; the fLn~L shape of the Draft 
ArtLcLes on exceptLons 
dLff ered sLgnLfLcantLy from the fLeLds 
orLgLnaLLy conceLved as 
poss LbLe exceptLons Ln 1968 . The rath
er Loud sLLence of these 
Draft ArtLcLes on the customs unLon ex
ceptLon Ls perhaps the 
most conspLcuous departure from the fL
eLds orLgLnaLLy conceLved . 
Thos e fLnaLLy adopted were : 
Dr aft ArtLcLe 25 : 
ThLs estabLLshes the so called "frontL
er traffLc " exceptLon ; 
the essence of thLs rule Ls that a ben
efLcLary state may not cLaLm , 
pursuant to a MFN treaty, from the gran
tLng state the advantages 
that grantLng state accords to a " contL
guous thLrd state Ln order 
to facLLLtate frontLer traffLc" 2 . 
In fact Lt may be doubted whether thLs 
represents a true 
exceptLon at aLL; as the SpecLaL Rappo
rteur expLaLned : 
" It seems to be founded on the basLc p
hLLosophy of the most 
favoured natLon clause and notably on 
the ejusdem generLs rule ... 
It seems evLdent that a benefLcLary sta
te whLch has no common 
frontLer wLth the grantLng state Ls no
t Ln a posLtLon to cLaLm 
the same treatment for Lts natLoncls wh
Lch the grantLng state 
extends Ln respect of those natLons of 
the contLguous thLrd state 
who are resLdents of the frontLer zone"
 3 . 
Thus, to the extent that favours grante
d by the grantLng 
state to a thLrd state are not beLng ex
tended to the benefLcLary 
state, thLs represents an exceptLon to 
the general rule; however, 
the fact that such rLghts are not exten
ded stems from the LLmL-
tatLons Lnherent Ln the MFN prLncLpLe 
LtseLf (L . e . the ejusdem 
g e n e r Ls r·u Le ) r a t h e r t ha n s t em m L n g f r o m
 rep ea t e d ex c Lu s Lon of 
such rLghts Ln the practLc e of states . 
We shall deal subsequently 
wLth exceptLons to the ruL • whose excep
tLonaLLty cannot be traced 
back to wLthLn the prLncLpLe LtseLf . 
1 . - Yearbook '1968 Vol . I I p 169 - 70 
2 . - Report of the ILC '1978 p 16 
3 . - Lb Ld p 165 
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Dr aft ArtLcle 26 : 
ThLs ortLcle estobLLshes the LnobLLLty of a coastal
 state 
benefLcLory of a MFN clause to cloLm for Ltself the
 some advant -
ages accorded by a grontLng state to a thLrd Landlo
cked state . 
The sou r ce of thLs exceptLon LLes Ln " the fundament
al rLght of 
a Landlocked state to free access to the sea " 4 . I
n fact the 
Spec Lol Rapporteur expressly refroLned from mokLng t
he bosLs of 
thLs exceptLon on the " rLghts and focLLLtLes whLch 
ore needed 
by Landlocked states or whLch ore due to them under
 general 
Lnte r notLonol Low " 5 . Instead he cLted the general
 recognLtLon 
that such rLghts could not be cloLmed under a MFN c
lause . ThLs 
affords on example of how on exceptLon Ls Lnvoked, 
and recognLsed 
Ln pursuance of securLng the LegLtLmote Lnterests o
f states Ln 
a dLsodvontogeous posLtLon, and one cannot help but
 feel that 
on element of "progressLve " codLfLcotLon exLsted Ln
 the LnclusLon 
of thLs exceptLon -
" The odoptLon of the rule wLLL focLLLtote the extens
Lon of 
free access rLghts to those countrLes" 6 . 
Clearly then thLs exceptLon may be contrasted wLth 
the 
frontLer troffLc exceptLon . The Lotter stems dLr
ectly from the 
MFN clause Ltself and Lts structure , whereas the fo
rmer seeks 
Lts justLfLcotLon Ln the overall relotLonshLp betwe
en the oper-
otLon of the MFN clause and LnternotLonol Low; one 
could hardly 
argue that Lt followed LogLcolly from the ejusdem g
enerLs rule , 
or any LngredLent of the MFN rule for that matter . 
A more blatant example of thLs Lotter type of excep
tLon Ls 
that relotLng to developLng notLons; Draft ArtLcle 
23 states : 7 
"A benefLcLory state Ls not entLtled under a most fa
voured 
notLon clause to treatment extended by developed gr
ontLng state 
to a developLng thLrd state on a non recLprocol bos
Ls wLthLn a 
scheme of generoLLsed preferences estobLLshed by th
at grontLng 
state ... " 
The rotLonole und erlyLng thLs exceptLon Ls precLsel
y the 
opposLte from that of the " frontLer troffLc " exceptL
on; the 
Lotter exLsts because of the MFN prLncLple - the eju
sdem generLs 
4 . - Yearbook 1976 Vol . I I Port I I - proposal by Cz
echoslovokLo 
5 . - Lb Ld 
6 . - Report of the ILC 1978 p 168 
7 . - Lb Ld p 138 
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rule LogLcolly dLctotes such a LLmLtotLon flowLng n
aturally 
from the prLncLple Ltself. The developLng notLons ex
ceptLon , 
on the other hand, Ls erected precLsely to LLmLt th
e natural 
operotLo n of the MFN prLncLple . LLkewLse, Lts exLs
tence owes 
noth Lng to any estobLLshed prLncLple of LnternotLono
l Low; thLs 
could not be otherwLse , sLnce no prLncLple of Lnter
notLonol Low 
ex Lsts , apart from wLdespreod sympathy stLpulotLng an
y rLghts 
fo r de ve l opLng notLons . As the SpecLol Rapporteur co
mmented : 
"WhLLe all these developments show that there mLght
 be a 
tendency among states to promote the trade of develo
pLng count -
rLes ... the conclusLon of the CommLssLon was that th
Ls tendency 
was not yet crystoLLLzed suffLcLently to permLt Lt 
to be 
embodLed Ln a clear Legal rule whLch could fLnd Lts 
place among 
the general rule s on the functLonLng and oppLLcotLo
n of the most 
favou r ed notLon clause " 8 . 
I ts LnclusLon Ls prLmorLLy a product of the concLusL
on that 
some consequences of the untompered operotLon of th
e MFN clause 
ore unacceptable. 
"T o apply the most favoured notLon clause to all co
untrLes 
regardless of theLr Level of development would sotL
sfy the 
condLtLons of formal equoLLty , but would Ln fact Ln
volve LmpLLcLt 
dLsc rLmLnotLon ogoLnst the weaker members of the Ln
ternotLonol 
communLty ... The recognLtLon of the trade and develop
ment needs of 
developLng countrLes requLres that for a certoLn perL
od of tLme , 
the most favoured notLon clause wLLL not apply to c
ertoLn types 
of LnternotLonol trade relotLons " 9 . 
The possLble development of rules of LnternotLonol 
Low Ln 
favour of developLng notLons was focLLLtoted as muc
h as possLble 
Ln Draft ArtLcle 30. 
"The present ArtLcles ore wLthcut prejudLce to the 
estobLLsh -
ment of new rules of LnternotLonol Low Ln favour of
 developLng 
notLons " '10 . 
LLke Draft ArtLcle 26 , the "developLng notLons excep
tLon Ls 
justLfLed not by reference to any prLncLple of Lnte
rnotLonol Low 
(because none at present hos emerged) and certoLnly 
not by refer-
8 . - Report of the ILC '1978 p '176 
9 . - LbLd p '138 quotLng SecretorLot of UNCTAD 
'10.- Report of the ILC p '173 
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ence to the LLmLtotLons Lnherent Ln the clause Ltse
lf, but 
rather Ln the general agreement ... that states wLLL 
refroLn 
from LnvokLng theLr rLghts to most favoured notLon 
treatment" 11 1 
such agreement beLng expressed Ln the UnLted NotLons
 organs, 
an d the agreement by the ControctLng PortLes to GAT
T to woLve 
theLr rLghts to MFN treatment where the advantages 
Lnvolved ore 
granted to a deveLopLng notLon . Tht..s "general agre
ement", 
though not a rule of customary Low, Ls okLn to the 
general 
recognLtLon of "the LegLtLmote Lnterest of Landlock
ed stotes"12 ; 
both ore examples of the lnternotLonoL Low CommLssL
on fLxLng on 
a degree of consensus reLotLng to a certoLn fLeLd (
not Lntense 
enough to represent a rule of customary Low), and, 
performLng 
Lt functLon of "progressLve development", tokLng th
at consensus 
and estobLLshLng a rule based on Lt. 
The Customs UnLon ExceptLon: 
Purely Ln terms of economLc con-
sequence , the customs unLon Lssue represents the m
ost Lmportont 
exceptLon . Its Lmportonce stems portly from the fL
eLd Lt oper-
ates excLusLveLy Ln - that of commercLoL MFN clause
s, trodLtLon-
oLLy regarded as the most Lmportont domoLn Ln whLch
 the MFN 
prLncLple operates . The Lssue domLnotes the commer
cLoL sphere 
of the MFN clause for the sLmpLe reason that Lts do
mLnotLon of 
world trade threatens to empty the operotLon of the
 prLncLpLe 
Ltself of any meonLng . CertoLnLy today the Lmp o rton
ce of the 
customs unLon exceptLon may be opprecLoted by the f
act that Lt 
Ls dLffLcuLt, Ln matter s of c ommerce, to dL s cu s s the
 operotLon 
of the MFN prLncLpLe wLthout s ome reference to thL s 
alleged 
exceptLon . In LLght of the pervosLve tendency of th
e world to 
oLLgn Ltself Ln economLc matters Lnto regLonoL bloc
s, the rele7 
vonce of the customs unLon exceptLons takes on unpr
ecedented 
sLgnLfLconce; there Ls LLttLe meonLng Left to the M
FN prLncLpLe 
Ln commercLoL matters Lf Ln reoLLty the bulk of the 
world's trade 
Ls conducted on the prLncLpLe of on exceptLon to th
at prLncLpLe -
the customs unLon . Indeed today strong grounds ex
Lst for cLoLm-
11 . - LbLd at p 153 
12 . - LbLd at p 168 
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Lng that the exceptLon has become the rule; thLs tendency 
to 
form customs unLons had been dLscerned as far back as 1963
 when 
K.W . Dam commented: 
" The Last dozen years have seen a proLLferatLon of custom
s 
unLons and free trade areas of unforeseen proportLons 13 . 
True Ln 1963 , thLs trend has, Lf anythLng, LntensLfLed Ln 
the 1970's . In part thLs LncreasLng customs unLonLzatLon 
of the 
world ' s trade Ls due to the Lmpact of the European Commun
LtLes, 
estabLLshed Ln 1957 . The Lmpact of thLs customs unLon on 
the 
world's trade stems from the sLmpLe fact that Lt Ls the L
argest 
tradLng bloc Ln the world; partly Ln retaLLatLon, and par
tly Ln 
emuLatLon of the European CommunLtLes, other formerly Lnd
ependent 
tradLng natLons formed themselves Lnto Large tradLng unLt
s to 
an unprecedented degree . 
In thLs part of the paper , Lt Ls proposed to Look Lnto the
 
general nature of the customs unLon exceptLon LncLudLng th
e ILC ' s 
vLews on Lt . The reLatLonshLp between thLs customs unLon 
except-
Lon and Lts appLLcatLon to the European CommunLtLes wLLL 
then be 
examLned; thLs wLLL Lnvolve an LnquLry Lnto the nature of 
the 
European CommunLtLes Ltself . 
The customs. un Lon : 
It Ls Lmportant, as a preLLmLnary, to under-
stand what Ls meant by a customs unLon . It Ls not propose
d to 
get Lnvolved Ln the economLc aspects of the customs unLon 
Ln 
depth, because thLs aspect Ls outsLde the o rbLt of thLs p
aper. 
The paper wLLL only deal wLth the economLc aspects of the 
customs 
unLon as they arLse Ln pursuLt of the Legal aspects. 
A dLscussLon of the customs unLon exceptLon must, Ln Lts 
LnLtLaL stages, confront the bosLc questLon; what Ls a cus
toms 
unLon? Partly os o result o f the customs unLon rage Ln th
e 
1950's and 1960's, dLscussLons on the subject by economLs
ts 
came Lnto vogue, resuLtLng Ln o proLLfLc amount of LLtero
ture 
on the subject . ThLs paper wLLL LLmLt Lts LnvoLvemnt Ln t
hLs 
fLeLd to the extent needed to gLve the reader on LndLcatLo
n , 
13 . - UnLversLty of ChLcogo Law RevLew 1963 Vol . 30 p 615 
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aLbeLt rough and ready , of what o customs unLon bos
LcoLLy Ls . 
DefLnLtLons: 
In contrast to the vorLety of opLnLon surroundLng 
customs unLons generoLLy, o happy degree of consens
us exLsts as 
to what they ore, though obvLousLy the LeodLng defL
nLtLons vary 
somewhat occordLng to the context Ln whLch they ore
 Lnvoked . 
ConsLderLng the domLnonce of the economLc element L
n thLs sub -
ject , Lt appears opproprLote to defer LnLtLoLLy to 
the economLc 
defLnLtLon of o customs unLon , the cLossLcoL exampl
e of whLch 
Ls usuoLLy accepted to be that of VLner ' s Ln 1950: 
" It hos generoLLy been agreed that o perfect custom
s unLon 
must meet the foLLowLng condLtLons : 
:I 
(1) The complete eLLmLnotLon of troffLs as between 
the 
member terrLtorLes 
(2) The estobLLshment of o unLform torLff on Lmpor
ts from 
outsLde the unLon 
(3) ApportLonment of customs revenue between the m
embers 
Ln accordance wLth on agreed formula" 14 . 
Count Covour ' s defLnLtLon Ln 1857 LnsLsts on the fu
sLon 
of the torLff Lnterests of two or more states; other
wLse what 
Ls Left Ls sLmpLy another commercLoL treaty . Covou
r specLfLed 
4 prerequLsLtes whLch a customs unLon must sotLsfy :
 15 
(o) unLformLty of export and tronsLt torLffs 
(b) free exchange of the products of the unLted co
untrLes 
(c) pooLLng of customs revenue and theLr shorLng o
ut among 
member states of the unLon 
(d) unLformLty of the external Lmport torLffs of th
e member 
countrLes and suppressLon of on LnternoL torLff LLn
e. 
R. G. LLpsey approaches the subject from another ang
le : 
"When o customs unLon Ls formed, the torLff changes 
ore of 
the country - dLscrLmLnotLng type; the torLff system
s of the 
controctLng states ore amended to dLscrLmLnote Ln fa
vour of the 
members and ogoLnst the outsLde world" 16 . 
StLLL Ln the economLc sphere but movLng closer to th
e Legal 
14 . - The Customs UnLon Issue - J . VLner p 5 
15 . - LbLd p 4 
16 . - The Theory of Customs UnLons - R. G. LLpsey p 
1 
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sphere, ArtLcLe XXIV paragraph 8 of the GATT provLdes another 
defLnLtLon of a customs unLon: 
"A customs unLon shall be understood to mean the substLtut-
Lon of a sLngLe customs terrLtory for two or more customs terrL-
torLes so that : 
(L) dutLes and other restrLctLve relotLons of commerce 
ore eLLmLnoted wLth respect to substontLoLLy all the trade be-
tween the constLtuent terrLtorLes of the unLon or at Least wLth 
respect to substontLoLLy all the trade Ln products orLgLnotLng 
Ln such terrLtorLes, and 
(LL) .. . substontLoLLy all the some dutLes and other reguL-
otLons of commerce and oppLLed by each of the members of the unLon 
to the trade of terrLtorLes not Lncluded Ln the unLon" 17 . 
An oddLtLonol requLrement must be fuLfLLLed, Lt tronspLres, 
before the GATT defLnLtLon Ls compLLed wLth; paragraph 4 stLpu-
Lotes that the purpose of a customs unLon should be to focLLLtote 
trade between the constLtuent terrLtorLes and not to roLse borrLers 
to the trade of other controctLng portLes wLth such terrLtorLes 18. 
FLnolly, the Legal defLnLtLon of a customs unLon was handed 
down by the Permanent Court of lnternotLonoL JustLce Ln 1931 Ln on 
AdvLsory OpLnLon on a customs regLme between Germany and AustrLo . 
It cLted the foLLowLng LngredLents: 
"unLformLty of customs Low and customs torLff; unLty of the 
customs frontLers and of the customs terrLtory vLs-o-vLs thLrd 
states; freedom from Lmport and export dutLes Ln the exchange of 
goodsbetween the partner states; opportLonment of the dutLes 
collected occordLng to a fLxed quota" 19. 
CertoLn features stand out from these defLnLtLons generally 
agreed upon as beLng necessary. The most obvLous Ls the creotLon 
of a new frontLer for economLc purposes, composed of joLnLng up, 
physLcoLLy and fLgurotLveLy, the prevLous notLonoL frontLers . 
ThLs appears to rest on the ossumptLon (odmLttedLy a safe one) 
that Lt wLll always be states who ore members of a customs unLon . 
Another recognLsed chorocterLstLc Ls that the unLon Ls purely a 
commercLol matter; Lts vLtol features ore all commercLol ones. 
17. - GATT, BosLc Instruments and Selected Documents VoL IV p 43 
18 . - LbLd p 41 
19 . - PCIJ SerLes AB No . 41 p 51 
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The members must adopt the same tarLffs agaLnst the
 outsLde 
world and must elLmLnate the tarLffs on the bulk of
 Lnter 
membe r trade . One can be more specLfLc about Lts f
eatures; 
the varLous defLnLtLons all lLmLt the features not 
merely to 
comme r cLal measures , but to tarLff measures . Thus 
the prLncLpaL 
Lnterest of a customs unLon Ls the trade of goods o
f the member 
states between each other and between the unLon and
 the world, 
and not conscLously, for example , to how those prod
ucts beLng 
traded are produced . It acts as a sLngle state onl
y Ln regard 
to a specLaLLzed sector of commerce - trade . As re
vealed by the 
defLnLtLons , the customs unLon has tradLtLonaLly be
en lLmLted to 
securLng the free flow of goods and products produc
ed by the 
count r Les belongLng to Lt . Its characterLstLc feat
ures - the 
eLLmLnatLon of tarLffs between Lts members, a unLform
 tarLff on 
Lmports Lnto the unLon, poolLng of such revenues be
tween the 
members - relate by defLnLtLon to physLcaL goods . 
As the follow -
Lng sectLon wLLl reveal , thLs can be regarded as th
e most super -
fLcLal level of LntegratLon . 
In defLnLng customs unLons, one should bear Ln mLnd 
that 
other assocLatLons do exLst wLth varyLng degress of
 sLmLlarLty 
to the customs unLons . The most obvLous Ls the free
 area; 
another accepted cousLn Ls the LnterLm agreement le
adLng to the 
formatLon of eLther a customs unLon or a free trade
 area. Reduced 
to basLcs, the dLfference between a customs unLon a
nd a free trade 
area consLsts Ln the external poLLcy adopted by the
 group . 
"In a customs unLon, member states hove to erect a 
common 
tarLff wall towards the outsLde world, Ln o free tra
de area member 
states are free to moLntoLn or modLfy LndependentLy
 theLr external 
structure of tarLffs and other barrLers to Lmport fr
om thLrd 
states " 20 . 
It should also be added that Ln facto customs unLon
 envLsages 
a Lot more LntegratLon between the member states, r
esuLtLng Ln 
more substantLaL common LnstLtutLons . 
20 . - "The Structure, FunctLon and Law of a Free Tra
de Area " 
p 23 - LambrLnLdLs J . S . 
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The European CommunLtLes as a Customs UnLon : 
One possLble Lnter-
pretotLon of the EC Ls that Lt Ls merely a hL
ghly sophLstLcoted 
customs unLon . Undoubtedly thLs Ls true, and 
yet thLs descrLptLon 
Ls Lnoccurote because the EC Ls also a Lot mor
e . 
The orLgLnol treotLes foundLng the EC furnLsh 
some LnsLght 
Lnto Lts " customs unLon" element . CertoLnly th
e term " customs 
unLon ", " free trade area" and "common market" 
ore expressly 
Lncluded Ln these treotLes : Lt Ls sLgnLfLcont , 
however , that the 
ultLmote descrLptLon of all 3 treotLes fLxed o
n the word "communLty ". 
It Ls true that the bosLc Ldeo underlyLng the 
customs unLon concept 
Ls expressly Lncorporoted Ln the EC; ArtLcles 
12-29 of the EEC 
Treaty expressly provLde for the creotLon of a
 sLngle customs 
ter r Ltory , freeLng the trade of members from t
orLff, quota , charge 
rest r LctLons . LLkewLse , SectLon 2 . creates a 
common torLff wall . 
From thLs Lt may safely be concluded that the 
EC Lncorporotes the 
customs unLon concept . The treotLes, however, 
reveal that the 
regLme estobLLshed goes well beyond what Ls tro
dLtLonolly under -
stood to be a ' customs unLon' . 
The fLrst area thLs occurs Ln Ls actually rela
ted to the 
customs unLon concept - the common market conc
ept . It Ls okLn to 
the customs unLon because Lt Ls stLLL wLthLn t
he economLc sphere 
whereas the customs unLon trodLtLonolly hos so
ught to create 
freedom of trade Ln goods, the common market c
oncept supplements 
thLs process by provLdLng for unLon Ln other e
conomLc spheres -
such as the rLght of estobLLshment of componLe
s, the free move-
ment of copLtol and Labour, the free supply of
 servLces across 
notLonol frontLers and common rules for compet
LtLon between 
states . Thus by thLs common market, a wLder r
ange of economLc 
spheres ore Lntegroted, goLng beyond that norm
ally embraced by 
the customs unLon . 
The EC Ls more than purely a customs unLon Ln 
another and 
potentLolly much more sLgnLfLcont aspect . The
 EEC Treaty pro-
vLdes the best example of thLs aspect; Lnterpre
tLng the object 
of the treaty as sLmply LLmLted to economLc un
Lon would Leave 
unexploLned a number of express suggestLons th
at on ultLmote 
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.,, 
..... 
39, 
object Ls envLsoged - poLLtLcoL unLon; thLs Ls Lncorporoted by 
the customs unLon sLnce all Levels of apparently purely economLc 
LntegrotLon contoLn o poLLtLcoL comment; Lt Ls typLcoLLy the 
fLrst step Ln such o process . Where the European CommunLty Ls 
unLque however Ls that Lt expressly refers to thLs uLtLmote object , 
oLbeLt Ln guarded terms . ArtLcLe 2 specLfLcoLLy sLngL~ out the 
'closer r elotLonshLp between Lts members' as one purpose of the 
EC; thLs cannot mean purely close economLc unLon as that Ls 
achLeved by the precedLng purposes of ArtLcle 2 . The preamble 
ogoLn outLLnes the foundotLons of on ever closer unLon among the 
European peoples ' as one of Lts hLghest goals . ThLs reLnforces 
the vLew token of ArtLcle 2 that Lt Ls the foundotLons of poLLtLcoL 
unLon that Ls beLng talked about; the European peoples' Ln the 
Preamble beLng a reference to the European PorLLoment . The Ln -
escapable conclusLon Ls that economLc unLon Ls to be ochLeved 
wLthLn the EC to act as the foundotLon of o poLLtLcoL unLon . 
The Treaty appears therefore to accept that economLc unLon wLLL 
only provLde the foundotLon of poLLtLcoL unLon; Lt does not 
actually set poLLtLcoL unLon Ltself wLthLn Lts sLghts . But the 
poLnt remoLns; the express poLLtLcoL orLentotLon of the Treaty 
takes Lt beyond o normal customs unLon . 
Furthermore the conceptLon of o communLty poLLcy Lmplemented 
by the LnstLtutLons of the EC by them under Pnrt V of the Treaty 
gLves those LnstLtutLons on Lndependent justLfLcotL01 1 goLng beyond o 
customs unLon; thLs ogoLn LndLcotes that somethLng more than a hLghLy 
sophLstLcoted customs unLon hos been created. Thus, because Lt 
LS at the very Least o customs unLon, the alleged customs unLon 
exceptLon LS re velont to the reLotLon shLp of the EC and the MFN 
prLncLpLe . However the exLstence Ln the EC o f elements not 
trodLtLonoLLy contaLned Ln o customs unLon ore relevant to the 
oppLLcotLon of the customs unLon exceptLon to Lt and f orm the 
bosLs of on Lndependent ground on whLch favours granted wLthLn 
Lt may be excluded from the operotLon of the MFN prLncLple -
namely , that on entLty analogous to a new state hos been created. 
• • • 
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OutLL ne of the Lssues raLsed by the EC and the MFN prLncLpLe : 
The customs unLon exceptLon embraces a wLde range of Lssues; 
the European CommunLty , Lf anythLng, Ls a broader and more complex 
subject matter . Therefore Lt Ls proposed Ln thLs paper to LLmLt 
the consLderatLon of both to the extent that they are relevant to 
the Lssues raLsed by the reLatLonshLp of the European CommunLty 
to the MFN prLncLpLe , and by assocLatLon , wLth the customs unLon 
exceptLon ; Lt Ls LmpossLbLe to examLne the prLncLpLe LndependentLy 
of the exceptLon . In fact , consLderLng the aggressLve assertLons 
of the customs unLon exceptLons , the prLncLpLe tu whLch Lt Ls 
supposed to be an exceptLon often appears relegated to the back -
ground , and Lndeed , after a consLderatLon of the Lmpact of the 
European CommunLty , thLs may emerge as too generous a descrLptLon 
of Lts p l ace Ln the scheme of thLngs . GLven the wLdth of the 
topLcs , Lt Ls now proposed, Ln an effort to catch the flavour 
of the problems LnvoLved to gLve a brLef outLLne of the Lssues 
raLsed by thLs reLatLonshLp . The EC Ls , at the very Least , a 
customs unLon . It Ls c r ucLaL therefore, to determLne whether the 
creatLon of such a group excludes Ln LtseLf the operatLon of the 
MFN prLncLpLe . As a " customs unLon" , the EC has a very reaL 
Lnte r est Ln the determLnatLon of the questLon whether an LmpLLed 
customs unLon exceptLon , supported by customary Law, , exLsts, part -
LcuLarLy where the prevLous MFN treatLes of Lts member states con-
taLned no express customs unLon exceptLon . The Lssues raLsed Ln 
reLatLon to the customs unLon exceptLon are sLgnLfLcant Ln another 
respect however Ln that they form the basLs of an argument support-
Lng a "supranatLonaL s tate" exceptLon . The treatment of the 
customs unLon except Lon by the I LC Ls therefore crucLoL to the 
reLatLonshLp of the EC and the MFN prLncLpLe. FLrst, however , 
Lt Ls proposed to outLLne the Lssues raLsed by the customs unLon 
except Lon . 
The New EntLty Issue : 
A customs unLon, as may be apprecLated by 
Lts defLnLtLon, results Ln the creatLon of new LLnks between the 
• • • 
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membe r states . DependLng on the quoLLty and quontLty of these 
new LLnks , the Lssue Ls r oLsed whether a new entLty , Lndepende n t 
of the combLnotLon of the membe r states may be soLd to hove bee n 
c r eated . ThLs Lssue becomes more compeLLLng Ln reLotLon to 
customs unLons because the member states conscLousLy adopt a 
common stand ogoLnst the outsLde world , thus creotLng on Lmpress -
Lon of unLty . Such a possLbLLLty was recognLsed by the SpecLoL 
Rapporteur : 
" Another argument consLders a customs unLon as a new entLty 
and pe r haps a new subject of LnternotLonoL Low . If the ossoc -
Lot Lon of states Ln such unLons could be ossLmLLoted to a unLtLng 
of states , the argument goes , the MFN rLghts based on favours 
accorded by one member of the unLon to the other could not be 
cLoLmed by on outsLder after the estobLLshment of the unLon " 21 . 
The I LC consLdered a sLmLLor argument , presented Ln the con-
text of ArtLcLe 30 paragraph 3 of the Draft ArtLcLes on SuccessLon 
of States whLch odmLts the LnoppLLcobLLLty of a treaty where one 
of Lts partners voLuntorLLy unLtes wLth another state . The 
argument was 
" If such a rule con be adopted Ln the case of a unLtLng of 
states , perhaps a sLmLLor rule could be adopted for the case of 
me r e ossocLotLon" 22 . 
The European CommunLty, Lt wLLL be subsequently revealed , 
Ls portLcuLorLy susceptLbLe to thLs type of treatment. Indeed 
the rejectLon of such a possLbLLLty roLsed one of the crucLoL 
Lssues reLotLng to the European CommunLty . 
"The case of a unLtLng of states cannot be compared wLth on 
ossocLotLon Ln whLch the members retoLn theLr sovereLgnty" 23 . 
ThLs comporLson Ls Ln many respects precLseLy the Lssue 
roLsed by the European CommunLtLes . 
Change of CLrcumstonce : 
The essence of thLs Lssue Ls whether 
the formotLon of a customs unLon constLtutes a suffLcLent 
change of cLrcumstonces renderLng the prevLous promLse of MFN 
21 . - Yearbook 1975 Vol . I I p 16 
22 . - Yearbook 1975 Vol . II Port II p 47 
23 . - LbLd 
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treatment by a member of the unLon to a non membe r Lnoper
atLve . 
Aga Ln the most LLkeLy condLdate to succeed unde r thLs a r g
um e n t 
Ls the Eu r opean CommunLty . 
Ejusdem Ge nerLs Ru l e : 
Lnd Lcated . 
The nature of thLs rule has already been 
Pescatore argues Lts operatLon Ln the context of 
the customs unLon Leads to the result that : 
" There Ls no common measure bet ween a treaty desLgned sLm
pLy 
to facLLLtote LnternotLonaL trade and the much more ambLtLo
us 
and fundamental objectLve of a treaty desLgned to brLng a
bout 
economLc LntegratLon Ln the form of a free trade area, a 
customs 
unLon or an economLc unLon " 24 . 
It Ls faLr to say that the st rength of thLs argument grows 
Ln proportLon to the amount of 'LntegratLon' LnvoLved Ln th
e 
customs unLon - the more LntegratLon , the Less common measu
re 
there Ls between the sLmpLe commercLoL treaty and the trea
ty 
creatLng such LntegratLon . The vaLLdLty of thLs LLne of a
rgu-
ment may be resurrected by the unLque degree of LntegratLo
n Ln 
quantLty and quoLLty terms LnvoLved Ln the Treaty of Rome 
1957 . 
The SpecLaL Rapporteur rejected aLL three arguments pur-
portLng to estabLLsh a ratLona~ for the alleged except Lon
. HLs 
concLusLons on the ' new entLty ' argument and the change of
 cLrcum-
stances argument are portLcuLarLy pertLnent to the presen
t dLs -
cussLon . To the suggest Lon that a customs unLon represen
ts a 
new entLty, he repLLed : 
"SLnce the states partLcLpotLng Ln such unLons usually 
contLnued as Lndependent and sovereLgn states, thLs vLew L
s 
dLffLcuLt to accept" 25 . 
After revLewLng a sample of economLc unLons, LncLudLng the
 
EEC , the SpecLaL Rapporteur confLrmed hL s orLgLnaL concLus
Lon: 
" ThLs chaLn of reosonLng Leads to the concLusLon that on 
economLc ossocLotLon or LntegratLon of states , however clo
se but 
faLLLng short of o unLtLng of states, does not by Ltself t
ermLnate 
prevLousLy exLstLng agreements of partLcLpants Ln general "
 26 . 
24 . - AnnuoLre de L' lnstLtut de droLt LnternatLonaL 1969 B
osle 
VoL 53 p 209 
25 . - Yearbook 1975 Vol . 11 p 16 
26 . - Yearbook 1975 Vol . 11 p 17 
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Subsequently, the SpecLol Rapporteur gLves more precLsLon 
to what constLtutes a unLtLng of states : 
" Here ogoLn Lt seem untenable to moLntoLn that Ln the 
absence of a polLtLcol unLon among the portLcLpants ... " 27 . 
Thus the polLtLcol unLon of two ore more states emerges 
as the prerequLsLte before eLther a " new entLty" may be sold 
to hove been created . Presumably , the element of polLtLcol 
unLon must occu r Ln oddLtLon to economLc LntegrotLon before a 
new entLty may be sold to hove emerged ; though thLs Ls not 
exp l LcLtly stated , the context of the SpecLol Rapporteu r' s 
comments LndLcotes thLs conclusLon . LLkewLse , the SpecLol 
Rappo r teu r regarded the absence of polLtLcol unLon as fatal 
to t he success of the " changed cLrcumstonces " argument as a 
basLs on whLch the operotLon of the MFN prLncLple could be 
exc l uded after a customs unLon hos been created : 
" It seems untenable to moLntoLn that , Ln the absence of a 
polLtLcol unLon among the portLcLponts, the changed cLrcumstonces 
of one of the portLes should justLfy a modLfLcotLon by LmplLcotLon . 
ThLs follows from the general rule that any recognLtLon of the 
effect of changed cLrcumstonces requLres more than a voluntary 
and unLloterol change of cLrcumstonces" 28 . 
The SpecLol Rapporteur rejected the ejusdem generLs rule , 
advanced by Pescatore , as a bosLs on whLch favours granted wLthLn 
a customs unLon ore excluded from the operotLon of the MFN prLncLple 
descrLbLng thLs result as on "unjustLfLed extensLon" of the rule . 
Such a conclusLon LnevLtobly followed from hLs LnterpretotLon of 
that rule; Ln delLmLtLng the operotLon of that rule, the SpecLol 
Rapporteur hod prevLously reached the conclusLon that: 
"The grontLng state cannot evade Lts oblLgotLons unless on 
express reservotLon so provLdes on the ground that the relotLons 
between Ltself and the thLrd country ore frLendlLer or "not sLmL -
lor " to those exLstLng between Lt and the benefLcLory .. . It Ls 
only the subject matter of the clause whLch must belong to the 
some category " 29 . 
27 . - LbLd p '17 
2 8 . - Lb Ld p '1 7 
29 . - YILC '1973 Vol . 11 p '108 
• • • 
44 . 
On thLs vLew of the ejusdem generLs rule, the new 
reLotLonshLp bought about by the creotLon· of a customs unLon 
between Lts membe r s Ls clearly Lr r elevont Ln the context of 
that r u Le . 
These , then, ore the central Lssues roLsed Ln the reLot -
LonshLp between the MFN prLncLpLe and the EC . TheLr soLutLon , 
Lt Ls submLtted, Lnvolves two aspects . The fLrst Ls whether under 
present LnternotLonoL Low, the favours granted wLthLn a customs 
unLon ore outomotLcoLLy excluded from the operotLon of the MFN 
prLncLpLe . The prLncLpLes Lnvolved Ln the determLnotLon of thLs 
questLon ore oppLLcobLe to the determLnotLon of the further Lssue 
whether the favours granted wLthLn a structure embodyLng a for 
mo r e fundamental and extensLve element of LntegrotLon than 
trodLtLonoLLy envLsoged by a customs unLon - such as the EC -
ore also excluded from the operotLon of the MFN prLncLpLe under 
present LnternotLonoL Low . There Ls however on equally Lmport -
ont Lssue Lnvolved, fundamental to the Lnvolvement of the ILC 
Ln thLs topLc : whether the MFN prLncLnLe should recognLse the 
exceptLon of favours granted wLthLn such a process of LntegrotLon. 
The ILC and th~ "customs unLon exceptLon" : 
The sLngle most 
strLkLng feature of the Draft ArtLcLes produced by the ILC on 
the MFN clause Ln 1978 was theLr conspLcuous sLLence on the 
customs unLon Lssue . In fact on a portLcuLor LnterpretotLon 
of Draft ArtLcLes 17 and 18, Lt could be argued that the Draft 
ArtLcLes themselves embody, olbeLt LndLrectly, a denLoL of the 
customs unLon exceptLon, and consequently ore not Ln fact sLLent 
on that Lssue . Draft ArtLcLe 17 entLtLed "Irrelevance of the 
fact that treatment Ls extended to a thLrd state under a bLLoteroL 
or muLtLLoteroL agreement" provLdes: 
"The ocquLsLtLon of rLghts by the benefLcLory state ... under 
a most favoured notLon clause Ls not affected by the mere fact 
that the treatment by the grontLng state of a thLrd state hos 
been extended under on LnternotLonoL agreement , whether bLLoteroL 
.. .. 
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or muLtLLateraL" 30 . 
The prevLous draft ortLcLe 15 hod provLded: 
" The benefLcLory state Ls entLtLed to treatment extended 
by the grontLng state to a thLrd state whether or not such 
treatment Ls extended under a bLLateroL or o muLtLLateroL agree-
ment" 31 . 
To thLs sLmLLor provLsLon, the EC reacted Ln the foLLowLng 
manner : 
"The odoptLon of such on ortLcLe could be Lnterpreted as 
meanLng that under the most favoured notLon clause, the advant -
ages whLch the states members of a customs unLon grant among 
themselves by vLrtue of that unLon should be extended to thLrd 
countrLes; Ln other words, the states members of the communLty 
should grant thLrd states the some treatment that they grant 
to each other" 32 . 
There Ls a dLfference Ln emphosLs between draft ortLcLe 15 
and the 1978 Draft ArtLcLe; the former Ls emphotLc - "Ls entLtLed" 
whereas the Lotter Ls certoLnLy more LndLrect - "Ls not affected 
by the mere fact". Both, however, state the Lrrelevonce of 
whether the favour Ls granted pursuant to a bLLoteroL or muLtL-
LateroL agreement. If, therefore, the LnterpretotLon feared 
by the EC of Draft ArtLcLe 15 Ls a possLbLe one, Lt would appear 
LLkewLse to be oppLLcobLe to the present Draft ArtLcLe 17. Are 
the EC's fears justLfLed? To the extent that customs unLons ore 
LnvorLobLy created between states by LnternotLonoL agreement, 
Draft ArtLcLe 17 would appear to odmLt the possLbLLLty of beLng 
oppLLcobLe to them. If such on LnterpretotLon Ls possLbLe of 
Draft ArtLcLe 17, Lt Ls certoLnLy not one Lntended by the I LC, 
whLch expressly stated Ln paragraph 58 of the Lntroductory 
commentary that the Draft ArtLcLes remoLned sLLent on the Lssue 
of the customs unLon exceptLon. 33. ThLs, of course, would not 
be the case Lf the LnterpretotLon of Draft ArtLcLe 17 feared by 
the EC Ls correct. In thLs respect Lt Ls perhaps sLgnLfLcont 
that Draft ArtLcLe 17 provLdes that "the ocquLsLtLon of rLghts . . . 
Ls not affected by the mere fact that the treatment" suggestLng 
30 . - Report of the I LC 1978 p 100 
31 . - Yearbook of the ILC 1976 Vol. 2 Port 2 p 39 
32 . - Comments of the European EconomLc CommunLty, Report of the 
ILC 1978 p 449 
33. - Report of the llC 1978 p 21 
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that the entLtlement of the benefLcLory state to such rLghts 
must otherwLse exLst Lndependently and thot- t-hP fromP111ork 
estobLLshLng the rLght to such favour s whether a bLLoteroL or 
muLtLLoteroL agreement wLLL not, of Ltself, dLsentLtle the 
benefLcLory to such a rLght; on express customs unLon except-
Lon , or o customary rule to thLs effect Leaves the non-member 
benefLcLory wLthout such a rLght to favours granted wLthLn a 
customs unLon. CertoLnLy the commentary to Draft ArtLcLe 17 
contoLns no reference to customs unLons as such, and Ls geared 
toward curLng another LLL . It Ls unconceLvoble that such on 
Lnflommoble Lssue as the customs unLon exceptLon should be so 
quLetly and LncLdentoLLy dLsposed of by Draft ArtLcle 17 - and 
thLs would be the result Lf the LnterpretotLon of Lt feared by 
the EC Ls the correct one . It Ls submLtted, therefore, that 
Draft ArtLcle 17 does not affect the customs unLon exceptLon, 
and that the Lotter remoLns at Lorge to be decLded . 
The some arguments ore oppLLcoble to the effect of Draft 
ArtLcle 18. Draft ArtLcLe 16 of the 1976 Draft ArtLcLes pro-
vLded : 
" The benefLcLory state Ls entLtLed to treatment extended 
by the grontLng state to a thLrd state whether or not such 
treatment Ls extended as notLonoL treatment" 34 . 
To thLs, the EC responded : 
" ThLs draft would Lmply that the mutual non dLscrLmLnotory 
commLtments granted to each other by States members of a customs 
unLon should be extended to thLrd countrLes " 35 . 
Draft ArtLcle 18 of the 1978 Draft ArtLcLes ochLeves the 
some result as Draft ArtLcle 16 , but once ogoLn the dLfferent 
formula ; "The acquLsLtLon of rLghts ... Ls not affected by the 
mere fact ... " 36 . Ls employed . Once ogoLn, Lt would appear 
that the Draft ArtLcLe 18 only entLtles the benefLcLory state 
to such treatment Lf such a rLght exLsts otherwLse under the 
orLgLnoL MFN treaty; Lt Ls only concerned therefore to secure 
thLs rLght ogoLnst on attack on Lts entLtLement on the ground 
that the grontLng state Ls occordLng notLonoL treatment to a 
34 . - Yearbook of the ILC 1976 Vol . 2 Port 2 p 47 
35 . - Report of the ILC 1978 p 449 
36 . - LbLd p 114 
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thLrd state . If a customary rule of LnternotLonoL Low exLsts, 
or on express customs unLon exceptLon Ls LncLuded Ln the orLgLnoL 
MFN treaty , the benefLcLory state hos no rLght to a promLse of 
notLonoL treatment mode by the grontLng state to a fellow member 
of a customs unLon . The ArtLcLe does not, therefore , overrLde 
on express customs unLon exceptLon, or one based on a rule of 
customary Low - Lf the Lotter exLsts Lt Ls to thLs questLon 
that we now turn . 
The customs unLon exceptLon Ln LtseLf Ls a sLmpLe concept; 
Lt moLntoLns that where a state concludes on MFN agreement wLth 
another state , the benefLcLory state may not cLoLm the advant-
ages that the grontLng state hos accorded a thLrd state where 
the grontLng state and that thLrd state ore members of a common 
customs unLon, free trade area or LnterLm regLme LeodLng to 
eLther of these two. The only concessLon to the customs unLon 
exceptLon was mode Ln the 1978 Report, whLch LncLuded, Ln Lts 
Lntroductory commentary, on ArtLcLe exemptLng favours granted 
wLthLn a customs unLon from the operotLon of the MFN clause 
(ArtLcLe 23 bLs) 37 . It Ls not however a port of the Draft 
ArtLcLes, but only a model whLch could be followed should 
states at a future conference decLde to LncLude such on except-
Lon . The Draft ArtL~Les themselves remoLn sLLent on thLs Lssue. 
The SpecLoL Rapporteur commented Ln 1978: 
"The CommLssLon, beorLng Ln mLnd the LnconcLusLveness of 
the comments mode there o n and the Lock of tLme ovoi....LobLe to Lt to 
consLder the matter, agreed not to i....ncLude on ortLcLe on a 
customs unLon exceptLon i....n the draft ortLcLe s . It was under-
stood that the sLLence of the draft ortLcLes could not be Lnter-
preted as an LmpLLci....t rec o gnLtLon of the exi....stence or non-exi....st-
ence of such a ruLe .. . 11 38. 
The ILC's treatment of the customs unLon exceptLon Ls eval-
uated Ln detoLLs Ln the fLnoL chapter of thi....s paper . These 
comments ore however also relevant to the i....mmedLote i....nquLry of 
defi....ni....ng what the I LC's posLtLon on the customs unLon exceptLon 
Ls . The problem wLth the comments quoted above Ls that they 
37 . - LbLd p 21 
38 . - Report of the ILC 1978 p 21 
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app e a r Ln consLstent wLth the stand token by the SpecLoL Rappo r t eur 
Ln 1975 . The customs unLon exceptLon dLd , Ln that yea r, r ece Lve 
ext en s Lve t r eatment ; 11 fu l l pages of the Yea r book Ls devoted to 
Lt. The wo r k of the I LC on the MFN clause spanned a pe r Lod of 1 0 
ye a r s ; or1 e questLon r theref o re whethPr , Ln fact, Lt suffe r ed f r om 
a Lock of tLm~ , and whether thLs was the reason why o conc lu s(ve 
answ er on the customs unLon exceptLon was not orrLved at . lhLs 
Leads to the mo r e Lmportont poLnt; Ln 1 975 a defLnLte answer was 
o rr Lved at . The SpecLoL Rapporteu r come to the defLnLte conclus -
Lon that the customs unLon exceptLon dLd not r epresent a rule 
of customary LnternotLonoL Low . ThLs concLusLon was shored by 
the Comm LssLon Ln _1976 : 
" Mr Ustor summLng up the dLscussLon , soLd that Lt hod shown 
that ... the r e was vLrtuoLLy unonLmLty among the members as to 
the posLtLon de Lege Lato; there was at present no general rule 
of customa r y LnternotLonoL Low that would exclude customs unLo n 
benefLts ... Ln the absence of any express stLpuLotLon Ln the 
treaty " 39 . 
What therefore does thP statement Ln 1978 "that the sLLence of 
the Dr aft ArtLcLes could not be LnLerpreted O !:> on LmpLL c Lt 
recognLtLon of the exLstence or non exLstence of such a rule " 40 
mean? ThLs r eference appears capable only of beLng Lnterpreted 
as a r efe r ence to the alleged customary rule ; Lt Ls only thLs 
rule whose exLstence o r non exLstence Ls Ln conjecture . It 
certoLnLy cannot be a reference to any rule based on progressLve 
deve l opment sLnce LncLusLon of such a rule hod been rejected . 
Does therefore thLs reference LndLcote that the I LC hove retreat -
ed from the concLusLons orrLved at by Lts SpecLoL Rapporteur Ln 
1975 , optLng Ln favour of a neutral stand? On Lts own , the 1978 
statement certaLnly supports the possLbLLLty of such a change 
hovLng occurred . Even Lf thLs Ls so , the SpecLoL Rapporteur ' s 
work on the topLc Ln 1975 Ls stLLL hLghLy relevant to the present 
dLscussLon Ln that Lt represents a thorough and certoLnLy the most 
recent , LnvestLgotLon Lnto the " customs unLon except Lon ". More -
ove r, there Ls on expLLcLt statement by the new SpecLaL Rappo r teu r, 
39 . - Yearbook of the I LC 1978 p 21 
40 . - supra , Footnote 38 
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Mr Ushokov, Ln 1978 confLrmLng the concLusLons reached Ln 1975: 
" A generally recognLsed exceptLon to the operotLon of the 
most favoured notLon clause Ln the case of economLc unLons of 
states dLd not currently exLst Ln LnternotLonoL Low ... AdmLttedLy 
many exceptLons of that kLnd were to be found Ln treotLes con-
toLnLng a most favoured notLon clause .. . dLd that prove that such 
exceptLons were odmLtted as a general rule ... ? The CommLssLon 
hod answered that questLon Ln the negotLve , and he took the 
some posLtLon" 41 . 
Thus the concLusLon orrLved at by Mr Ustor Ln 1975 Ln re -
gard to the posLtLon de Lege Lato does appear to enjoy the 
suppo r t of the mojorLty of the ILC. 
As , hos already been poLnted out , customs unLons hod 
fLgured orLgLnoLLy Ln hLs conceptLon of the estobLLsh except -
Lons to the operotLon of the MFN clause Ln 1968 . The Lssue 
remoLned Ln LLmbo tLLL 1975 when Lt was dealt wLth Ln depth. 
It Ls useful , from the outset , to deLLneote the boundary wLthLn 
whLch such on exceptLon potentLoLLy could apply; as the SpecLoL 
Rapporteur poLnted out, the exceptLon could only apply to clauses 
contoLned Ln commercLoL treotes, and Ln portLcuLor those reLotLng 
to customs dutLes . A further LLmLtotLon emerged : 
" It Ls also evLdent that the problem orLses only Ln coses 
where the grontLng state enters a customs unLon or other ossoc-
LotLon after the concLusLon of on agreement contoLnLng a most 
favoured notLon clause whLch Ls not coupled wLth on opproprLote 
exceptLon; Ln the hypothetLcoL case where the grontLng state was 
already a member of such a unLon at the tLme of the concLusLon 
of the agreement whLch contoLns no exceptLon, the outomotLc 
extensLon of the clause to customs unLons benefLts Ls obvLous" 42 . 
The SpecLoL Rapporteur LsoLoted the two grounds on whLch 
codLfLcotLon of thLs exceptLon could be based (occeptLng of course 
that states ore free to create on exceptLon reLotLng to customs 
unLons Ln a MFN agreement); that the exceptLon Ls now so common 
as to be regarded as a rule of customary Low or that Lt Ls a suLt -
obLe condLdote on the bosLs of progressLve development . The 
41 . - Yearbook 1978 Vol . I p 127 
42 . - Yearbook 1976 Vol . 2 Port 2 p 45 
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co ntroversLoL Lssue orLses as to the exLstence of on LmpLLed 
ex ceptLon L.e . o ne that exLsts Lndependently Lf the treaty Ls 
sL Lent. 
"T he crux of the matter Ls, of course, whether the exLst-
ence of a customary rule of on LmpLLed customs unLon exceptLon 
con be estobLLshed" 43 . 
The SpecLoL Rapporteur concluded : 
" No customary rule of LnternotLonoL Low exLsts estobLLshLng 
o n LmpL Led customs unLon exceptLon" 44 . 
Th ough fLnoLLy defLnLte Ln thLs conclusLon, Lt Ls clear that 
Lt was r eached only after careful consLderotLon . An estobLLshed 
schoo l of thoughtmoLntoLned the exLstence of such on exceptLon 
and theLr arguments corrLed consLderoble weLght . The mojorLty 
of trade agreements concluded by states stLpuloted expressly 
suc h on exceptLon and hove done so sLnce the Lnter wa r yea r s . 
The most famous exceptLon Ln thLs genre Ls of course ArtLcle XXIV 
of GATT . The League of NotLons EconomLc CommLttee , and even more 
forcefully t he 1936 resoLutLon of the lnstLtute of lnternotLonoL 
Low supported the LmpLLed exceptLon . 
The SpecLol Rappo r teur rejected thLs vLew cLtLng the Lnode -
quocy of the recognLtLon accorded to the exceptLon Ln state 
proctLse , puttLng ArtLcle XXIV of GAT T Ln proper, and more LLmL-
ted perspectLve , the dLvLded nature of ocodemLc comment on thLs 
vLew and the Lmmense proctLcoL dLffLcuLtLes of reducLng the 
alleged exceptLon Lnto a codLfLed form , he opted Ln favour of 
the presumptLon he felt naturally presented Ltself from fLrst 
prLncLples of the MFN clause : 
"T he presumptLon obvLously mLLLtotes ogoLnst such on except -
Lon . If states promLse each other most favoured notLon treatment 
they ore supposed to carry out theLr promLse . They may LLmLt such 
a promLse , but Lf they do not, they hove to bear the consequences "45. 
The domLnont Lnfluence of thLs vLew Ls that of the doctrLne 
of pocto sunt se rvondo, from whLch one proceeds to extract a pre -
sumptLon created by the prLnples . CertoLnly Lt Ls true that the 
MFN prLncLple as Lt stand oppLLes wLthout quoLLfLcotLon to all 
43 . - Yearbook 1975 Vol . 2 p 17 
44 . - Lb Ld p 19 
45 . - Yearbook 1975 Vol. 11 p 15 - 16 
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advantages granted, and Lndeed , thLs general ossumptLon consLtLt -
utes one of Lts chLef chorocterLstLcs . From thLs vLewpoLnt, 
therefore , the prLmo focLe presumptLon created by the nature of 
the MFN prLncLple , Ln the SpecLoL Rapporteur's eyes Ls voLLd . 
The st r ength of such o presumptLon Ls weakened however by the 
fact that on another occosLon , the SpecLoL Rapporteur appears 
to argue that the MFN prLncLple, by Lts very nature, gLves rLse 
to on exceptLon; Ln justLfyLng the "frontLer troffLc" exceptLon 
contoLned Ln Draft ArtLcle 25 , the SpecLoL Rapporteur commented: 
" It seems to be founded on the bosLc phLLosophy of the most 
favou r ed notLon clause and notably on the ejusdem generLs rule " 46 . 
If the bosLc phLLosophy of the MFN clause, and portLculorly 
the ejusdem generLs rule, Leads to on exceptLon Ln favour of 
" f r ontLer troffLc" Lt appears to undermLne the presumptLon Loter 
cloLmed to orLse ogoLnst exceptLng customs unLon advantages; 
there appears to be no good reason Ln prLncLple why frontLer 
troffLc should attract the LLmLtotLons of the ejusdem generLs 
rule and customs unLons not . CertoLnly Lt Ls true that o 
greater degree of consensus to the except Lon by states attaches 
to the former than the Lotter but that Ls Lrrelevont to the 
prLncLples Lnvolved, and even more Lrrelevont Ln the fLeld of 
presumptLons . The uLtLmote concLusLon of the SpecLoL Rapporteur 
on customs unLon exceptLon Ls not here beLng questLoned but the 
presumptLon he vLews as orLsLng from the MFN phLLosophy appears 
LnconsLstent wLth hLs eorLLer stand. 
The SpecLoL Rapporteur concluded that no customary rule of 
LnternotLonoL Low hod emerged from on exomLnotLon of the proct-
Lse of states on the crLterLon formulated by the lnternotLonoL 
Court of JustLce Ln Lts judgment Ln the North Seo ContLnentoL 
Shelf coses 47 - specLfLcoLLy that state proctLse Ln thLs respect 
was neLther suffLcLently "settled" or "extensLve and vLrtuoLLy 
unLform" nor dLd such proctLse LndLcotP o "general recognLtLon 
that o rule of Low or Legal obLLgotLon Ls LnvoLved" 48 . As the 
commentary concedes, thLs concLusLon runs contrary to on Lmpres-
sLve body of outhorLty whLch supported the exLstence of such o 
46 . - Yearbook '1976 Vol . 11 Port 11 p 64 
47 . - ICJ Reports '1969 p 42 
48 . - Yearbook '1975 Vol . 2 p '18 
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ru Le. Furthermore, the mojorLty of re p re sentotLves Ln the SLxth 
Comm Lttee moLntoLned that such o customary rule exLsted : 
" No one hod been able to cLte o sLngle case where the treat -
me nt whLch states members of o customs unLon granted each other 
hod been cloLmed to apply too state benefLcLory of the most 
favou re d notLo n clause ... the convLctLon was expressed that the 
exceptLon Ln favour of customs unLons corresponded exactly 
to the cu rrent state of LnternotLonoL Low and was perfectly 
Ln LLne wLth the Lnterest of all states ... thLs clossLc exceptLon 
hod Long been accepted by jurLsts and hod been sonctLoned by 
the proctLse of states as evLdence by the frequency of expLLcLt 
exceptLons Ln treaty p roc tLse " 49. 
In fact , the frequency of the LnclusLons of express customs 
un Lon exceptLons Ln MFN treotLes Ls open to two LnterpretotLons ; 
Lt may eLther be the foundotLon of such o customary rule , or may 
Ln fact LndLcote that such o r ule does not exLst - hence , the 
need to Lnclude on express exceptLon Ln such treotLes. 
as the SpecLoL Rappo r teur poLnted out : 
Moreover , 
" the states concerned must therefore feel that they ore 
con f o rmLn g to what amounts too Legal obLLgotLon . The frequency 
even or hobLtuoL characte r of the acts Ls not Ln Ltself enough ... 
that the alleged customary rule of on LmpLLed customs unLon 
exceptLon ... falls f ar short of the requLrement set out above , 
needs hardly any proof " 50 . 
UnLLke the SLxth CommLtte , the SpecLoL Rapporteur provLded 
examples of o benefLcLory cloLmed under o MFN treaty , the favours 
granted by one member of the cu s t oms unLon to another. One such 
example was the posLtLon adopted by the UnLted States on the form -
otLon of o customs unLon between AustrLo and Germany ; the SoLLcLto r 
for the Deportment of State of the UnLted States of AmerLco express -
ed the vLew that the estobLLshment of o customs unLon between 
AustrLo and Germany would not constLtute on exceptLon to the most 
favoured not Lon provLsLons ... " 51 . 
It Ls submLtted therefore that the conclusLon orrLved at by 
,the SpecLoL Rapporteur was justLfLed ; though the proctLse of 
49 . - Report of the SLxth CommLtte 1978 p 22 Poro 45 A/33/419 
50 . - supra Footnote 48 
51 . - Yearbook 1975 Vol. 2 p 14 
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states LndLcotes that Ln the mojorLty of coses, the creotLon 
of o customs unLon hos resulted Ln the denLol of MFN rLghts 
beLng extended to non member MFN treaty partners - o proctLse 
that hos been unLversolly followed Ln relotLon to the customs 
unLons created Ln the Lost 20 years, Lt Ls not o proctLse that 
Ls followed " Ln the beLLef that thLs proctLse Ls rendered 
obLLgotory by the exLstence of o rule of Low requLrLng Lt " 52 . 
The comment mode Ln the SLxth CommLttee that "No one hod 
been able to cLte o sLngle case where the treatment whLch 
states members of o customs unLon granted each other hod been 
cLoLmed to apply too state benefLcLory of the most favoured 
notLon clause " 53 may Ln fact be accurate Lf the foLLowLng 
dLstLnctLon mode by the EC Ln Lts wrLtten comments to the 
Draft ArtLcles Ls o voLLd one . 
" The SpecLoL Rapporteur's argument appears to be Lnode-
quote . It Ls Lntended to show that there Ls no customary rule 
under LnternotLonoL Low whLch would LmpLLcLtly exclude customs 
unLons from the effects of the clause and that Ln consequence 
the draft ortLcle could not embody any exceptLon relotLng to 
customs unLons . Even Lf hLs argument was conclusLve, Lt would 
not address Ltself to the fact that there Ls also no LnternotLonoL 
custom by whLch o benefLcLory state could obtoLn all the advant-
ages granted by members of o customs unLon among themselves; not 
only Ls there no such custom, there Ls not even o sLngle example 
of such on occurence" 54 . 
The dLstLnctLon beLng mode here, Lt Ls submLtted, Ls 
foLLocLous. A fundamental LngredLent of the MFN prLncLple -
Lndeed Lt could be regarded as Lts unLque feature, Ls that any 
favours granted by the grontLng state too thLrd state (provLded 
they are, of course, ejusdem generLs to the subject matter of 
the MFN treaty) may be cloLmed by the benefLcLory state . ThLs 
result Ls achLeved from the natural operotLon of the MFN clause; 
Lt Ls thLs rLght of entLtlement that the alleged LmpLLed customs 
unLon exceptLon threatens to deny; Ln the absence of such on 
LmpLLed exceptLon the rLght of the benefLcLory to such favours 
52 . - LbLd p 18 
53 . op cLt 
54 . - Report of the ILC 1978 p 480 
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stands; Lt requLre s , the ref o r e , no support from 'LnternotLonoL 
custom', and stands quLte safely Lndependently of any such cus-
tom . ThLs result Ls ochLeved by nothLng more than the normal 
oppLLcotLon of the MFN prLncLpLe . ThLs dLstLnctLon con Lt Ls 
submLtted, be dLsregorded. 
The second ground on whLch the customs unLon exceptLon could 
be codLfLed to become o full fledged exceptLon to the ope rotL on 
of the most favoured notLon clause Ls that of p r ogressLve develop-
ment . The SpecLoL Rapporteur consLdered whether customs unLons 
represented o LegLtLmote condLdote for such treatment . The prob-
lem, as recognLsed by the SpecLoL Rapporteur, Ls that thLs Ls almost 
excLusLveLy on economLc Lssue - whethe r customs unLons ore o good 
t hLng - and hen ce o ne whLc h the Lawyer may not be best quoLLfLed 
to judge. Further, the posLtLon Ls exacerbated by the dLvLded 
economLc ve rdLc t on customs unLons. To make matters worse , the 
Legal aspects themsevles were dountLng, to soy the Least - Ln 
portLculor , as the experLence of GATT testLfLed , and the lnter -
not LonoL Court of JustLce confLrmed Ln the North Seo ContLnento L 
Shelf coses 55 - the attempt to defLne what o customs unLon or 
free trade area Ls posed hLghly complex problems . A stronger Ln 
an aLLen fLeLd, and Lnsecure on hLs home front, the SpecLoL 
Rapporteur had no optLo n but to retreat, wLth the portLng con-
cLusLon: 
"bec ause there Ls no compeLLLng evLdence as to the desLra -
bLLLty of substLtutLng a general rule for the partLcular arrange -
ments of the partLes , the best course of actLon Ls to Leave matters 
where they are " 56 . 
The Draft ArtLcle as a result dLd not Lnclude any reference 
to customs unLons constLtutLng an exceptLon to the operatLon of 
the MFN clauses . Such on omLSSLon must be consLdered hLgh 
authorLty for the proposLtLon that the exceptLon Ls not port of 
the customary rules of LnternatLonaL Low . In fact , as the SpecLaL 
Rappo r teur hLmself poLnts out , LLttle consequence may flow from 
thLs dLscovery, sLnce GATT members ore protected by ArtLcLe XXI V 
Ln reLatLon to one another and non members of thLs Agreement fre-
55 . - JCJ Reports 1969 p 43 
56 . - 1975 Vol . 2 p 19 
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quently expressly stLpulate such an exceptLon . The SpecLal 
Rapporteur Ln 1975 dLd LndLcate that the rejectLon of such 
an exceptLon was subject to a more detaLled examLnatLon of 
the Lnterests of developLng natLons; such as dLscussLon dLd 
Ln fact result Ln a separate exceptLon out of the customs 
unLon context Ln favour of these states Ln Draft ArtLcles 
23 and 24 . It Ls curLous however that such an exceptLon 
should surface LnLtLaLly by assocLatLon wLth the customs unLon 
Lssue Ln lLght of the contempory bLtterness felt by developLng 
countrLes agaLnst the overwhelmLng power of such unLons as the 
European CommunLty . 
Whatever vLew Ls taken of the omLssLon to draft a customs 
unLon exceptLon, the exLstence of customs unLons and theLr 
growLng popuLatLry nevertheless repre sents the sLngle most 
sLgnLfLcant threat to the survLval of the MFN prLncLple, be-
cause the sLmple fact remaLns that whenever a customs unLon Ls 
created, dLscrLmLnatLon LnevLtably results between the treat-
ment members accord one another and the treatment they extend to 
non members - Lndeed, such dLscrLmLnatLon Ls the corr1erstone of 
the customs unLon concept . Its relatLonshLp wLth the MFN 
prLncLple Ls Ln fact LntLmate due to the LncorporatLon of both 
Ln the GATT (ArtLcle XXIV) under whLch the bulk of the world 's 
trade Ls conducted; LnevLtabLy, the operatLon of one Leads to 
a consLderatLon of the other . It Ls proposed to focus on thLs 
relatLonshLp by Lts applLcatLon to the greatest customs unLon 
of them all - the European CommunLtLes. ThLs LnevLtabLy entaLLs 
an examLnatLon of what thLs creatLon Ls; by such an examLnatLon 
and the applLcatLon of the concLusLons arrLved at to the MFN 
prLncLple , a more precLse pLcture of that relatLonshLp may be 
goLned . 
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Ove r vLew of the European CommunLtLes : 1 
The LmmedLate hLstory 
of European LntegratLon dates back to 1951 wLth the sLgnLng of 
the Treaty of ParLs establLshLng the European Coal and Steel 
CommunLty . ThLs was followed Ln 1957 wLth the sLgnLng of the 
FLrst Treaty o f Rome , establLshLng the European EconomLc 
CommunLty ; the Second Treaty of Rome set up the European 
CommunLty of AtomLc Energy . True to the prLncLples of Lnteg -
ratLon the 1969 Merger Treaty put all three CommunLtLes under 
a sL ngle CommLssLon and a sLngle CouncLl . 
lnstLtutLons of the European CommunLtLes : 
The three Euro-
pean treatLes set up CommunLty LnstLtutLons, whLch remaLn 
Lntact despLte the fusLon of the CommunLtLes Lnto a sLngle 
"European CommunLtLes" . The LnstLtutLons establLshed are: 
The European ParlLament at Strasbourg : thLs Ls a sLngle 
Assembly wLth 198 members consLstLng of "representatLves of 
the peoples of the State - members of the CommunLty" . 1 . It has 
no legLslatLve or executLve functLons but exercLses a delLber-
atLve and consultatLve functLon Ln all matters relatLng to the 
scope covered by the former three TreatLes . Though ArtLcle 
138(3) of the Treaty of Rome envLsaged electLon by dLrect 
unLversal suffrage, tLll 1979 members of thLs body were 
nomLnated by the ParlLaments of the member states . It cannot 
be saLd not to have any real power, though Lt must be conceded 
that Lts maLn Lnfluence Ls exercLsed through publLc opLnLon . 
Further Lt has the ultLmate sanctLon of a vote of censure on 
the CommLssLon: Lt may force the resLgnatLon en bloc of the 
CommLssLon by a two thLrds majorLty vote . It Ls entLtled to be 
consulted before the exercLse of many of the CouncLl's Lmport -
ant powers, and may propose amendments to the budget . 
Tne CouncLl of MLnLsters: 
ThLs consLsts of one representatLve 
1 .- ArtLcle 137 , Treaty of Rome . 
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from each member state 2 . controLLLng and coordLnotLng the 
overall dLrectLon of the EC. Its members sLt on Lt as repre-
sentotLves of theLr states, and must be members of the govern-
ment of that state. It Ls consLdered the supreme organ of the 
CommunLty sLnce Lt represents the sovereLgnty of the member 
states . Its decLsLons ore reached by a mojorLty of Lts members. 
ArtLcle 145 of the EEC Treaty states that the role of the 
CouncLL wLLL be to coordLnote economLc poLLcLes of the member 
states and gLves the CouncLL "the power to take decLsLons". 
ThLs power of decLsLon LLes generally Ln the fLeld of poLLcy 
mokLng CommunLty LegLslotLon, the concLusLon of treotLes(Art-
LcLe 228) and the odoptLon of the budget (ArtLcle 203A). 
The CommLssLon: 
ThLs Ls the executLve body of the CommunLty 
and as such, a truly CommunLty LnstLtutLon . Its members must 
be notLonols of a member state but once oppoLnted act wLth 
complete Lndependence of that state . they ore forbLdden to 
seek or take LnstructLons from any government . ArtLcLe 157 
outLLnes the brood crLterLon of "general competence and total 
Lndependence" as the quoLLfLcotLons for offLce . No more than 
two members may be oppoLnted by any one member state . The 
CommLssLon Ls headed by a PresLdent . The powers of the 
CommLssLon hove been descrLbed as those of "LnLtLotLve, prep-
orotLon and decLsLon" . 3. It formulates recommendotLons and 
opLnLons concernLng the Treaty, and works Ln conjunctLon wLth 
the CouncLL and the Assembly . LLke the CouncLL, the members of 
the CommLssLon ore outhorLsed to act by the grant of a pluroL-
Lty of specLfLc powers of decLsLon. The CommLssLon's portLc-
LpotLon Ln decLsLon mokLng cannot be underestLmoted however. 
It Ls true that many of Lts powers ore odmLnLstrotLve : by and 
Lorge, the CommLssLon proposes and the CouncLL dLsposes. 
However, the CommLssLon's portLcLpotLon Ln decLsLon mokLng 
Ls nevertheless fundamental Ln that Lt hos on exclusLve rLght 
of LnLtLotLve: wLthout a proposal from the CommLssLon the 
2 . - ArtLcle 148 Treaty of Rome 
3. - Losok & BrLdge: "Low and lnstLtutLons of the European 
CommunLtLes" 1973 p26 . 
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Co uncLl con decLde nothLn g. 
The method by whLch the wLll of the CouncLl or CommLssLon 
Ls t r onsmLtted Ls regulated by ArtLcle 189 of the EEC Treaty 
an d ArtLcle 161 of the EurotLon Treaty whLch provLde : 
" In order to carry out theLr task and Ln accordance 
wLt h t he p r ovLsLons of thLs Treaty, the CouncLl and the CommL -
ssLo n shall make regulotLons and Lssue dLrectLves , take decLs -
Lons , make recommendotLons or gLve opLnLons ." 4 . 
ThLs dLscloses o hLerorchy . The regulotLon stands 
p r eemLnent : Lt Ls to "apply generally ", to " be bLndLng Ln 
Lt s entLrety " and to " take dLrect effect Ln each Membe r state " 
A decLsLon , on the other hand Ls to " be bLndLng Ln Lts entLr -
ety upon those to whom Lt Ls dLrected ." A dLrectLve Lmposes 
ob l LgotLons whLch ore bLndLng as to the result ochLeved upon 
eac h Member state to whLch Lt Ls dLrected " whLle leovLng to 
notLonol outhorLtLes the choLce of form and methods" ; recom m-
endotLons and opLnLons " hove no bLndLng force . " 
The European Court of JustLce : 
ThLs sLngle court operates 
unde r jurLsdLctLon conferred upon Lt by the three orLgLnol 
treotLes . It consLsts of nLne judges and four Advocates Gener -
al . ArtLcle 187 of the EEC Treaty provLdes for enforcement of 
Lts judgments Ln the notLonol courts of member states . Lts 
ju r LsdLctLon Ls LLmLted to : 
- proceedLngs brought ogoLnst a Member State by the CommLss -
Lon or another Member state for a breach of Lts obLLgotLons 
under the Treaty of Rome 1957 . 
- supervLsLon of the exercLse of the powers of CommunLty 
LnstLtutLons Ln proceedLngs brought by member states, other 
CommunLty LnstLtutLons , LndLvLduoLs or undertokLng . 
- ruLLng on questLons orLsLng Ln notLonoL courts and trLb -
unoLs on the LnterpretotLon of the provLsLons of the Treaty 
of Rome . 
Thus Lt resmbles more o federal court rather than on 
LnternotLonoL one : Lts jurLsdLctLon Ls LLmLted to the odmLn -
4 . - ArtLcLe 189 EEC Treaty 
.. 
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LstrotLon of CommunLty Low, and as such Ls Lnternol to the EC. 
Howeve r, Lt hos power to annul acts of the CommLssLon and the 
CouncLL . ConsLderLng the vLgLLont role Lt ploys, the Lobel 
"custodLon of the Treaty" 5 . Ls not LnopproprLote . 
It Ls useful also to estabLLsh from the outset, the LLmLt-
ed sphere wLthLn whLch CommunLty Low operates . The domLnont 
thrust of the TreotLes clearly Ls Ln the LndustrLoL and 
commercLoL spheres : Ln portLculor, the Lord Chancellor's 
Deportment Lsoloted the foLLowLng areas of octLvLty : 6 . 
1 . Customs dutLes 
2 . agrLculture 
3. free movement of Labour servLces and capLtoL 
4. tra0spoct 
5. monopoLLes and restrLctLve proctLses 
6 . state old for Lndustry 
7 . regulotLon of the cool, steel and nuclear energy 
LndustrLes . 
How the lnstLtutLons ore worked: 
The reaLLty produced by thLs 
LnstLtutLonoL fr amework vorLes somewhat from the result whLch 
one mLght hove expected . The European ParLLoment has played a 
subsLdLary role Ln thLs structure . The LnstLtutLons whLch 
hove emerged domLnant have been the CouncLL and the CommLssLon 
and not Least , theLr LnterrelotLonshLp . One may hove ontLcLp-
ated a happy equLLLbrLum to hove been ochLeved Ln thLs relot-
LonshLp , but experLence LndLcates otherwLse : the Last twenty 
years hove seen the contLnuLng domLnance of the CouncLL of 
MLnLsters, and hence notLonaL Lnterests, at the expense of the 
CommLssLon . The natLonoL Lnterest has asserted Ltself Ln Less 
LnstLtutLonoLLsed ways . NatLonoL offLcLoLs ploy on Lmportant 
role Ln advLsLng the CommLssLon on poLLcy proposals: Lf any 
common feature chorocterLses the member states ' ottLtude to 
the EC , Lt Ls a general reluctance to concede autonomous 
powers to Brussels . The growth of the Lnfluence of Permanent 
5 . - op cLt footnote 3 
6 . - R e p o r t o f t h e Lo r d H Lg h C ho n c e L Lo r : " Le g a L a n d C o n s t L t -
utLonaL lmpLLcatLons of UK MembershLp of the European 
CommunLtLes" 1967 HMSO Cmnd 3301 pQ. 
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RepresentotLves of the member states Ln Br ussels hos accent-
uat ed thLs trend : they pr ov Lde o crucLol LLnk between the 
notLonal and CommunLty LnstLtutLons repre sentLng the member 
sta tes Ln Brussels to such an extent that they have become a 
pa rt of the CommunLty Ltself . Indeed, COREPER now ranks as an 
offLcLal LnstLtutLon of t he EC, actLng as representatLve Ln 
Brussels of the member states and Lts varLous LnstLtutLons 
an d presentLng the communLty poLnt to the natLonal capLtals . 
The Lmportonce of thLs group Ls Ltself testLmony to the jealous 
p reservotLon of notLonol Lnterests Ln the CommunLty . The 
notLonol Lntere st of member states Ls ogoLn promoted by the 
c lose LLnks moLntoLned between notLonol odmLnLstrotLons and 
t he prLvote offLces o f the CommLssLone rs (LncludLng the 
Co mmLssL o ners) of theLr own notLonoLLty . The ottLtude of our 
"CommL ssLo ner Ln Br ussels " on the port o f notLonol governments 
hos very real consequences . The LnsLstence on guordLng natLon-
ol Lnterest s , and reluctance to entrust the CommunLty wLth 
vLto l notLonol Lnterests or decLdLng o poLLtLcolly sensLtLve 
Lssue ho s affected the gr owt h of o "c ommunLty poLLcy " (reflec-
tLng the LLmL ted growth of the CommunLty Ltself) and resultLng 
Ln on emphosLs on technLcol consLderotLons apparently devoLd 
of LLfe and blood personaLLty: 
"What Ls most LnsLdLous and destructLve Ln on ossocLotLon 
of thLs kLnd Ls the proctLse by members of treotLng each case 
that comes before them strLctly on Lts LndLvLduol merLts . In 
that way they ore drLven to concentrate exclusLvely on the 
effect each such decLsLon mLght hove on any conceLvoble 
notLonol Lnterest . The CommunLty process of LegLslotLon Ls 
then treated Less and Less as o serLes of buLLdLng brLcks , 
each mokLng Lts contr(but(on towards a future European struct -
ure : Lnsteod, each brLck Ls exomLned Ln LsolotLon, and seen 
to hove potentLolly sharp edges ." 7 . 
The Low turn out to the fLrst "E uropean electLons " Ln 
1979 8 . LndLcotes that even wLthLn Europe, the EC remoLns on 
LndLstLnct personoLLty : much of thLs con be ottrLbuted to the 
ca ref ul , and sometLmes posLtLvely deferentLol ottLtude 
7 . - A. ShonfLeld: The French SpLrLt and the BrLtLsh Intruder 
LLstener 16 November 1972 p666 
8, - On overage, 54% The Even(ng Post , 
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adopted by the CommunLty -"D on ' t mLnd us, we're not really 
here" appears to be the ottLtude token whenever the two 
Lnterests rub shoulde r s on on Lmportont Lssue . ThLs state of 
offoLrs would appear to mLlLtote ogoLnst vLewLng the EC as a 
separate creotLon justLfyLng the exclusLon of MFN rLghts 
accorded by the member states Lf Ln reolLty, those member 
states act Ln such a dLctotorLol fo shLon Ln the group 
alleged to repre sent a new entLty, especLolly Lf thLs Ls at 
the expense of potentLol autonomy whLch could develop wLthLn 
the framew o rk provLded . In general , the balance Ls fLrmly 
Ln favour of the contLnued domLnonce of the notLonol Lnterest 
where the two conflLct . In certoLn fL elds Lt Ls true the rel-
otLonshLp Ls re ve r sed : the Common AgrLculturol Polley, for 
example , Ls governed exclusLvely by CommunLty LnstLtutLons , 
wLth notLonol mLnLstrLes octLng as Lts agent where requLred, 
but Ln general, the prevLous comment holds good . 
ThL s reolLty Ls a tentotLve LndLcotLon of what the EC 
Ls : the ossertLon, and re asse r tLon of the natLonal Lnterest 
by member states Ls Ln part a symptom of the rooted reluc-
tance o f states to su rrend er powers to another body ; corres -
pondLngly , thLs ossertLon o f natLonol Lnterest , and partLcu -
l a rl y Lts reossertLon (as LndLcated by the unforseen vLtalLty 
of COREPER) can be Lnterpreted as an LndLcotLon that the EC 
does pose a threat to theLr sovereLgnty . The fact that polLcy 
questLons Ln regard to the EC are formulated by the ForeLgn 
MLnLsters of the member states further poLnts to the EC beLng 
somethLng foreLgn and Lndependent of those member states : what 
that somethLng Ls remaLns to be examLned . 
The European CommunLtLes - Whot are they? 
"Europe grew Ln 
the form of small natLons . In a way, the Ldeo of natLon and 
notLonal sentLment were Lts most characterLstLc LnventLon . And 
now Lt must surpass Ltself . ThLs Ls the outlLne of the mLghty 
drama whLch wLll take place Ln the years to come . WLll Europe 
be able to free Ltself from the remnants of the post or wLll 
.. 
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Lt forever remaLn theLr prLsoner? For once before Ln hLstory 
a great cLvLLLsatLon dLed because Lt could not adopt a 
substLtute for Lts tradLtLonaL Ldea of a state . 9. 
Thus Jose Ortega y Gosset sounded a chLLLLng warnLng Ln 
1929 . The dream of a unLfLed Europe Ls as old as Europe Ltself . 
It would today be premature to applaud the reaLLzatLon of that 
dream, because Lt has not been reaLLzed. If any candLdote 
stands poLsed to fulfLLL thLs dream however Lt Ls undoubtedly 
the EC . It Ls generally recognLsed that the evoLutLon of thLs 
body has resulted Ln the creatLon of a unLquely novel regLme 
whLch fLts only uncomfortably Lnto estabLLshed prLncLpLes, 
and yet Lt Ls only by those estabLLshed standards that thLs 
creatLon may be judged . Thus the framework of LnquLry, of 
necessLty, gravLtates towards the EC's compotLbLLLty wLth the 
estabLLshed concept of the state . At some stage, however, one 
has to admLt the Lnadequacy of thLs framework and seek another 
framework wLthLn whLch to place the EC . As prevLously LndLcoted 
Lt Ls relatLveLy easy to outLLne the factual basLs of the 
EC : Lt Ls L@ss easy, however, to attrLbute a character to those 
LnstLtutLons as a whole. ThLs part of the paper wLLL attempt 
to do thLs . 
A dauntLng varLety of methods Ln whLch to do thLs 
present themselves . SLnce one knows only what one knows, the 
most natural approach, LnLtLaLLy, Ls to compare Lt to LnstLt-
utLons that already exLst to see Lf Lt corresponds wLth one of 
these tradLtLonaL LnstLtutLons . ThLs framework examLnes the 
compotLbLLLty of the EC wLth tradLtLonaL LnstLtutLons one 
suspects Lt mLght be . The questLons asked therefore are : Ls Lt 
a state? If so, what type of state - a federatLon or a 
confederotLon? A contrastLng Level on whLch such on enquLry 
may be conducted accepts the equatLon between the nature of the 
Law produced and the entLty producLng Lt: here, therefore, 
CommunLty Law Ls focused on as beLng LndLcatLve of the basLs 
on whLch that communLty rests. A further comparLson Ls wLth 
the natLonaL Law of the member state . Could Lt, alternatLveLy 
9 . - Hay: FederaLLsm and SupronatLonoL OrganLzotLons 1966 p1 . 
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be treated as merely another LnternotLonoL orgonLsotLon? It 
hos been , Ln port , the concepts themselves of state or Lnter -
notLonoL orgonLsotLon whLch hove yLelded Ln a bLd to occomo -
dote the EC . If one concludes nevertheless, that Lt Ls 
LncompotLble wLth such trodLtLonoL concepts, even where they 
hove been stretched, a new bosLs must be found for Lt . 
The olternotLve framework Ls more progmotLc, reochLng conclus-
Lons as to Lts nature by the way Lt acts, portLculorly Ln the 
LnternotLonoL sphere . ALLLed to thLs Ls the questLon of Lts 
Legal personoLLty . It Ls generally agreed that the EC repre-
sents a new and unprecedented force Ln LnternotLonoL Low , but 
that novelty hovLng been conceded, dLfferLng conclusLons hove 
been reached on the consequences of that novelty . 
The bosLs of the EC ' s novelty Ln the world of LnstLtutLons 
Ls exempLLfLed by the dLchotomy presented by the Treaty of Rome 
1957 : Ln one respect, Lt Ls LLke any other LnternotLonoL treat½ 
bLndLng because of the prLncLple of LnternotLonoL Low" pocto 
sunt servondo" . In another respect , however , thLs treaty may 
be rega r ded as representLng a constLtutLon between the member 
stotes , sLnce Lt governs the dLstrLbutLon of powers among them . 
As a constLtutLonoL Low , Lt Ls pecuLLor Ln that Lts force 
derLves from LnternotLonoL Low and not the wLLL of the people 
Ln constLtutLonoL assembly, and yet Lt would be focLLe, Ln 
LLght of the extensLve commLtments mode by Lts member states 
to each other , to conclude that Lt Ls merely another Lnterno-
tLonoL treaty . ThLs dLchotomy encapsulates the bosLc problem 
of ottrLbutLng a defLnLte character to the EC: Lt Ls not so 
much that the LnstLtutLons created Ln thLs regLme ore novel , 
but rather theLr effect , especLoLLy when consLdered Ln unLson, 
Leads to a result whLch Ls unexpected . AgoLn, the EC resembles 
Ln many respects a typLcoL LnternotLonoL orgonLsotLon but as 
such, pecuLLor Ln that they hove a defLnLte terrLtorLoL base , 
and hove dLrect, though lncomplete jurLsdlctlon over the 
populotLon of thLs base: Ln thLs respect they resemble a state 
more than on LnternotLonoL orgonLsotLon . In the genres of 
lnternotLonoL orgonLsotLons, the EC resemble more the poLLtLcoL 
ossocLotLon of states, despLte the tentotLve and stLLL Largely 
potentLoL nature of polltLcoL unLon contoLned Ln them , because 
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the oLternotLve "odmLnL st r otLve LnternotLonoL orgonLzotLon" 
type Ls potently more Lnoccurote Ln descrLbLng the m - though 
here ogoLn, Lt must be odmLtted Lts proper cLossLfLcotLon LLes 
somewhere Ln between the two . Schworzenberge r states : 
"The three CommunLtLes .... represent the hLghest form of 
LnternotLonoL LntegrotL on so for reached . "'10 . 
From thLs flow the bosLc problems o f cLossLfyLng the 
European CommunLtLes - not merely fr om t he fact o f LntegrotLon , 
but also fr om the type o f LntegrotLon ochLeved wLthLn the EC . 
The fLr st perspectLve fr om whLch the EC may be vLewed 
Ls fr om the outsLde . The ve ry fact that thLs perspectLve Ls 
possLbLe , ba sed as Lt Ls on o dLvLsLon between the members 
an d the "out sLde wo rld", Ln Ltself suggests that o common bond 
between the member s makes that dLvLsLon possLbLe and perhaps 
necessary . Two elements ore LnvoLved : the character Lt p re sent~ 
Lf any, to the outsLde world, and the verdLct of the outsLde 
wo rld on thLs presentotLon. The voLLdLty of such o dLvLsLon 
Leads to the Lnescopoble suggestLon that o state LLke body Ls 
LnvoLved: the typLcoL context Ln whLch o sLmLLor dLstLnctLon 
orLses Lf "Ln te rn otLonoL " Ls substLtuted for " outsLde world ", 
Ls that of the state . The poLnt Ls that Ln many respects, the 
European CommunLtLes do act exactly LLke o state Ln theLr 
Lnte rno tLonoL deoLLngs : the sLgnLfLconce of thLs appearance 
must therefore be assessed . 
The most obvLous fLeLd Ln whLch they act LLke o state Ls Ln 
the treotLes concluded wLth other subjects of LnternotLonoL Low. 
The very fact of thLs treaty mokLng power Ls Ln Ltself 
sLgnLfLcont : certoLnLy the range of treotLes concluded by the 
EC Ls LLmLted to the commercLoL sphere (dLctoted by ArtLcLes 
'1'13 and 228 of the EEC Treaty); once thi....s Li....mi....toti....on i....s 
accepted howeve r, then Ln terms of proctLcoL effect , form and 
enforceobLLLty, Lt Ls i....denti....coL too treaty entered i....nto by o 
sove re Lgn state : Lt oppLi....es di....rectly to on estobli....shed terri....to ry 
and populoti....on . The EC themselves ore named as the cont rocti....ng 
party; i....ts organs , i....n porti....culor the Commi....ssi....on , must deal 
'10 . - The Fronti....ers of lnternotLonoL Low '1962 p280 . 
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wLth any breach of Lt . CertaLnLy the trade agreements to whLch 
the EC ore a party Looks LLke a typLcaL LnternatLonaL treaty 
concluded by two states : the preferentLaL trade agreements 
concluded wLth SpaLn and Israel gLve the flavour of such 
treatLes: the treaty Ls concluded by the "CouncLL of the 
European Commun Lt Les " wLth the "SpanLsh Head of State"; the 
CommunLty was represented by both the PresLdent of the CouncLL 
and the PresLdent of the CommLssLon . The EC ore, therefore, Ln 
the true sense of the word the contractLng party; the CommLssLon 
Ln partLcuLar Ls the organ whLch LnLtLates and negotLates 
LnternatLonaL treatLes Le those wLth non member states . If that 
treaty Ls breached Lt Ls the organ whLch acts . The Lnvolvement, 
even Ln a conceptual sense as prLncLpaLs of the member states 
sLmpLy does not exLst : all NLne actLng together cannot Lnterfere 
because Ln regard to commercLaL treatLes, the EC have Lndeed 
replaced the member states. ThLs, then, Ls one LnternatLonaL 
sovereLgn power whLch has been transferred to the EC, or 
aLternatLveLy the rLght to partLcLpate Ln thLs fLeLd has been 
suspended by the member states Ln favour of the EC . ThLs 
represents Ln fact the strongest example of the dLvLsLbLLLty of 
LnternatLonaL sovereLgnty. As such, perhaps thLs mandate from 
the member states to the EC (LLmLtLng theLr LnternatLonaL 
sovereLgnty) may be LLkened to the federal clause adopted Ln 
some federal structures - except that the Latter emanates from 
the LnternaL control of a subject matter exercLsed by the states 
to the federal government; treaty makLng sovereLgnty suspended 
by the member states relates exclusLvely to theLr external 
relatLons of both the member state and that of the EC . If a 
state dLd enter a commercLaL agreement wLth another state, Lt 
could only be subject to the consent of the CommunLty to Lntro-
duce the approprLate LmpLementLng legLslatLon . 
HavLng touched on the aspects of Lts treaty obLLgatLona Lt 
Ls worthwhLle to consLder Lf Ln fact the EC succeed to treatLes 
of the member states - an aspect partLcularly pertLnent to the 
MFN clause, sLnce the promLse of MFN treatment Ls LnvarLabLy 
Lncluded Ln a treaty; the context Ln whLch the Lssue arLses Ls 
where an MFN treaty has been concluded before one party became 
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a member of the EC . The confLLct posed LS Ln fact relevant to 
all treotLes to whLch member states were bound: what LS the 
posLtLon of treotLes concluded before a member state become a 
party to the EC? Clearly the possLbLLLty of confLLct exLsts : 
ArtLcle 234(EEC Treaty) LS quLte clear on thLs poLnt , provLdLng 
that pre-membershLp treaty provLSLons LnvoLvLng non members 
"shall not be affected by the ProvLsLons of thLs Treaty" . 
However, members ore also requLred to take due steps to 
hormonLze or wLthdrow from such treotLes to brLng them Lnto 
LLne wLth the obLLgotLons under the Treaty of Rome . States wLLl 
therefore remoLn bound by prevLous treotLes unless they con be 
Lawfully termLnoted . ThLs concLusLon prLmo focLe opplLes to MFN 
treotLes . ThLs vLew LS supported by the ILC ' s concLusLon Ln the 
context of successLon to treotLes: 
"Thus ArtLcle 234 of the Treaty of Rome unmLstokobLy 
approaches the questLon of pre-CommunLty treotLes of member 
states wLth thLrd countrLes from the angle of the rules 
governLng the oppLLcotLon of successLve treotLes reLotLng to the 
some subject matter (ArtLcLe 30 of the VLenno ConventLon) on 
the Low of TreotLes . In other words, pre-CommunLty treotLes ore 
dealt wLth Ln the Rome Treaty Ln the context of compotLbLlLty 
of treaty obLLgotLons and not of the successLon of stotes . "'l'l . 
On thLs VLew, the EC do not succeed to pre-membershLp 
treaty obLLgotLons of the member states even Ln the areas 
(mostly Ln the commercLoL sphere) covered by the Treaty, because 
the Treaty of Rome LS VLewed as remoLnLng on the Lntergovern-
mentoL plane . The consequences of thLs ore rather stortLLng: 
Lf the EC could be consLdered to "succeed" to prLor MFN treotLes 
of the member states, the only favours a non member could cloLm 
would be those granted by the EC to another state : thLS Lndeed , 
LS the posLtLon token by the EC. It LS not, however, the 
accepted LnterpretotLon of the Treaty of Rome whLch vLews the 
member states as stLLL bound by theLr MFN treotLes after 
occessLon . As Wohlfarth poLnts out: 
"We must start from the fact that at the present tLme the 
'l'l . - Yearbook '1974 VoL 2 Port 'l p253-4 . 
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member states stLL L possess theLr commercLoL poLLcy competences, 
and that they ore bound by treotLes o f commerce, and Ln 
prLnCLPLe con also conclude new trade agreements wLth thLrd 
countrLes .... As for as exLstLng agreements between the member 
states and thLrd countrLes o re concerned, efforts must also 
be mode to ossLmLLote and adopt them to the sLtuotLon produced 
by the LntroductL on o f a common customs torLff. 11 12. 
In fact the VLtoLLty o f t he MFN treotLes o f member states 
Ln area s regulated by the Treaty of Rome depends on whether the 
favours granted by one member to another may be cLoLmed by 
non member MFN partners because after membershLp, "the States 
members of the CommunLty hove reLLn quLshed all powers Ln the 
fLeLd of trade poLLcy to the CommunLty and, as LndLVLduoL 
countrLes, no Longer hove t he necessary means of fuLfLLLLng 
bLLoteroL commLtments. They no Longer hove LndLVLduoL customs 
torLffs . They connot ,therefore , grant customs o r trade advant -
ages not provLded for by the common system " . 13. 
The Lssue therefore LS whether the favours granted by one 
member o f t he EC to another may Legally be cLoLmed by a non 
member MFN treaty partner under the contLnuLng treaty , and to 
what extent the LncLusLon of on exp re ss customs unLon excludes 
suc h fa vours from beLng cLoLmed. As Feld poLnts out , these 
favours were , Ln proctLse , cLoLmed by certoLn countrLes under 
bLLoteroL MFN treotLes wLth member states : 
" the SovLet bloc countrLes hove demanded that thoy be 
accorded under the most favoured notLon clause the some torLff 
advantages from whLch the member states hove benefLted Ln theLr 
LnternoL trode . "14. 
The UnLted States of AmerLco LLkewLse LS a party to 
treotLes of Commerce and NovLgotLon wLth Germany , Italy and the 
Netherlands, and to a ConventLon of EstobLLshment wLth Fronce . 
Hoy outLLnes the ottLtude of the EC Ln regard to the MFN 
treotLes of the member states : 
"Th e SLx of the EEC hove already determLned that the most 
fav oured notLon treatment wLLL not be extended thLrd countrLes 
12 . - " The European EconomLc CommunLty and World Trade": 
B11CL SpecLoL PubLLcotLon No 7 1965 p11 . 
13 . - Comments of the EEC : Report of the ILC 1978 p448 
14 . - Texas Low RevLew 1965 43 p899 cLtLng 6EEC Comm Gen Rep . 
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wLth r egard to benefLts under the EEC Treaty . The UnLted States 
hos not questLoned , and Ls not LLkeLy to questLon thLs , o LbeLt 
unLLoteroL denLoL of most favou r ed notLon benefLts Lest the 
desL r ed e f fects of the Common Market as o tool of economLc and 
possLbLy poLLtLcoL LntegrotLon be perverted ." '15 . 
The domLnont motLve Ln the UnLted States ocquLescence Ln 
the ottLtude adopted by the EC was therefore o poLLtLcoL one , 
not o Legal one . The SpecLoL Rapporteur ' s LnterpretatLon of 
non member government ' s reoctLons to the creotLon of the EEC Led 
hLm to the some concLusLon : 
" No r con the fact that controversLes, protests and 
dLpLomatLc steps hove Led Ln several coses to more or Less 
sotLsfoctory compromLses mostly to the detrLment but sometLmes 
to the benefLt of outsLders, be consLdered as suffLcLent to 
estobLLsh o general proctLse and communLs opLnLo of Stotes" . '16 . 
The Legal voLLdLty of the EC ' s posLtLon therefore remoLns 
to be decLded . Where the prevLous treaty and the Treaty of Rome 
ore consLstent , but the State by Lts membershLp of the EC, does 
not hove the power to LmpLement Lt , CommunLty LmpLementotLon 
must be sought , or permLssLon for the member to comply wLth Lts 
Lnte r notLonoL obLLgatLons be granted . An aLternatLve to such a 
Loose system could be based on a parallel to ArtLcLe '1'16 
(EEC Treaty) whLch provLdes for the CommunLty to take over the 
role of separate members Ln orgonLzotLons : thLs prLncLpLe of 
successLon could be oppLLed to prevLous treatLes now covered 
by CommunLty jurLsdLctLon, or o "communLty clause" mokLng the 
treaty entered Lnto by the member state subject to CommunLty 
LmpLementatLon . In regard to unLLoteraL convent Lons not 
governLng economLc matters such as the European ConventLon on 
Human RLghts the LndLvLduoL member state remoLns Ln oLL senses 
the controctLng party, and the EC have only on LnformoL 
"obLLgotLon" to conform to Lt . VLsuaLLy, the result ochLeved by 
ArtLcLe '1'16 Ln respect of membershLp of LnternatLonoL organ-
LzotLons Ls negLLgLbLe because the actual LndLvLduoL state 
membershLp remaLns : on EC matters, however , all must vote 
'15 . - The EEC and The Most Favoured NotLon Clouse : 23 
V. PLttsburg LR '1962 p662 
'16 . - Yearbook I LC 
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together Ln proceedLng "by common act Lon" : Ln thLs respect, Ln 
real terms the EC hove succeeded to the orgonLzotLon . Formally 
the dLvLsLons between member states persLst : thLs Ls the case 
wLth Lts membershLp of GATT - certoLnLy Ln the Second Hoegemon 
Cose 17 the Court of JustLce consLdered the EC LtseLf a partner 
to the Gott . 
The corollary of enterLng dLrectLy Lnto LnternotLonoL Legal 
reLotLonshLps roLses the Lssue of the EC's LLobLLLty . CertoLn 
Legal consequences flow from thLs portLcLpotLon : Lf the EC 
themselves ore the controctLng party to a trade agreement, then 
Lt Ls the only possLbLe defendant . The mojorLty of contentLous 
Lssues wLLL normally only LnvoLve the EC as the party to deal 
wLth because Lt Ls typLcoLLy the CommLssLon and Court of JustLce 
(Le non notLonoL organs) who ore domLnont Ln the fLeLds LLkeLy 
to Lead to non member government LnterventLon . Only Lf the 
CouncLL was LnvoLved could on organ of the EC possLbLy Lead to 
the LnvoLvement of the member states : Ln other cLrcumstonces, Lt 
Ls the EC wLth whom one must negotLote dLpLomotLcoLLy, cLoLm 
reporotLon from , or engage Ln orbLtrotLon wLth . 
The EC hove certoLn other features whLch Ln proctLse 
resemble the functLons of a typLcoL state . The most obvLous 
Ls the Lus LegotLons: thLs Ls LLmLted at present to EC Ambass-
adors Ln WoshLngton D.C., New York, and Tokyo, representLng 
the group's Lnterests, though the potentLoL exLsts for dLrect 
representotLon Ln more f o reLgn copLtoLs. If state proctLse Ls 
onythLng to go by, the PresLdent o f the CommLssLon Ls accorded 
Head of State status outsLde the EC. On the home front, a 
separate dLpLomotLc corps Ls occredLted to the European 
CommLssLon Ln Brus sels - Ln thLs respect Lt Ls treated Ln fact 
exactly LLke a state . Aga(nst thLs sLmLLar(ty of State attr\.,b-
utes however Ls the fact that overseas the Lnterests of notLon-
oLs ore safeguarded excLusLveLy by the member state: the 
European CommunLtLes ore excluded from thLs fLeLd, as Lndeeo they 
are Ln all matters except trade . 
17 . - 12 CMLR 1975 77 Cose 181/73 
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PoLLtLcol Aspects of the European CommunLtLes 
The sLngle greatest 
obstacle to closs~fyLng the EC as o state Ls that poLLtLcolly 
the member states cannot be consLdered to hove unLted . ObvLously 
Lf the EC may be treated as o state, the favours granted by one 
member to another cannot be cloLmed by o non member (the MFN 
prLncLple processes only favours granted from one state to 
another state) because the members con no Longer be regarded as 
separate states . SLnce the degree of poLLtLcol unLty ploys o 
crucLol, Lf not decLsLve role Ln the determLnotLon of statehood, 
Lt must be consLdered . 
To many commentators, the poLLtLcal dLsunLty of the EC Ls 
conclusLve evLdence that Lt cannot be treated as a state . The 
SpecLol Rapporteur on Most Favoured NotLon clauses Ln portLculor 
cLted the absence of poLLtLcol unLty Ln customs unLons, Ln 
portLculor the EEC, Ln rejectLng the argument that the EEC 
constLtuted a new entLty or o suffLcLent change Ln cLrcumstonces 
to exclude the operotLon of MFN treotLes: the process of 
economLc LntegrotLon alone Ls regarded as foLLLng short of o 
unLtLng of states . 18 . SLnce economLc LntegrotLon, however close 
cannot be regarded as unLtLng the states, what type of unLty 
could ochLeve thLs result? The clearest LmpLLcotLon Ls that of 
poLLtLcol unLty - presumably Ln oddLtLon to the economLc 
LntegrotLon already ochLeved . ThLs suggestLon Ls subsequently 
confLrmed by the SpecLol Rapporteur's answer to the "change of 
cLrcumstonce" argument: 
"Here ogoLn Lt seems untenable to moLntoLn that Ln the 
absence of o poLLtLcol unLon among the portLcLponts . . . "19. 
ThLs confLrms that the gap created by economLc LntegratLon 
faLLLng short of a unLtLng of states" would Lndeed be fLLLed by 
poLLtLcol unLon . Such o conclusLon as Lt stands, Ls unsotLs-
foctory because Lt takes no account of the degrees of poLLtLcal 
unLon : Lt appears to assume that a state of poLLtLcol unLon 
eLther exLsts or Lt doesn't, whLch clearly Ln relotLon to the 
EC Ls not on opproprLote crLterLon. If poLLtLcol unLon consLsts 
18. - Yearbook Vol I I 1975 p17 
19. - LbLd. 
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o f the peoples votLng for theLr representatLves to a common 
assembly , the the EC can be consLdered as contaLnLng an ele-
ment of poLLtLcal unLon , (albeLt Ln a LLmLted form) to the 
extent that the " peoples of Europe" now vote dLrectly for 
theL r repre sentatLves Ln the European ParLLament . It LS too 
early of course to assess the SLgnLfLcance of the advent of 
dLrect electLons, Ln partLcular whether Lt WLLL elevate the 
European ParLLament from beLng LLttle more than a propaganda 
forum . CertaLnly the parLLament LS now poLLtLcally representatLve 
Ln that poLLtLcal LoyaltLes, rather then natLonal LoyaltLes now 
prov Ld ed- the basLs of dLVLSLon , so that Lt can hardly be re-
ga rded as a subsLdLary of the member states ' parLLaments Ln 
thLs r egard . TLLL dLrect electLons , Lt dLd reflect the potentLal 
dLVLSLons of the member states ' parLLaments Ln that the poLLtLcal 
partLes sent represen~atLves to Strasbourg Ln proportLon to those 
represented Ln the home parLLaments . DLrect electLons however 
WLLL mean at the very Least that the European ParLLament WLLL 
represent an Lndependent poLLtLcal verdLct from that exLstLng 
Ln the home parLLaments . Hay predLcted : 
" The dLr·ect electLon of the ParLLament would mark the 
estabLLshment of the fLrst branch of a " European government " 20 . 
ThLs may be true , but would hardly dLsplace the SpecLal 
Rapporteur ' s verdLct , whLch LS justLfLed Ln terms of the LLmLted 
powers that the parLLament enjoys; Lt has no control over the 
most Lmportant poLLcy makLng organ , the CouncLL , and only an 
emergency power agaLnst the CommLSSLon . Thus , though the SpecLal 
Rapporteur LS correct as matters stand at present , Ln hLS con-
clusLon Lt LS clear that the Label "p oLLtLcal unLon" requLres a 
more specLfLc defLnLtLon - especLally SLnce the LndLcatLons are 
that the groundwork LS beLng LaLd at present for the development 
Ln the future of the type of "poLLtLcal unLon " the SpecLal 
Rapporteur has Ln mLnd . 
20 . - Hay - Supra Footnote 9 p 78 
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Conceptual descrLptLon of the European CommunLtLes: 
ThLs sectLon 
wLLL be devoted to fLndLng a conceptual framework that fLts the 
EC . The consequences of such a cLossLfLcotLon process ore of 
dLrect r elevance to the LmmedLote concern of thLs paper ; deLLver -
Lng a verdLct of statehood on the EC clearly would scotch any 
suggestLon that MFN treatment extended to favours granted wLthLn 
that " state "; LLkewLse the oppLLcotLon of the ' customs unLon 
exceptLon ' becomP~ stroLned Lf one may chorocterLze the EC as a 
state . It Ls quLte clear , however , that Lf the Lmpoct of the EC 
on the MFN prLncLpLe Ls to be evaluated , fLrst of all one must 
evaluate what the EC ore, sLnce much of the reLotLonshLp turns 
on that questLon . 
The feature whLch strLkes one LmmedLoteLy about the EC Ls 
that Ln some respects Lt LS Lndependent from Lts creators, the 
member states , and further , hos power over them suggestLng a 
federal structure . ThLs superfLcLoL LmpressLon LS reLnforced 
by the fact that the nature of thLs power extends beyond the 
odmLnLstrotLve and technLcoL to LLfe and blood poLLcy mokLng , 
LncLudLng poLLtLcoL representotLon; further , the EC's Low 
regulate:; the LndLvLduoLs of the member states dLrectLy and not 
through the member state as LntermedLory . We begLn the exomLn -
otLon of what the EC ore by comporLng to the most fomLLLor 
structure , the state . 
Are the European CommunLtLes a state? 
A superfLcLoL exomLnotLon 
of the EC on Lts own reveals certoLn stoteLLke chorocterLstLcs , 
and more precLseLy, federal stotelLke powers . CommunLty Low, 
for example, Ls dLrectLy bLndLng on the LndLvLduoLs of the group , 
and beLng so, may be regarded as LnternoL Low . The LnstLtutLons 
created by the 3 TreotLes may be regarded as creotLng the 
"embryo" of a state structure - the CouncLl of MLnLsters becomes 
the upper house where sectLonol Lnterests ore represented, the 
CommLssLon becomes the CobLnet, popular representotLon Ls exer-
cLsed Ln the European PorLLoment, and the European Court of 
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JustLce acts as a supreme constLtutLonoL and odmLnLstrotLve 
cou rt. The LmmedLote oppLLcotLon of the Low of thLs body to 
Lts LndLvLduols, on thLs LnterpretotLon , forms the strongest 
evLdence that a specLfLed degree of sovereLgnty relotLng to 
Lts competence hos been transferred to the EC by the orLgLnol 
member states. On thLs vLew : 
"The CommunLty Ls a hLerorchLcoL structure buLLt from 
wLthLn and below and constLtutLng the hLghest common refer-
ence for Lts members; (Lt) Ls not a collateral structure but 
Lntegrotes exLstLng ones " 2'1 . 
ThLs vLew Lnterprets the EC as potentLoLLy representLng 
a new federal state because of the character of the LnstLtut-
Lons created, and vLewed sLmply Ln LsolatLon, thLs vLew hos 
consLde roble force . Unfortunately, Lt Ls LmpossLble to vLew them 
Ln LsolotLon, because the Lnfluence of the member states persLsts 
Ln thLs structure . HesLtotLon surrounds the conclusLon that the 
EC ore a state because the operotLon of Lts LnstLtutLons Ls 
LLmLted to specLfLc fLelds - mostly economLc. Thus the LnstLtut-
Lons may be descrLbed as federal Ln effect, whLch Ln Ltself 
LndLcotes theLr orLentotLon wLthout actually concludLng that they 
brLng a federal state Lnto exLstence . Pescatore focuses on 
sLmLLor features as Hoy Ln dLstLnguLshLng the EC from onythLng 
that hos preceded Lt - LncludLng the federal state: 
"It permLts the formotLon of a poLLtLcoL wLLL , the creotLon 
of a common body of LegLslotLon, the management of common Lnter-
ests , and Lastly the regulotLon of dLsputes on the bosLs of a 
compulsory jurLsdLctLon exercLsed by the trLbunoL endowed wLth 
a general competence" 22 . 
By the trodLtLonoL defLnLtLon , the EC may superfLcLoLLy be 
regarded as fulfLLLLng three of the four requLrements of a stote 23 
i..t hos " people '' who "LLve together as a communLty"; the borders 
of the nLne fulfLLL the requLrement of "a country Ln whLch the 
people hove settled down"; the EC may be regarded as Lts Govern -
ment . It Ls Ln the fourth requLrement - of a sovereLgn govern-
ment - that the EC and the trodLtLonoL defLnLtLon of a state port 
company; as OppenheLm states: 
2'1 . - Supra Footnote 9 p 6'1 
22 . - Common Market Low RevLew 7 '1970 p '170 
23 . - They ore set out Ln "OppenheLm's lnternot(onol Low" -
Lauterpacht Vol '1 8th Ed. '1955 p '1'18-9 
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" SovereLgnty Ls a supreme outhorLty , on outhorLty whLch 
Ls Lndependent of any earthly outhorLty . SovereLgnty Ln the 
strLct and narrowest sense of the term LmplLes , therefo r e , 
Lndependence al l round , wLthLn and wLthout the borders of the 
cou n tr y" 24 . 
The EC , of course , Ls not " Lndependent all round " - but 
the r e ogoLn , on thLs defLnLtLon , neLther ore the membe r states . 
In fact the Lssue of sovereLgnty emerges as decLsLve Ln deter -
mLnLng whether the EC ore a state - and more precLsely that of 
"external sovereLgnty" sLnce " Lnternol " sovereLgnty may be 
shored between constLtutLonol unLts wLhout any encroachment 
on Lts status of statehood . As poLnted out by Joenlcke : 
" The exLstence of sovereLgn powers Ls LndLvLsLbly connect -
ed wLth the exLstence of state powers from whLch the former Ls 
derLved " 25 . 
On thLs crLterLon , Lt cannot be soLd the sovereLgn powers 
were transferred to the EC; the foundotLon of these powers Ls 
the foundLng treotLes; Lt Ls hard to conceLve of "state " powers 
beLng created Ln on LnternotLonol treaty for the sLmple reason 
(apart from the Lnherent conceptual conflLct of the suggestLon) 
that beLng treaty powers, Lt Ls open to the portLes to the 
treaty to dLsmontle the EC , LncludLng Lts powers - or on 
LndLvLduol state may unLloterolly wLthdrow . ThL s fact Ls 
LnconsLstent wLth the exLstence of soverelgn powers hovLng 
been transferred to the CommunLty . Such a conclusLon stLll 
holds good Lf one Lnterprets the Treaty of Rome as gLvLng the 
EC the rLght to act Ln a certoLn fLeld (undoubtedly Lt hos thLs 
"rLght" sLnce Lt con decLde and bLnd the member states by Lts 
decLsLon) but the member state , though not hovLng the rLght, 
hos the power to act Ln that fLeld because Lt may revoke Lts 
outhorLzotLon to the CommunLtLes . Such a conclusLon LnevLtobly 
flows from concelvLng of sovereLgnty as LndLvLsLble and cannot 
therefore by defLnLtLon be transferred except to another state . 
On thLs LnterpretotLon, the CommunLtLes hove no "lLfe of theLr 
own"; Lt ls not a state because Lt weLlds no sovereLgn powers ; 
24 . - LbLd, p 119 
25 . - Hoy Supra Footnote 9 p 64 
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Lt hos no sovereLgn powers because those powers Lt hos may be 
revoked , whLch Ln turn testLfLes to the resLduoL sovereLgnty 
of those Lotter powers . 
DLfferent conceptLons of sovereLgnty hold more promLse 
Ln LobeLLLng the EC os o state . ThLs vLew suggested LnLtLoLLy 
by E . N. van Kleffens and ompLLfLed upon by Von Hecke , takes 
os Lts sto r tLng poLnt o more progmotLc (and Less demondLng) 
vLew of the LngredLents of sovereLgnty : 
" In every LnternotLonoL LnstLtutLon , port of the sover-
eLgnty of Lts members Ls ceded by the to LnternotLonoL orgons " 26 . 
At fLrst sLght, thLs vLew appears to support the school 
of tho ught whLch regards any LnternotLonoL commLtment os o Loss , 
olbeLt small , of that state ' s sovereLgnty . ThLs LmpressLon Ls 
soon co r rected ; the quoLLty of LntegrotLon envLsoged before Lt 
con be soLd that the state's sovereLgnty hos been extLnguLshed 
requLres both on Lrrevocoble and on uncondLtLonol commLtment on 
the port of the state . In thLs respect, Lt Ls LdentLcoL to the 
trodLtLonoL school ; Lt only conceLves of on LnternotLonoL organ 
hovLng sovereLgn powers because o state hos emptLed Lts sover-
eLgnty Ln Lts favour ; sovereLgn power , lLke the stLng of o bee , 
con only orLse wLth the death of the transferor . For the rea-
sons suggested prevLously, the EC cannot be regarded os exercLsLng 
sovereLgn powers under thLs LnterpretotLon; Lts member states 
certoLnLy do contLnue to exercLse extensLve sovereLgn powers , 
and ogoLn , they may revoke the powers enjoyed by the EC . 
It would be temptLng to conclude ot thLs stage that the EC 
ore nothLng more than the member states ; the Latter's sovereLgn 
powers ore undoubted, and there LS consequently no ro om Left 
for another body wLthLn the some oreo exercLsLng sovereLgn powers . 
Hoy, however , takes Lssue wLth such o strLct conceptLon of sover -
eLgnty - thLs dLfference proves crucLoL to hLs ultLmote conclus-
Lon . He makes the apparently Lnnocent suggestLon that sovereLgnty 
Ls o dLvLsLbLe concept - that Lndeed, o LLtteL sovereLgnty con 
be transferred . 
"CLrcumstonces whLch show the Loss of sovereLgnty may be 
26 . - SovereLgnty Ln lnternotLonol Low 82 ReceuLL des Cours 
1953 p 119 
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whether decLsLons of the orgonLsotLon requLre o unomLnous vote 
or o mojorLty; whethe r the o r gonLsotLon hos jurLsdLctLon to 
det ermLne Lts· own jurLsdLctLon and whether the decLsLons of 
th e orgonLsotLon bLnd the member state outomotLcoLLy ... whet her 
the decLsLons o f the LnstLtutLons bLnd LndLvLduoLs dLrectLy and 
outomotLcoLLy" 27 . 
The rele vance of such o modLfLcotLon to the task of cLoss-
Lf yLng the EC Ls reodLLy apparent : they comply wLth oLL these 
crLterLo. It Ls portLcuLorLy relevant Ln that Lt accepts that 
sov ereLgn powers may shLft as o result of on express grant or 
by evoLutLon, or both; wLth the EC Ln mLnd, Lt Ls clea r that 
o grant o f powers was mode Ln the Treaty of Rome 1957 . The 
grant of powers related dLrectLy to economLc matters , but 
the EC hove evolved beyond such matters, LncorporotLng o unL -
fLed fLnoncLoL poLLcy and extendLng to dLrect eLectLons to the 
European PorLLoment . Such evoLutLon Ls token Lnto account Ln 
thLs assessment of sovereLgnty . 
ThLs vLew regards sovereLgnty as o "coLLectLon of powers 
analogous to the common Low notLon of o bundle of rLghts " 28 . 
SovereLgnty Ls thereby conceLved of as essentLoLLy o power 
(the supreme one Ln fact) reguLotLng o certoLn subject matte r . 
The portLcuLor bundle of rLghts transferred Ln thLs Lnstonce 
Ls the commercLoL poLLcy of the member states ; such o transfer 
affects both the LnternoL and external sovereLgnty of the member 
states ; the EC jurLsdLctLon Ln thLs respect replaces that of 
the member states both Ln the Latter ' s LnternoL Low and Ln Lts 
external reLotLons, sLnce the EC become the proper party Ln 
thLs respect that thLrd states must deal wLth . 
The LnescopobLe concLusLon on thLs LnterpretotLon of sover -
eLgnty Ls that the EC do WL~Ld some sovereLgn powers - an 
apparently dromotLc concLusLon . The sLgnLfLconce of such o 
concLusLon Ls, unfortunately , somewhat of on ontL-cLi. .. mox; the 
fLexLbLLLty of thLs controstLng conceptLon of sovereLgnty Ls 
won ot the expense, uLtLmoteLy , of the sLgnLfLconce ottrLbuted 
to LobeLLLng these powers as " sovereLgn " because theLr LnevLtobLe 
27 . - Hoy Supra Footnote 9 p 69 
28 . - LbLd p 70 
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LLnk wLth statehood Ls broken. Hoy odmLts : 
"I t Lntends to soy nothLng about the exLstence of state-
hood " 29 . 
The sLgnLfLconce of regordLng sovereLgnty as o dLvLsLbLe 
concept, and hence cLoLmLng that the EC do exercLse sovereLg n 
powers, Ls LLmLte d because Lt Ls not necessorLLy LndLcotLve of 
stat eh ood . The trodLtLonoL state structures whLch odmLt shored 
sove reLgn powers ore the federotLon and the confederotLon . The 
federotLon Ls composed of separate constLtuent states LnternoLLy , 
but externally operates o sLngLe unLt . The dLversLty of Lnter -
ests repre sented by o federotLon must hove o terrLtorLoL base ; 
the EC comply wLth thLs requLrement Ln that they ore terrLtorLoLLy 
LLmLted - they ore the European CommunLtLes . The LnternoL dLvLs -
Lon of powers envLsoged Ln o federotLon resembles the dLvLsLon 
of sovereLgn powers created by the EC; externally, however, the 
federotLon must appear as o sLngLe sovereLgn entLty . The membe r 
states of the EC pursue Lndependent foreLgn poLLcLes; thLs fact 
Ls LnconsLstent wLth the trodLtLonoL structure of o federotLon, 
and therefore, the EC must foLL as o federotLon. Hoy concludes : 
" FederotLon LS ossocLoted wLth statehood; and the communLtLes , 
unquestLonobLy, ore not states" 30 . 
ThL s unequLvocoL concLusLon exempLLfLes the LLmLted SLgnLfL -
conce to be attached to the notLon that sovereLgn power may be 
dLvLded . The Lndependent portLcLpotLon of the member states Ln 
the LnternotLonoL communLty Ls Lnvoked to s how that the EC 
ore not o federotLon . But the member states ore not completely 
Lndependent externally; theLr external commercLoL po LLcLes ore 
conducted excLusLveLy by the EC . SLnce s overeLgn powers may be 
dLvLded along the LLnes LndLcoted by Hoy, could not thLs sover -
eLgn power LndLcate that the EC represent a LLmLted federatLon? 
Or must o federotLon monopoLLze the external poLLCLes of Lts 
member states before Lt may properly be called o federotLon . 
The Lotter suggestLon LS LnconsLstent wLth the very notLon that 
sovereLgn powers may Lndeed be dLvLded . The concept of dLvLdLng 
sovereLgn powers Lends Ltself to the concept of o " LLmLted 
29 . - Lb Ld p 73 
30 . - LbLd p 87 
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fed erotLon - Lnde ed , Lt may be wondered whether Ln LLght of the 
memb er states' obdLcotLon of LnvoLvement Ln theLr commercLoL 
po LLcLes whether they should not be Labelled "LLmLted" states . 
LobeLLLng the EC os o confederotLon holds out more hope 
howev er. A confederotLon Ls on ossocLotLon of states esbLLshed 
by o treaty between Lts sovereLgn members. lnstLtutLons ore 
normally created by thLs treaty to LmpLement the objectLves of 
th Ls ossocLotL on . BeLng o treaty the members may wLthdrow from 
Lt . TheLr sovereLgnty consequently persLsts (wLthdrowoL from o 
fed erotLo n, on the othe r hand, generally cuLmLnotes Ln o cLvLL 
wa r, os the AmerLcon experLence Ln 1860 shows) . The Low bLndLng 
th e members of o confederotLon Ls consequently only LnternotLo noL 
Low; Ln thLs re spect , the EC fLt Ln only awkwardly because 
Commun Lty Low consLsts of o mLxture of LnternotLonoL Low and 
Low pecuLLor to LtseLf . However , Lf the treaty estobLLshLng o 
conf ederotLo n may odmLt cooperotLon only Ln LLmLted areas of 
commo n Lnterest between the member states , os contoLned Ln the 
Tr eaty of Rome, (and here the notLon of o shorLng of sovereLgn 
powe rs Ls crucLoL) the n the EC may be cLossLfLed os o LLmLted 
confederotLon, because the cooperotLon estobLLshed by the Treaty 
of Rome relate s only too LLmLted sphere - prLncLpoLLy economLc . 
An oLternotLve Lobel could be therefore on economLc confederotLo n. 
It Ls accepted that the operotLon of the MFN prLncLpLe Ls 
excluded Lf the favours granted ore granted wLthLn o federal 
state ; even Lf Lt con be argued that the EC represents o LLmLted 
federal state , Lt Ls uncertoLn whether the prLncLpLe Ls excluded 
by thLs "LLmLted " form . LLkewLse , the some uncertoLnty surrounds 
the Lmpoct of o " LLmLted " confederotLon on the MFN prLncLpLe . It 
may be doubted Ln fact whether o full fledged confederotLon Lt -
self would exclude the prLncLpLe . The answers to these questLons 
ore token up Loter Ln the concLudLng pages of thLs chapte r. 
An oLternotLve LnterpretotLon of federoLLsm produces yet 
another verdLct on what the EC ore . The emphosLs of thLs Lnter-
pretotLon Looks Less ot the conceptual structure of o federal 
state but focuses on the functLonoL reoLLty ochLeved by such on 
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ossocLotLon as the crLterLon of concLudLng that a federal 
prLncLpLe exLsts . It Ls therefore on LnternoL onoLysLs of 
the structure , concentrotLng on the reoLLty produced wLthLn 
Lt . ThLs vLew accepts that the essence of federoLLsm LLes 
Ln Lts recognLtLon of dLversLty wLthLn the structure . From 
such dLversLty , Lndependence and Lnterdependence combLne Ln 
the reLotLonshLp between the unLt and the central outhorLty . 
A constLtutLon reguLotLng such a reLotLonshLpe Ls therefore 
necessary . In functLonoL terms such a dLversLty Ls quoLLfLed 
by the foLLowLng cLrcumstonces: 
- physLcoL neLghbourhood of the terrLtorLoLLy dLverse groups 
- the expectotLon of Lncreosed economLc prosperLty 
- sLmLLorLty Ln the poLLtLcoL nature of the member governments 
- the shorLng of some unLfyLng LdeoL 
The EC ore portLcuLorLy susceptLbLe to thLs approach be-
cause the sLgnLfLconce of theLr pecuLLorLty as a whole Ls 
mLnLmLzed Lf theLr Lndependent functLons ore token as the 
crLterLon . UnquestLonobLy the EC members constLtute a physLcoL 
neLghtbourhood . The desLre for Lncreosed economLc prosperLty 
formed the LnLtLoL reason for Lts creotLon; LLkewLse the desLre 
for greater LnternotLonoL Lmpoct con be ottrLbted to Lt Lf one 
con accept Lts LLmLtotLon to the economLc sphere. The govern-
ments of the member states ore oLL "democrotLc" and the dream 
of a unLfLed Europe may be consLdered Lts unLfyLng LdeoL, 
reLnforced Ln the recent PorLs SummLt of 1978 . The degree of 
Lndependence and Lnterdependence exLsts as weLL; the Lndepend-
ent funcotLons of the member states ore numerous: economLc 
functLons, on the other hand, ore excLusLveLy handled by the 
EC; both functLonoLLy, ore Lndependent . The process of 
hormonLzotLon of the Lows of the member states Ln the EC, the 
recently ochLeved agreement Ln fLscoL poLLcy and dLrect elect-
Lons to porLLoment further LndLcote substontLve functLons execut-
ed by the EC. Some functLons, such as the prosecutLon of vLoLot-
Lons of the ontLtrust ortLcLes requLre mutual portLcLpotLon by 
the EC and the member states . If Lt Ls of any consequence, the 
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sel f Lmoge of the EC further reLnforces thLs federal functLon ; 
the French deLegotLon descrLbed the AssembL~ ' s rLght to port -
LcLpote Ln the amendment to the European Cool and Steel Commun -
Lty Treaty as o "genuLne federal LegLsLotLve power " 3'1 . FLnoLLy 
CommunLty Low (dealt wLth Lndependently) provLdes the strongest 
functLonoL evLdence of o federal prLncLpLe at work . 
A re t h e E u r o p e o n C o mm u n L ti.e s o n " L n t e r no t Lo no L o r g o n Ls o t Lon " ? 
Clearly Lf the EC con be cLossLfLed as such, the prLor MFN 
obLLgotLons of the members ore not excluded because Lt accepts 
that the status of Lts members hos not fundamentally changed: 
they remoLn states . In Lts codLfLcotLon of the OuestLon of 
TreotLes concluded between states and LnternotLonoL orgonLsotLons 
the I LC defLned on " LnternotLonoL orgonLsotLon " for the purposes 
of the Draft ArtLcLes Ln Draft ArtLcLe '1 ('1): 
" lnternotLonoL orgonLzotLon means on LntergovernmentoL 
orgonLsotLon " 32 . 
ThLs Ln fact hod been borrowed from the prLor defLnLtLon 
contoLned Ln the '1969 UnLted NotLons Conference on the Low of 
TreotLes . The commentary to thLs defLnLtLon LS sparse . Cert-
oLnLy the SpecLoL Rapporteur on successLon of states consLdered 
that thLs defLnLtLon covered the Treaty of Rome: 
"EEC appears wLthout doubt to remoLn on the plane of Lnter-
governmentoL orgonLsotLon"33 . 
The wrLter's objectLons to thLs ore recorded elsewhere Ln 
the poper .
34 
It LS not so much that thLs comment LS Lnoccurote 
but rather that the consequences that normally flow from hovLng 
soLd thLs ore not necessorLLy oppLLcoble to the EC . 
The relevance and LncLdentoLLy the expLonotLon of concludLng 
o group to be on LnternotLonaL organLsatLon Ls Ln terms of the 
LnternotLonoL Legal personoLLty one ottrLbutes to Lt . The Lnter-
notLonol personoLLty of on LnternotLonol orgonLsotLon uLtLmoteLy 
Ls traced bock to the personoLLty of states from whLch Lt LS 
derLved; thus the LnternotLonoL personoLLty of o state Ls descrLbed 
as orLgLnoL because Lt precedes that of the LnternotLonoL organ-
3'1 . - Supra Footnote 9 p 60 
32. - Yearbook '1974 Vol . 11 Port I p '142 
33 . - Yearbook '1972 Vol . I I p '18 
34 , - at p I l1 
• • • 
LsotLon and because states re present the o rLgLnoL subjects of 
LnternotLonoL Lo w; the LnternotLonoL personoLLty of on Lnter-
notLonoL orgonLsotLon Ls consequently Labelled "derLvotLve". 
Mosler LncLudes Ln hLs onoLysLs of the personoLLty of the state 
"ne_cesso ry" Lnterno t Lona L pe r sono LLty: necesso ry Lego L persons 
and "th ose wLth regard to whom the LnternotLonoL Legal system 
performs Lf functLons to ochLeve o rder and justLce" 35 . 
A hLerOtCh y Ls LmpLLed by thLs defLnLtLon: o rLg LnoL person -
oLLt y Ls con sLde red of the " hLghest order ", derLvotLve Ls con-
sLde red " second class". The consequence of thLs Lotter cLoss-
LfLcotLon Ls that Lts LnternotLonoL personoLLty Ls LLmLted and 
possesses no Lnherent rLght s because they may be dLsmontLed by 
the state portLes creotLng them . 
The EC o n thLs crLterLon ore such on LnternotLonoL orgon-
LsotLo n, because they we re c reated by LnternotLonoL t reotLes 
and may be dLsmontLed by the states creotLng Lt. Does Lt 
follow therefore that the EC ore o second class Legal persons 
wLth no Ln he ren t rLg hts and only LLmLted Lnte rn otLonoL person-
oLLty? Clearly on thLs crLterLon they hove no Lnherent rLghts 
becaus e none of theLr rLght s would survLve Lf the member states 
agreed to dLsmontLe them, or Lf one member decLded to wLthd ro w, 
the EC would hove no rLghts ogoLnst that ex member . AgoLn , Lt 
Ls true that theLr LnternotLonoL personoLLty Ls LLmLted, but Ln 
anothe r sense from thQtenvLsoged: Lt Ls LLmLted to the economLc 
fLeLd . However, Lf one Lgnores the Legal possLbLLLty of wLth -
drowoL by member states and focus on the balance of power 
created by the three treotLes whLLe they contLnue to be Ln 
force , then a rLght of exLstence , and hence orLgLnoL personoLLty 
may be soLd to hove evolved out of Lts derLvotLve personoLLty . 
The questLon then becomes how many elements of Legal pers 0noLLty 
do the EC exhLbLt Ln order to cLossLfy them as hovLng full pe r-
sonoLLty . The fact that the EC hos poLLcy mokLng functLons , 
that Lt Ls Lndependent from the member states , that Lt may assert 
Lts Lnterests ogoLnst them , oLL poLnt to on LnternotLonoL pe rson-
oLLty of the " hLghest order" . The LntensLty of LntegrotLon 
35 . - Supra Footnote 9 p 23 
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achLeved , olbeLt Ln the economLc sphere, and lLmLted to Europe , 
further LndLcotes that the EC may be clossLfLed as on Lnter -
notLonol orgonLsotLon . 
The SupronotLonol Concept : 
The dLffLculty of clossLfyLng the 
EC wLthLn a fomLlLor concept, LndLcoted Ln the precedLng dLs-
cussLon , hos exLsted sLnce Lts LnceptLon . To a lLmLted degree , 
those trodLtLonal concepts hove yLelded Ln on effort to accom-
modate Lt ; a lLngerLng suspLcLon however, that the morrLoge of 
these two was unsuLtoble provoked a search to fLnd a new closs-
LfLcotLon Ln whLch the monster may be contoLned . ThLs new 
closs LfLcotLon Ls the suprnotLonol state . 
It Ls no occLdent that the phrase emerged LnLtLolly from 
the context of the creotLon of the EC Ln 1949 . Its emergence 
Ls symtomatLc of the fact that a unLque orgonLsotLon was beLng 
estoblLshed for whLch trodLtLonol theory was suspected to be 
Lnodequote . In on effort to conceptuolLze thLs reolLty , Robert 
Schuman descrLbed the HLgh AuthorLty of the European Cool and 
Steel CommunLty "the fLrst example of on Lndependent supro-
notLonol orgonLsotLon 36 The West Germon Government Ln 1957 .. 
des~rLbed the European EconomLc CommunLty as a supronotLonal 
communLty equLpped wLth sovereLgn powers" 37 . 
Two problems ore posed by the concept of a supronotLonol 
state . The fLrst Ls one of defLnLtLon . It Ls neLther a state 
nor on LnternotLonol orgonLsotLon, yet some of Lts LngredLents 
appear LdentLcol Ln type to those two . Its Ln s tLtutLons ore 
Lndependent from those of the member states, and Lt may bLnd 
them by mojorLty vote; thLs Ls Lndeed the case of the EC . How-
ever, these chorocterLstLcs ore typLcol of a normal lnternotLonal 
orgonLsotLon . The extent of functLons powers and jurLsdLctLon 
of a supronotLonol state, however, Ls greater than that of a 
typLcol LnternotLonol orgonLsotLon, and Lndeed, thLs dLstLnguLshes 
the EC from such orgonLsotLons - but thLs dLstLnctLon Ls one of 
quontLty, not quolLty . 
36 . - Supra Footnote 9 p 30 
37 . - LbLd 
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UnLque features of a supranatLonaL state do exLst, how-
ever , dLstLnguLshLng Lt f r om a typLcaL LnternatLonaL organ-
LsatLo n . The Law produced by a supranatLonaL state bLnds 
natu ral and Legal persons dLrectLy and LndependentLy of the 
pa rtLcLpatLon of the member state . Further, the exLstence 
of a judLcLary wLthLn the organLsatLon (befo re whom p rL vate 
pa rtLes have sta ndLng ) and the exLstence of a representatLve 
ass embly have no parallels Ln an LnternatLonaL organLsatLo n -
and of course, all th ree LngredLents exLst Ln the EC. In 
fact , these LngredLents are tradLtLonaLLy LLnked wLth the 
state and not the LnternatLonaL organLsatLon . 
Thus o ne may conclude that the EC represents a supra -
natLonaL state - Lndeed, Lt Ls hard to conceLve of any othe r 
conc Lu s Lon sLnce the concept was taLLo r made to fLt the European 
CommunLtLes . The temptatLon at thLs stage Ls to ask the rather 
chLLd Lsh but necessary questLon; so what? CertaLnLy Lt des -
crLbes the European CommunL~es but LabeLLLng the EC as a sup ra-
nat Lo naL body and Lts Law as supranatLonal Law adds nothLng to 
Lts reLa tLonshLp to natLonaL or LnternatLonaL Law or the MFN 
prLn cLpLe . It has features of both an LnternatLonaL organLsat -
Lon and a state . Can Lt be treated as a state for some purposes? 
In reLatLon to our dLscussLon , does cLassLfLcatLon as a supra -
natLonaL state mean that the treatment granted by one member to 
anothe r wLthLn that supronatLonaL state exclude a non member from 
claLmLng such treatment pursuant to a MFN treaty , because Ln thLs 
rega r d a supranatLonaL state may be regarded as a state? Or ore 
such advantages entLtLed to be cloLmed wLthLn a supranatLonaL 
state because the reaLLty of the member states persLsts? The 
supranatLonaL concept holds no LmmedLate answer, precLseLy be -
cause Lt Ls a novel creatLon . If the determLnatLon of Lts 
Lmpact on MFN treatLes can only be pursued by analogy to a 
sLmLLar structure , such as ~federal state , thLs would appear to 
negate any Lndependent contrLbutLon the supranotLonaL concept 
could offer to Lts effect on MFN treatLes . The dLffLculty of 
assessLng the Lmpact of a supranatLonaL state on prLor MFN 
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treotLes entered Lnto by Lts members Ls that the concept LtseLf 
suggests the creotLon of o structure " on top " of the member 
states whLLe opporen~Ly LeovLng those member states essentLoLLy 
Lntoct - o dLffLcuLt Ldeo because Lt appea r s to create someth Lng 
wLtho ut LeovLng o cor re spondLng gap Ln Lts creators . On t he 
st reng th of the Lotter chorocterLstLc, Lt would appear that 
the prLor MFN t rea ty obLL gotLons of the members persLst ; such 
o progmotLc opprooch1 Ln emphosLsLng the persLstence of the membe r 
states as states , correspondLngLy accords LLttLe weLght to the 
su pronotLonoL state . The creotLon of the Lotter does not, of 
LtseLf, exclude the prLor MFN obLLgotLons of Lts members because, 
by defLnLtLon, Lt cannot be consLdered o state ; the some terrLtory 
can not be governed by two " states ". Con the new reLotLonshLp 
between member states of thLs supronotLonoL orgonLsotLon Ln Lt-
se lf se r ve as o bosLs on whLch MFN rLghts of non members ore 
excluded? It Ls doubtful . The nearest analogy of the reLotLon-
shLp Ls that between the federal and state governments , resuLt-
Lng Ln the " federal clauses " or where o terrLtory Ls LnternoLLy 
se lf governLng but the mother state represents Lt LnternotLonoLLy -
hence the ' Commonwealth clauses' . The exLstence of ' communLty 
clauses ' may LndLcote that o sLmLLor type of reLotLonshLp hos 
been created between the members and the communLty . CertoLnLy 
those clauses LndLcote that o great deal of fLexLbLLLty con 
exLst when Lt comes to the Lssue of LnternotLonoL personoLLty , 
on whLch the supronotLonoL state , Lf Lt Ls to command Lndependent 
recognLtLon , must rely heovLLy . In fact , communLty clauses 
reverse " federal clauses" : Ln the Lotter , the LnternotLonoL 
personoLLty of the federal state Ls undLvLded, whereas LnternoLLy 
the constLtutLonoL powers ore dLvLded between the states . Commun -
Lty clauses, on the other hand, exLst because o member state con 
only enter Lnto 'a commercLol agreement subject to the approval 
of the EC, and protects Lt Lf opproprLote LmpLementLng legLslot-
Lon Ls not Lntroduced . The onolog\; tULth federal or Commonwealth 
clauses reveals that the reLotL ons hLp between the communLty and 
member states Ln the supronotLonol state Ls Ln fact the reverse 
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of that exLstLng Ln those r egLmes . It attests , Lf onyt Lng, 
to the contLnuLng domLnonce of the member states at the 
expense of the supror10tLonoL structure . For the analogy 
to hold good , Lt would be the CommunLty whLch , when ente r-
Lng on LnternotLonoL agreement, whLch would Lntroduce a 
"member state clause "; however, the communLty negotLotes 
Ln Lt s own name, ogoLn mokLng the onologLes unreal . 
Equally clearly , the argument that the rLghts granted 
by one member to another ore excluded from the MFN prLncLple 
because , both beLng members of a supronotLonoL state, cannot 
be regarded as beLng granted to "another country" or a 
"foreLgn country " SLmply begs the questLon, and Ln any event 
cou ld not be LmpLLed Ln the absence of on express stLpulotLon 
Ln the MFN treaty that a foreLgn country excludes members of 
a supronotLonoL group . The BrLtLsh proctLCP moLntoLned Ln the 
preferentLoL system by on express defLnLtLon of " foreLgn 
country " or "any country or terrLtory not under the sovereLgnty 
protectLon suzeroLnty or mandate of HLs Majesty" 38 . The con-
tLnued poLLtLcoL Lndependence of the member states renders such 
on LmpLLed LLmLtOtLon on MFN treotLes LmpossLble . 
CertoLnly no LmpLLed "supronotLonoL state excepti...on " at 
present exLsts . Hoy predLcted that the MFN prLncLple may 
eventually take account of the supronotLonoL state: 
" Beyond eloborotLng new technLques , supronotLonoL orgon-
LsotLons contrLbute Ln another sense; theLr extensLve proctLse , 
Li...ke that of states, becomes the source of LnternotLonoL Low . 
Thi...s contrLbutLon may be i...n the oppLLcotLon of refoshLoni...ng of 
exLstLng rules and concepts of LnternotLonoL Low - for Lnstonce , 
the most favoured notLon clause" 39 . 
To dote, however, state proctLse does not support such on 
LmpLLed exceptLons . Perhaps the otti...tude of the EC that the 
Treaty of Rome does exclude the operotLon of the MFN prLncLple, 
and the acceptance by states of thLs ottLtude, i...s Lndi...coti...ve of 
the future trend . 
38 . Schworzenberger BYBI L 1945 p 109 
BrLti...sh State ProctLse 
39 . - Supra Footnote 9 p 302 
The MFN Clouse Ln 
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The Law of the European CommunLtLes: 
The Law produced by a 
natLonaL state LS characterLzed as natLonaL Law . The Law 
ope r atLng between states LS consequently Labelled Lnte r natLonaL 
Law . Federal states are regulated by federal Law . CertaLn 
s Lmp Le concLusLons can be drawn from thLS: the genre of Law 
produced by a body LS , by defLnLtLon 1 typLcaL of Ltself . Equally 
true, that state may be characterLzed as such by the Law that 
bLnds Lts LndLVLduaLs; the two are LnextrLcabLy LLnked . ThLS 
LS conspLcuousLy true of the EC; Lts cLassLfLcatLon admLts more 
than one possLbLLLty and thLs LS reflected Ln, and because, of 
Lts Law . The very fact that one can speak of a "European 
CommunLtLes Law" suggests a degree of Lndependence from both 
the natLonaL Law of the member states and from LnternatLonaL 
Law, perhaps creatLng a new order of Law pecuLLar to Ltself . 
The SLgnLfLcance of the concLusLon one reaches about the nature 
of Lts Law should not be underestLmated; as stated above , Lt 
symboLLzes the characterLzatLon one uLtLmateLy settles on the 
EC - at the very Least gLves an LnsLght Lnto the character of 
thLs group , whLch Ln turn Leads to a more precLse apprecLatLon 
of the reLatLonshLp of the EC and the MFN prLncLpLe . 
FLrst of all one should descrLbe what "CommunLty Law " Ls . 
Its LngredLents are varLed, and may be LLsted hLerarchLcaLLy . 
Foremost of Lts components LS the foundLng treatLes, chLef 
among them the Treaty of Rome 1958; the treatLes estabLLsh the 
permLSSLbLe scope of the EC's actLon . The treatLes not only 
Lnclude the basLc text but the LLsts, annexes, protocols and 
supplementary protocols. Secondary CommunLty LegLsLatLon, on 
the other hand, comprLses the bulk of Law LmpLementLng thLs 
Treaty, the most Lmportant beLng acts promulgated by CommunLty 
decLsLons; ArtLcLe 189 specLaLLy descrLbes them as "reguLatLons ", 
"dLrectLves" and "decLSLOns", though LnternaL reguLatLons of 
the LnstLtutLons could equally be so Labelled . Another example 
of secondary communLty Low LS on LnternotLonaL agreement con-
cluded by the communLty . ThLS LS the foundatLon of "communLty 
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Law ". Now one must assess the characte r of the LegaL regLme 
estab LL shed by thLs Law. 
For the LnLtLaL characterLzatLon of thLs Law one shou ld 
p~rhaps LnLtLaLLy defer to the vLews of the LnstLtutLon most 
LntLmateLy LnvoLved wLth communLty Law - the Cou rt of JustLce 
of the Eur opean CommunLty , created by ArtLcLe 164 of the EEC 
Treaty . A natLonaL court derLves Lts mandate from the natLonaL 
Lega l order to appLy the Laws of that natLon; by analogy , and Lt 
Ls a va LLd one , the Court of JustLce derLves Lts mandate from 
Art LcLe 164 of the EEC Treaty to maLntaLn observance of 
"communLty Law" and the Law accepted Ln the EC. Its attLtude 
to the reLatL o nshLp of communLty Law to natLonaL and Lnter-
natLona L La w Ls partLcuLarLy Lmportant because Ln the LmmedLate 
context , theLr decLsLons wLLL domLnate the formuLatLon of that 
reLatLonshLp , especLaLLy Ln the appLLcatLon of LnternatLonaL 
Law whe re no competLng pronouncements dLLute Lts Lmpact . (The 
Pe rmanent Court of lnternatLonaL JustLce Ls LLmLted to states , 
excLudLng the EC). 
SLnce the foundLng treatLes are, whatever eLse , Lnter -
natLonaL treatLes , one wouLd expect that LnternatLonaL Law 
naturaLLy wouLd regulate theLr operatLon . If a dLspute arose 
between two member states , Lt foLLows that LnternatLonaL Law 
should form the basLs of Lts soLutLon . However , the character -
LzatLon of the treaty as LnternatLonaL does not necessarLLy 
dLctate the nature of Lts Law : 
"I t aLL depends on the contents of the treaty . A treaty 
Ls Ln fact onLy a form of procedure whLch may serve to do a 
great many dLfferent thLngs . For example , a number of states 
have been created by treatLes whLch thus have generated pubLLc 
Law" 40 . 
The Court of JustLce ha s supp o rted thLs fLexLbLLLty Ln 
characterLzatLon where the reLatLonshLp of communLty Law and 
LnternatLonaL Law has arLsen . In the DaLry Products Case , 
the Court of JustLce rejected the submLssLon of the BeLgLan 
Government that communLty Law couLd be regulated by the 
prLncLpLes of LnternatLonaL Law : 
40 . - Common Market Law RevLew 1970 VoL . VI I p 168 - (t'::iC•t 01' 
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" The EEC Treaty establl..shes a new Legal order whl..ch 
regulates the powers , rl..ghts and dutl..es of the subjects to 
whom l..t appll..es as well as the necessary procedure fo r det er-
ml..n l..n g and adjudl..catl..ng upon any possl..ble vl..olatl..on " 41 . 
The nove l ty of communl..ty Law was ampll..fl..ed upo n l..n Cost a 
v E.N.E. L.: 
" It r epresented a specl..aL Legal order ... derl..ved from 
autonomous sources " - the nature of whl..ch l..s " pe cull..ar " and 
"o rl.. gl.. naL " 42 . 
Communl..ty Law excluded l..nternatl..onaL Law because l..t pro -
vl..ded ·a procedu r e , as pol..nted out l..n the Dal..ry Products Case , 
fo r r eg u latl.. ng vl..o l atl..ons - a feature not contemplated by the 
43 l..nt er natl..onaL prl..ncl..pLe . However , the Van Duyn Case offers 
an example whe r e l..nternatLonaL Law overrode the express pro -
VLS Lons of the EEC Tr eaty whLch appeared to confLLct wLth 
the f ormer : 
" It LS a prLncLpLe of Lnternatl..onaL Law , whLch the EEC 
Treaty cannot be assumed to dLsregard Ln the reLatLons between 
membe r states ... " 44 . 
Clearly then LnternatLonaL Law can apply between member 
states ; the LnternaL order of the communLty can be regarded 
as beLongLng to the LnternatLonaL sphere , where states are 
stl..LL states . 
The RadLo Tubes Case LS partLcuLarLy pertLnent to the 
present dLscussLon SLnce Lt LnvoLved an LnconsLstent rLght 
held by Italy from the GATT prevLous to joLnLng the EEC . 
The Court Lnvoked the prLncLpLes of LnternatLonaL Law Ln re -
Ll..nquLshLng the prevLous rLght Ln favour of the subsequent 
obLLgatLon . 
11 In fact , Ln matters whl..ch l..t regulates the EEC Treaty 
overrLdes the ConventLons made prLor to Lts comLng l..nto force , 
l..ncLudLng the agreements arrLved at WLthLn the framework of 
GATT " 45 . 
46 In the ThLrd lnternotLonaL FruLt Company Case , the 
Court consLdered the posLtLon where a EC provLsLon confLLcted 
41 . - 1965 CMLR 72 
42 . - No . 6/64 July 15 189 - 204 p 197 
43 . - No . 41/74 
44 . - LbLd , consl..deratLons 21 - 23 
45 . - 1962 CMLR 203 
46 . - 1972 Ree 1227 21 - 24/72; 12 
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wLth on obLLgotLon of LnternotLonol Low . It held that the 
compotLbLLLty of the former would be consLdered on the bosLs 
of the rule of LnternotLonoL Low; the rule must be 
(a) bLndLng on the communLty 
(b) capable of creotLng rLghts of whLch Lnterested 
portLes may ovoLL themselves of Ln a court of Low. 
Only then wLLL the Court be prepared to declare a 
CommunLty Act LnvoLLd - and further, only Lf the confLLct 
hos been roLsed Ln a notLonol court and reached the Court 
through ArtLcle 177 . 
Thus, LnternotLonol Low con be oppLLed dLrectly wLthLn 
the communLty Legal order; sLnce the relotLonshLp between 
LnternotLonol Low and communLty Low Ls monLst, tronsformotLon 
Ls not requLred . ThLs hos repercussLons on Lts relotLonshLp 
wLth the notLonol Low of the member states . Most member 
states ore duoLLst; they moLntoLn that LnternotLonol Low and 
notLonol Low ore separate; the former Ls a port of the Lotter 
only through tronsformotLon . ThLs throws Lnto sharp reLLef 
the nature of communLty Low; as poLnted out by the Court Ln 
Costs v E.N . E . L. 47. 
"By contrast wLth ordLnory LnternotLonol treotLes the 
EEC Treaty hos created Lts own Legal system whLch on the 
entry Lnto force of the Treaty, becomce on Lntegrol port of 
the Legal systems of the member states and whLch theLr courts 
ore bound to apply" 48 . 
Thus, communLty Low forms on Lntegrol port of notLonol 
Low; the problem Ls, however, that most member state adhere 
to the duoLLst concept, but communLty Low Ltself Ls monLst 
Ln Lts ottLtude to LnternotLonol Low; thLs creates the 
possLbLLLty that the notLonol Low of member states wLLL outo-
motLcolly Lncorporote LnternotLonol Low to the extent that Lt 
exLsts Ln the oppLLcotLon to the member state of communLty 
Low . The only olternotLve would be to exclude the LnternotLonoL 
element Ln communLty Low; proctLcolly thLs may be possLble: 
conceptually Lt Ls LmpermLssLble. Thus, Ln duoLLst states, 
47 . - Supra Footnote 42 p 198 
48 . - Lb Ld 
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LnternotLonal Law would automatLcally be Lnc orpo rated Lnto 
natLonol Law where Lt Ls Lncluded Ln communLty Law . 
The fact that the r elatLonshLp between communLty and 
LnternotLonol Low Ls monLst, and that prLncLples of Lnter-
notLonol Law ore Ln voked as on oLd to LnterpretotLon of dLs-
pu tes (such as the LnterpretatLon of the text , hovLng regard 
to Lts orLgLn and purpose) between members does not Lead to 
the conclusLon that the Lnternol st ru cture of t he communLty 
ope rate s on the LnternotLono l plane - any mo re tha n the 
Ln ternol structure o f a state , whLch Lncorporotes customary 
LnternotLonol Low makes the LnternoL Low of that state Lnter-
notLonal Low . It Ls true that LnternotLonoL La w portLcLpotes 
Ln communLty Low Ln o dLfferent manner from Lt po rtLcLpotLon 
Ln notLonol Low, whether monLst or duaLLst ; thLs stems from 
the fact that the TreotLes ore LnternotLonoL treotLes . The 
foundL ng treotLes ultLmotely con only be revLsed by o subse -
que nt treaty . ArtLcle 220 al l udes to the power of membe r s to 
make s upplementary agreements pe rL pherol to the maLn commu nLty 
act LvLtLe s , oLLen to the communLty process . As such , the 
p recedLng represent areas where LnternotLonol Low operates 
Ln communLty Law . In more Lmportont ways , however , communLty 
Low dLffers from LnternotLonoL Low, Ln type and degree . The 
foundLng treatLes are treatLes of LnternatLonal Law. But 
the obLLgotLons Lmposed by those treatLes take them beyond 
clossLfLcatLon as merely an LnternatLonaL treaty , representLng 
nothLng Less than the " constLtutLon of a system of LnstLtutLons 
whLch are capable of makLng decL s Lons and what LS most Lmportont , 
LegLslatLng 11 ; 49 unLLke a tradLtLonal LnternatLonal treaty , the 
EC contoLn wLthLn themselves a system of LegLslotLve self 
regulatLon; thLs ls the product of a Llvlng organlsm . A 
manLfestatLon of thLS "L LvLng organLsm " quaLLty LS reflected 
Ln the method of LnterpretatLon employed ; on LnternatLonaL 
treaty Ls Lnterpreted essentLoLLy from a statLc standpoLnt , 
wLth a tendency to Look back and gauge the partLes ' LntentLons 
when they made the concessLons. The foundLng treotLes , on the 
/ 49 . - CMLR '1970 7 p '17 L -P~!>C.Q..tore 
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othe r hand, ore Lnterpreted dynomLcoLLy; the text of the words 
of the TreotLe s ore approached Ln the LLght of the common object -
Lves of the Treaty. The LnterpretatLon of the texts Ls Lnfluenced 
by a vLsLon of the future, rather than moLntoLnLng on equLLLbrLum 
reached Ln the post . CommunLty Low dLffers ogoLn Ln Lt s Lmpoct 
f rom Ln te rno tLonoL Low: prLmorLLy, the Lotter speaks to states; 
commu nLty Lo w, on the other hand , goes beyond thLs and touches 
the rLghts and obLLgotLons of every LndLvLduoL wLthLn Lt. As 
poLnted out by the Court of JustLce Ln the "Von Gend en Loos" 
Cose : 
"The object of the EEC Ls to estobLLsh a common market the 
ope rotL on of whLch dLrectLy affects the subjects of the communLty ... 
Lt Lntended to create rLghts whLch ore port of theLr jurLdLcoL 
prope r ty " 50 . 
PhLLLsophLcoLLy , communLty Low dLffers from LnternotLonoL Low. 
The Lotter developed as a re sponse to the "wont of soLLdo rLty" 
typLfyLng the LnternotLondcommunLty; Lt Ls a Low of confLLcts , 
eq uoLLbrLum and coordLnotLon . As Pescatore comments : 
" CommunLty Low Ls more that that ; Lt Ls a Low of soLLdorLty 
and LntegrotL on ... LnternotLonoL Low exLsts wLthLn a socLety whLch 
Ls weakly orgonLsed and profoundly heterogeneous Ln the poLLtLcoL , 
LegLsLotLve and judLcLoL fLeLds ... communLty Low ... operates wLthLn 
a for more soLLdLy buLLt structure ... Lt permLts the formotLon of 
a poLLtLcoL wLLL , the creotLon of a common body of LegLsLotLon , 
the management of common Lnterests , the reguLotLon of dLsputes 
on the bosLs of a compulsory jurLsdLctLon exercLsed by a trLbunoL 
endowed wLth general competence" 51 . 
The sLgnLfLconce of thLs onoLysLs of communLty Low Ls Ln Lts 
cont rLbu tLon to chorocterLzotLon of the EC. Hoy sees Ln communLty 
Low the strongest evLdence that the EC Ls based on a federal 
prLncLpLe : 
" CommunLty Low hos several aspects , LncLudLng LnternotLonoL 
Low aspects but ... much of LnternoL communLty Low Ls truly federal 
Low " 52 . 
ArtLcLe 177 (EEC Treaty) provLdes the clearest example of 
50 . - 26/62 Feb 5 1963 RCJEC 
51 , - 1970 CMLR 7 p 170 
52 . - Supra Footnote 9 p 76 
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the Court of JustLce operatLng Ln a federal context ; by thLs , 
Lt has excLusLve ju r LsdLctLon to be the fLnaL arb Lter of 
comm un Lty Law . 
Pescato r e ag r ees WLth Hay that the Law of the EC rep r e -
sents t he st r ongest evLdence of a federal prLncLpLe operatLng 
Ln th e EC: 
"T he Lnt r oductLon of the prLncLpLes of soLLdarLty ... takes 
us to the boundarLes of federaLLsm ... The most satLsfactory te r m 
to defLne Lt wLthLn the coordLnates of current concepts would 
be that of federaLLsm of an LnternatLonaL , and not of a pubLLc , 
Law type . What brLngs communLty Law Lnto the categorLes of 
fede r a LL sm Ls the prLncLpLe of profound soLLdarLty ... and also 
the method of proceedLng by the markLng out of competences and 
by the r ecou r se of LnstLtutLonaL schemes . But what gLves thLs 
fede r aLLsm Lts LnternatLonaL character LS the fact that the 
members of thLs new unLon , apart from the peoples of Europe , 
are SLX states whLch have not renounced theLr poLLtLcaL person -
aLLty " 53 . 
CLassLfLcatLon of the EC and the MFN PrLncLple: 
Before LeavLng 
the conceptual world and steppLng on to the meetLng groun~ of 
the EC and the MFN prLncLpLe, Lt LS Lmportont to pause and con -
SLder the LmpLLcatLons of classLfLcatLon of the EC on the MFN 
prLncLple , because much of that reLatLonshLp depends on Lts 
cLassLfLcatLon . 
The EC repre sents a new force Ln LnternatLonaL Law, one 
whose structure poses unLque problems for the MFN prLncLpLe be-
cause the prLncLpLe evolved from a world composed of natLon 
states . From thLs focus of attentLon sp rang Lts LnterpretatLon 
of an assocLatLon of states - the customs unLon exceptLon. Two 
POLnts should be made about thLs exceptLon . The fLrst relates 
to Lts relevance to the prLncLpLe Ltself Ln the LLght of the 
ILC ' s vLew that Lt does not represent o rule of customary Lnter -
natLonaL Law . Unless therefore the exceptLon LS specLfLed Ln 
53 . - 1970 CMLR 7 p 183 
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on MFN treaty, Ln whLch case Lt oppLLes anyway, Lt provLdes no 
answers to the problems created where on ossocLotLon of states 
emerge such as the EC because (and thLs Ls the second poLnt) 
though the Lotter more than odquotely clothes the customs unLon, 
Lt Ls such o Loose fLttLng garment that one suspects that another 
body may be more suLtoble . The European CommunLtLes ore o customs 
unLon , and as such, certoLn consequences ore prescrLbed Ln theLr 
relotLonshLp wLth the MFN prLncLple Lf the MFN treaty of one of 
Lts members contoLned o customs unLon exceptLon . But the voLLdLty 
of these conclusLons Ls quoLLfLed because the EC Ls also o Lot 
more than sLmply o customs unLon; thLs possLbLLLty threatens to 
alte r Lts relotLon shLp
1
os o customs unLon, wLth the MFN prLncLple . 
It Ls apparent that the clossLfLcotLon of the EC hos on enormous 
Lmpoct on the oppLLcotLon of the MFN prLncLple . Clearly the 
prLncLple Ls excluded Lf o state party to on MFN treaty merges 
wLth another state and o new state may be soLd to hove emerged . 
ThLs exclusLon stems from wLthLn the MFN prLncLple Ltself: Lhe 
favours ore no Longer beLng granted from one state to another . 
Though the EC ore Ln specLfLc respects LdentLcol too federal 
state, the contLnuLng poLLtLcol Lndependence of the member states 
must ultLmotely exclude the possLbLLLty of regordLng Lt as o 
trodLtLonol state . To the proposLtLon that the EC represented 
o new entLty analogous too state , the SpecLol Rapporteur comment-
ed: 
"SLnc e the states portLcLpotLng Ln such unLons usually con-
tLnued as Lndependent and sovereLgn states, thLs vLew Ls dLffL-
cult to accept" 54 . 
ThLs then forms the bosLs of the vLew that MFN treotLes 
cont(nue to catch favours granted wLthLn o customs unLon , because 
ThLs poLnt Ls , however , that the no new entLty hos been created . 
EC ore o Lot more than merely o customs unLon, os LndLcoted by 
precLsely the very crLterLo Lnvoked by the SpecLol Rapporteur . 
It Ls true that the member states ore "Lndependent and sovereLgn " 
but as hos been shown, not Lndependent or sovereLgn Ln economLc 
matters . They all pursue generally Lndependent foreLgn poLLcLes 
54 . - Yearbook 1975 Vol. 11 p 16 
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(though LncreasLnLy, an attempt Ls beLng made to harmonLze 
these) but whLLe bound by the Treaty of Rome, they are anythLng 
but Lndependent Ln theLr external commercLaL poLLcy - Lndeed , the 
obLLgatLons accepted under the Treaty Lmposes LnternaL obLLgatLo n s 
as wel l . Member states are sovereLgn Ln that they retaLn the 
powe r to wLthdraw from the EC, but whLLe the EC bLnds them , 
sove r eLgn powe r Ln commercLaL matters, Lf sovereLgnty be accepted 
as a powe r concept, rests wLth the communLtLes and not wlth the 
member states . WLth thLs more precLse defLnLtLon of the terms , 
the Lssue becomes whether the MFN prLncLpLe Ls excluded by the 
fo r matLon of an assocLatLon of states where certaLn sovereLgn 
powe r s have been transferred from the orLgLnaL states . The 
temptatLon Ls to demand full statehood on the part of the EC 
before thLs Ls conceded , and thLs Lndeed Ls the response of the 
MFN p r LncLpLe at present . The LLmLted nature of the EC as a 
state Ls harshly punLshed Ln thLs reactLon; Lts stateLLke 
features - Lts excLusLve control of the terrLtory's commercLaL 
poLLcy , the federal nature of Lts Law, Lts LLmLted sovereLgnty -
are dLsmLssed because they do not take the EC to full statehood . 
ThLs response appears to accept a degree of Lnaccuracy Ln order 
to achLeve overall the rLght answer, for Lt also LmpLLes that 
the member states are Left fundamentally unaltered by the Treaty 
of Rome; consLderLng theLr abdLcatLon of Lnvolvement Ln commer-
cLaL matters, they themselves may be regarded as "LLmLted" 
states - aLbeLt Less LLmLted a state that the EC are. The 
conceptual dLscussLon all poLnts to a fundamental dLvLsLon 
beLng created between the member states and the EC whLch the 
MFN prLncLpLe, Lf Lt responds tradLtLonoLLy from wLthLn LtseLf, 
wLLL not recognLse . One should also bear Ln mLnd that Lt Ls 
precLsely Ln the areas dealt wLth Ln the MFN treatLes Ln questLon 
(L . e . trade and tarLff matters) that the member states have 
abdLcoted theLr rLght to act Ln L. e. precLseLy Ln the areas the 
EC exercLses sovereLgn power. A sLmLLar problem arLses Lf one 
concludes that the EC ore o supranatLonaL state: are the favours 
g!onted by one member of such a state to another able to be 
cLoLmed by o benefLcLary under an MFN clause? For much the same 
reasons LndLcated prevLousLy, Lt would appear that the answer Ls 
Ln the offLrmatLve, because, as tradLtLonoLLy understood , the 
member states ore stLLL states . It Ls debatable however whether 
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the MFN prLncLpLe should persLst Ln LgnorLng the exLstence of 
th Ls ossocLotLon . GLven the growLng trend to supronotLonoLLsm 
today , the r e LS o danger that the MFN prLncLpLe wLLL get out of 
touch WLth the reoLLty that LS the supronotLonaL state , espec -
LoL Ly Lf, Ln p r octLse , states accept the denLoL of theLr MFN 
rLg h ts when a supronatLonaL state LS brought Lnto beLng . The 
MFN p r LncLpLe evolved wLthLn a portLcuLor reoLLty , LnhobLted 
exc LusLveLy by states ; where that reaLLty changes however , 
prLncLp Le must come Lnto LLne wLth that change Lf Lt LS to 
reto Ln Lts meanL ng . 
cou l d take : 
Hoy LndLcotes the dLrectLon such a change 
" Fo r p r ospectLve treotLes , the most favoured notLon clause 
may then r eassert LtseLf on the muLtL state regLonaL bosLs Ln 
the fo r m of a most favoured regLon clause" 55 . 
ThLs then LS on LndLcotLon of how the MFN clause could 
adopt to the reoLLty of the supronatLonaL state . 
ThLs chapter hos gLven on LndLcatLon of what the EC ore . 
At vorLous stages of the LnquLry, the consequences of a portLc -
uLor feature of the EC on the MFN prLnCLpLe hove been suggested . 
In the next chapter , thLs reLotLonshLp -the combLned effect of 
these features mokLng up the EC on the MFN prLncLpLe , -Ls exam -
Lned Ln more detoLL . The reLotLonshLp of the EC to the MFN 
prLncLpLe LS exomLned specLfLcoLLy Ln the foLLowLng areas: 
- where the MFN agreement Lncorporates on express customs unLon 
exceptLon: what ore the consequences of such on exceptLon Ln 
reLatLon to the extensLve favours granted WLth o group LnvoLvLng 
the extent of LntegrotLon exLStLng Ln the EC? ThLs LS LLLustroted 
by the experLence of the EC Ln GATT. 
- where no such customs unLon exceptLon LS LncLuded Ln the MFN 
agreement . 
The answers gLven Ln the determLnotLon of these questLons 
WLLL be based on exLstLng prLncLpLes of LnternotLonoL Low as 
conceLved today . The novelty of the EC, however , does allow 
a degree of fLexLbLLLty Ln the answers orrLved at Ln the oppLLc -
otLon of these prLncLpLes . ThLS possLbLLLty LS therefore explored . 
55 . - "The EEC and the Most Favoured NotLon Clouse" '1962 23 
U. P . H. L. Rev p 684 
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The conclusLon arrLved at from thLs LnquLry LS that under 
present LnternatLonal Law, the extensLve favours granted by 
one member to another wLthLn a regLonal group as the EC are 
not excluded from the operatLon of the MFN prLnc~ple , and that 
the exLstence of an express customs unLon exceptLon only alters 
thLs re su lt to a LLmLted degree . The refusal of the ILC to 
Lnclude a Draft ArtcLLe excludLng favours granted wLthLn such 
regLonal groups, on the basLs of 'progressLve development ' 
therefore takes on added sLgnLfLcance , SLnce ' progressLve 
development ' emerges as the only basLs on whLch such an 
exceptLon could be created . If good reasons exLst why such 
favou rs should be excluded, the ILC ' s refusal to Lnclude such 
an exceptLon would appear to requLre re-evaluatLon. ThLs 
quest Lon Ls taken up Ln Chapter 6 . 
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The European CommunLtLes and the MFN prLncLple : 
The meetLng ground on whLch the MFN clause and the E . C. 
confronted each other was the GATT. 1 The record of that me etLng 
throws some lLght on the proctLcol aspects of the relotLon-
shLp we ore exomLnLng: Lt provLdes on expose of the relotLon-
s hLp of the two, dLrectly brLngLng the E . C. face to face wLth 
the MFN prLncLple, and specLfLcolly the "cu stoms unLon exceptLon" . 
Its sLgnLfLconce lLes beyond thLs however, Ln that the GATT 
Ls the framework under whLch over 80% of the world ' s t rade Ls 
conducted. It Ls not proposed to gLve o detoLled descrLptLon 
of the GATT bey ond descrLbLng the gLst of Lt , except Ln re-
lotLon to Lts relevance to the E.C. and the MFN prLncLple . 
J.J. Allen descrLbed the GATT adequately for our purposes: 
"The Gene ral Agreement on TorLffs and Trade Ls o multL -
loterol agreement whose members, called tontroctLng portLes ' 
Lnclude all o f the free world ' s major trodLng notLons The 
ag reement consLsts of o schedule of torLff commLtments , o group 
of common rules of trade and on orgonLsotLon to promote negotLo -
tLons to settle dLsputes and to odmLnLster the provLsLons of 
the GATT". 2 
K.W. Dom d2scrLbes the substance of the Agreement : 
" The cornerstone of the General Agreement Ls the most 
favoured notLon clause of ArtLcle I . That clause constLtutes 
on undertokLng by each controctLng party to refroLn from 
dLscrLmLnotLng wLth respect to such matters as torLffs and 
quontLtotLve restrLctLons; any concessLon accorded one con -
troctLng party must be accorded to every other controctLng 
party . CertoLn exceptLons to thLs most favoured notLon under-
tokLng ore set forth Ln the General Agreement . Perhaps the 
most sLgnLfLcont Ls that Ln ArtLcle XXIV stotLng the condLtLons 
1. - General Agreement on TorLffs and Trade 1947 
2 . - European RegLonal CommunLtLes (1961) p . 213 -JJ Al\e(\ 
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under whLch the controctLng portLes may become members of 
customs unLons and free trade areas. From one poLnt of vLew, 
there could be no clearer denLoL of most favoured notLon 
treatment than on agreement by two countrLes to eLLmLnote 
all torLffs borrLers between them whLLe moLntoLnLng exLstLng 
borrLers toward thLrd countrLes. Yet such on agreement would 
create nothLng other than a free trade oreo whLch ossumLng Lt 
conforms to certoLn standards set forth Ln ArtLcle XXIV, 
Ls exempt from most favoured notLonoL obLLgotLon of ArtLcle 1 113 
Loter, the some wrLter exploLns: 
"The General Agreement hos two grand desLgns: that free 
trade be promoted through multLLoteroL torLff negotLotLon~ 
and that dLscrLmLnotLon be eLLmLnoted by means of the most 
favou red notLonoL prLncLple ... customs unLons and free trade 
areas produced a confLLct between these two goals. Such 
regLonoL groupLngs seemed to be movements toward free trade 
to the extent that torLffs were Lowered between member countrLes, 
but they also seemed to Lnvolve d~scrLmLnotLon ogoLnst non-
4 members". 
The GATT provLdes on LnsLght Lnto the relotLonshLp beLng 
exomLned Ln that the most favoured notLon clouse 1 the customs 
unLons exceptLon, and the European CommunLtLes were brought Lnto 
cont oct wLth each other. It Ls best to begLn the record of 
thLs meetLng at the begLnnLng. Curzon poLnts out the LnLtLoL 
dLffLculty the prospectLve member states of the EEC faced: 
"Bu t every European Country was also a controctLng party 
to GATT and as such bound by the most favoured notLon clause . 
TorLff reductLons wLthLn GATT meant possLng on all concessLons 
to the USA whether Lt recLprocoted or not. The Europeans 
sow no need for such generosLty and therefore turned to the 
only GATT conform way out of reducLng torLffs among themselves 
wLthout reducLng them vLs - o-vLs the UnLted States, vLz the 
L • 11 5 customs unLon and free trade area so utLon. 
3. - UnLversLty of ChLcogo Low RevLew 1963 VOL.3 p.615 
4 . - LbLd p . 622 
5 . - MuLtLLoteroL CommercLoL DLplomocy p . 272 
• • .. 
Curzon attrLbutes great weLght to the Lnfluence t h e 
membe r states' obLLgatLons under GATT had on the fLnaL outcome 
of the Treaty of Rome: 
"That Europe went the whole way to a Customs UnLon 
and a Free Trade area Ls not the Least due to the knowledge 
that breaches of the most favoured natLon clause had to be 
GATT conformLng 11 , 6 
The obLLgatLons of member states LLkewLse shaped the 
substantLaL provLsLons of the Treaty: 
" Indeed , the Treaty of Rome had been wrLtten wLth GATT 
rules Ln mLnd . " 7 
I . Frank agrees: 
"Throughout the (Spook) report, however, there Ls a 
concern about GATT requLrements, and the Treaty Ltself Lncludes 
an expLLcLt assurance that rLghts and obLLgatLons resultLng from 
prLor agreements wLth thLrd countrLes shall not be affected by 
the provLsLons of the Treaty. 118 
One may have thought that the 'prLor agreements' envLsaged 
by ArtLcLe 234 would naturally Lnclude MFN treatLes entered 
Lnto by member states before joLnLng the E.C . ArtLcLe 234 
admLts two LnterpretatLons however; Usenko 
vLew : 
echoes the hostLLe 
"The somewhat obscure formulatLon of ArtLcLe 234 cannot 
conceal Lts meanLng whLch LLes Ln obLLgLng every party to the 
Treaty to deny thLrd countrLes the extensLon, Ln accordance 
wLth prevLously concluded agreements, of the same prLvLLeges 
9 as are enjoyed by members of the bloc." 
Flory, speakLng Ln the context of GATT, reaches a dLfferent 
conclusLon: 
6 . - LbLd p . 95 
7 . - LbLd p.276 
8 . - The European Common Market p. 99 
9 . Yearbook 1973 Vol 2 . p. 110 
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"How con the member states of EEC reconcLLe the commLtments 
resultLng from them from the sLgnLng of the Treaty of Rome wLth 
the obLLgotLons whLch they hod assured prevLously by sLgnLng 
multLLoterol agreements such as GATT? Under ArtLcle 234 of 
the Treaty of Rome, the prLncLple of fLdeLLty to prLor agree-
ments should pre-domLnote. By submLttLng the Treaty of Rome 
for consLderotLon by GATT and exhLbLtLng o concLLLotory 
ottLtude towards the ControctLng PortLes, the sLx hove res-
pected that prLncLple. 1110 
The hLstory of the submLssLon of the Treaty of Rome to 
the GATT vLndLcotes Usenko's vLew: Lt Ls true that the 
member states dLd not wLthdrow from the GATT ; Lt Ls submLtted 
however that fLdeLLty to prLor commLtments Lnvolves o LLttle 
more than merely submLttLng the Treaty Lf the end result of 
doLng that Ls, Ln substance, to deny thLrd countrLes the 
extensLon Ln accordance wLth prevLously concluded agreements 
of the some prLvLLeges as ore enjoyed by members of the bloc, 
as Ln fa ct happened (substance, here, consLsts of the promLse 
to extend) - It LS true that the Treaty of Rome was desLgned to 
comply wLth the provLsLons of the GATT - but not ArtLcle '1, 
estobLLshLng MFN treatment for the ControctLng PortLes , but 
ArtLcle XXIV estobLLshLng o customs unLon - whLch , of course, 
excludes the prLor MFN commLtments mode by the member states 
to the controctLng portLes. As poLnted out by Dom: 
"The Treaty of Rome, sLgned Ln Morch '1957, provLded not 
only for the eLLmLnotLon of Lntermember trade borrLers and estob-
LLshment of o common external commercLol poLLcy, but also for 
the eLLmLnotLon of restrLctLons on movement of copLtol and 
Labour and for co-ordLnotLon of certoLn Lnternol economLc 
poLLcLes. WhLLe the EEC thus went for beyond tradLtLonoL free 
trade and customs unLon projects, Lt nonetheless hod to pass 
. XX I V"'l '1 muster under ArtLcle 
The Treaty of Rome was fLrst submLtted to the ControctLng 
PortLes to the GATT Ln '1957, presented as embodyLng o "customs 
unLon" whLch, under ArtLcle XXIV, excepted the treatment member 
'10. - LbLd p.'1'10 
'1'1. UnLversLty of ChLcogo Low RevLew Vol 30 p,64'1 
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states accorded one another from beLng claLmed by another 
non-member ContractLng Party. It Ls not proposed to pursue 
the course of Lts consLderatLon by the ContractLng PartLes 
Ln detaLl, because the valLdLty of the EC as a customs unLon 
was not conclusLvely settled . The fact remaLns, however, that 
the Treaty was accepted Ln practLse by the contractLng partLes 
as a customs unLon, through not defLnLtely rejectLng Lt. 
In practLcal terms, thLs Lnformal acceptance by the ContractLng 
PartLes Ls basLc to the relatLonshLp beLng examLned. 
ArtLcle XXIV sets out the basLc test of a customs unLon 
or an LnterLm agreement leadLng to the formatLon of a customs 
unLon: 
"DutLes and other regulatLons of commerce shall not on 
the whole be hLgher or more restrLctLve than the general LncLdence 
of the dutLes and regulatLons of commerce applLcable" - paragraph 
5(a) 
RestrLctLons are removed when "dutLes and other restrLctLve 
regulatLons of commerce are elLmLnated wLth respect to substan -
tLally all the trade between the constLtuent terrLtorLes, 
Ln products orLgLnatLng Ln such terrLtorLes." 
The general defLnLtLon Ls: 
"A customs unLon shall be understood to mean the substL -
tutLon of a sLngle customs terrLtory for 2 or more customs 
terrLtorLes so that (L) dutLes and other restrLctLve regulatLons 
of commerce are elLmLnated wLth respect to substantLally all 
the trade between the constLtuent terrLtorLes of the unLons, 
and (LL) substantLally the same dutLes and other regulatLons 
of commerce ore applLed by each of the members of the unLon 
to the trade of terrLtorLes not Lncluded Ln the unLon. 1112 
The four problem areas raLsed by the Treaty Ln relatLon 
to the provLsLons of the GATT were the common external tarLff, 
quantLtatLve restrLctLons, agrLculture and the assocLatLon of 
overseas terrLtorLes. 
12, - SasLc Instruments and Selected Documents of GATT Vol. 4 
p. 43 
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In respect of the provLsLon regulatLng Lnter member 
trade, much of the controversy can be traced back to the 
ambLguLty of the rules themselves rather than the EEC cos~, 
vLndLcatLng R. W. Dam's oft quoted observatLon: 
"If a sLngle adjectLve were to be chosen to descrLbe 
ArtLcle XXIV, that adjectLve would be "deceptLve". FLrst 
the standards estabLLshed ore deceptLvely concrete and precLse; 
any attempt to apply the standards to a specLfLc sLtuatLon 
reveals ambLguLtLes whLch, to use an LrresLstLble metaphor, go to 
the heart of the matter. Second, whLLe the rule appears to 
be carefully conceLved, the prLncLples enuncLated make 
LLttle economLc sense . " 13 
Legally, however, the EEC case Ln respect of assocLated 
terrLtorLes was much weaker; under ortLcle 33 paragraph 3, 
the overseas terrLtorLes of the sLgnatorLes of the Treaty 
were Lncluded wLthLn the common market, thereby gaLnLng 
tarLff free, quota free access to the entLre EEC market, 
whLLe the competLtors wLth those assocLated terrLtorLes faced 
the old, and perhaps hLghe~ tarLffs. The arrangement appeared 
sLmply an extensLon of an exLstLng preferentLal commercLaL 
agreement, and hence a vLolatLon of the MFN clause of ArtLcle 
1: the EEC's answer that such arrangements constLtuted a 
free trade area under ArtLcle XXIV 8 (d) had LLttle force, 
appearLng merely a LegaLLstLc afterthought. 
The LegaLLty of the Treaty of Rome as a customs unLon 
under ArtLcle XXIV was never fLnally decLded; the arrangement 
was accepted by the ContractLng PartLes subject to the 
"sympathetLc consLderatLon" by each member state to a contractLng 
party's representatLons under the consultatLonprocedure provLded 
by ArtLcle XXIV. The Legal questLons were shelved , as the 
LntersessLonal commLttee recommended: 
"Lt would be more fruLtful Lf attentLon could be dLrected 
to specLfLc and practLcal pr o blems, LeavLng asLde for the tLme 
beLng questLons of Law and debates about the compatLbLLLty 
13. - Supra Footnote 3 p.619 
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of the Rome Treaty wLth ArtLcle XXIV 1114 
Thus , by a tocLt woLver, the Treaty of Rome was accepted 
by the ControctLng PortLes to the GATT , and the Legal Lssues 
remoLned undecLded . ThLs may be contrasted wLth the sub-
mLssLon of the European Cool and Steel communLty, neLther 
a customs unLon nor a free trade area whLch, for poLLtLcol 
reasons , receLved the blessLng of the GATT by on express woLve r. 
l 
Ce r toLn very defLnLte results showed from thLs de facto 
ac c eptance by the GATT of the EEC as o customs unLon . 
"As members of o customs unLon, the States of the 
CommunLty o r e exempt by ArtLcle XXIV of the GATT from the 
obLLgotLon to extend most favoured notLon treatment not only 
wLt h rega r d to the oboLLtLon of Lnternol torLffs wLthLn the 
. b t f . . . . LL "15 unLon , u or quontLtotLve restrLctLons as we . 
Thus the Lssue wLthLn the sphere of GATT LS apparently 
settled : the advantages accorded between members of the EC 
cannot be cloLmed by a non-member controctLng party under 
ArtLcle 1 of the GATT . In terms of volume , GATT covers 84% 
of the world ' s trade . 
Presumably a commercLol favour granted by o member state 
to another non-member controctLng party may stLLL be cloLmed 
by the other controctLng portLes, SLnce they ore not favours 
granted wLthLn the customs unLon, and the normal GATT regLme 
would apply . The SLtuotLon, however, LS not so clear cut 
as the judgment of the Court of the European CommunLtLes 
Ln the "ThLrd I nternotLonol FruLt Company Cose" 16 LndLcotes : 
the court held that the obLLgotLons of GATT hove generally 
shLfted to the CommunLty Ltself, mentLonLng that the transfer 
of powers hos been recognLsed by the other controctLng portLes 
to GATT . As provLded under ArtLcle 116, though the LndLvLduoL 
membershLp of the member states persLsts Ln GATT, they con 
only proceed "by common act Lon"; Ln proctLcoL votLng and rep re -
sentotLonol terms, the member states hove no power of Lndepen-
dent octLon Ln CommunLty matters - and Lt LS hard to conceLve 
14 . - GATT , BosLc Instruments 7th Supplement p . 70 1958 
15 . - R. EverLLng - CMLR 4 1966 p . 146 
16 . - lnternotLonol FruLt Company & Others v lroduLLtschop 
Groeten en Fr i.t- r)pr 11.. l'\11.,. 12.c.,_. l 1.l"f- l).y.J 
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of a GATT matter that Ls not also a "CommunLty" matter. The 
court spelt out the Lmpact of the Treaty Ln thLs area: 
"In partLcuLar, each tLme the CommunLty, wLth a vLew to 
LmpLementLn g a common poLLcy envLsaged by the Treaty, Lays 
down common rules, whatever form these may take, actLng LndLvL-
duaL Ly or even coLLectLveLy, to contract obLLgatLons towards 
non -member states affectLng these rules. To the extent that 
suc h common rules come Lnto beLng, the CommunLty alone Ls Ln a 
posLtLon to assume and carry out contractual obLLgatLonstowa rds 
non -member states affectLng the whole sphere of appLLcatLon of 
the CommunLty Legal system 11 • 17 
Clea rly Ln the fLeLd of GATT there ore such common rules: Lt 
would appear, therefore, that the LndLvLduaL states no 
Longe r have the rLght to partLcLpate LndLvLduaLLy Ln GATT . 
The possLbLLLty thLs LnquLry started wLth Ls therefore Largely 
ocodemLc because on LndLvLduoL member state wLLL not grant any 
favou rs under GATT, but Lf, Ln breach of Lts treaty obLLgotLon 
a state dLd accord o commercLoL favour too controctLng party 
outsLde the unLon, sLnce os for as the GATT Ls concerned that 
contractLng party Ls stLLL formally o member, Lt would appear 
that fa vour would be processed by ArtLcLe '1 . MLLLtatLng ogaLnst 
thLs however, Ls the recognLtLon by the controctLng portLes 
that the GATT obLLgotLons hove shLfted to the EC. 
The Lessons of the GATT experLence, for our dLscussLon 
ore prescrLbed by the provLsLons of the General Agreement 
Ltself . Its sLgnLfLconce LLes chLefLy Ln the fact that 
the bulk of the world's trade Ls conducted under Lts rules -
or rather, Lts exceptLons . One hos merely to Look ot the 
muLtLtude of customs unLons and free trade agreements (E . C . 
CommunLty of West AfrLcan States, NAFTA, the Andean Poet, EFTA, 
LAFTA , COMECON) to opprecLote that the great proportLon of world 
trade now flows under dLscrLmLno ~ory condLtLons . It shows 
that by o rough and ready approach, the EC Ls occeptobLy close 
· '1 B . h C t . enough too trodLtLonoL customs unLon, Ln t e on roctLng 
PortLes' recognLtLon of the transfer of commerce powers from 
'17. - ERTA Cose no 22/70 '197'1 Ree 263-296 . 
'18 . - Wohlfarth, commentLng on thLs poLnt, observes: 
"Though there ore some opLnLons to the contrary, thLnk 
that the mojorLty vLew Ls that the EEC Ls on orgonLsatLon 
111h(ch (s eRtobL(~hed on9 funct(9ns ~n coNnfocm~tlJ w)(th the 
~ATT rules BI !CL SpeCLOL PubLLCOtLOn o . 7 t-1965 p 3 
.. 
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the.member states to the EC, Lt Ls apparent that the EC oper-
ates , and Ls treated occordLngLy, on a hLgher Level than merely 
that of a customs unLon : no such recognLtLon would normally 
flow from the creotLon of a mere customs unLon . The prLncLpoL 
LLmLtotLon of the GATT Ln sheddLng LLght on the reLotLonshLp 
of the EC and the MFN clause Ls that the former only come Lnto 
contact wLth the Lotter very LndLrectLy by courtesy of ArtLcLe 
XXI V - whLch Ls on exceptLon to Lt. CompLLonce wLth thLs 
exceptLon (because the exceptLon was provLded) emerged as the 
prLncLpoL focus of the submLssLons . AdmLttedLy thLs settles 
the Lssue Ln respect of GATT and Lts controctLng portLes . It 
Leaves unanswered the reLotLonshLp of the EC and states hovLng 
MFN treotLes wLth member states who ore not portLes to the GAT~ 
of whLch there ore stLLL 60 such states . Moy they cLoLm the 
favours granted by one member to another, Ln the absence of on 
express customs unLon exceptLon? The some Lssues, and hence 
the some onwers, ore oppLLcobLe Ln the context of MFN treotLes 
concluded by states who subsequently wLthdrew from the GATT , 
and Lndeed, MFN treotLes where neLther party Ls a controctLng 
party . 
EverLLng answers the fLrst questLon Ln the negotLve: 
" Nor ore member states outsLde GATT, to whLch a member 
state may hove granted most favoured notLon treatment Ln a 
trade agreement entLtLed to the rLghts whLch the member states 
grant each other . For these rLghts ore on LntegroL port of a 
closed system based on recLprocoL commLtments and run by common 
LnstLtutLons; they cannot by theLr very nature be exercLsed 
separately" 19 . 
It Ls dLffLcuLt to see exactly why the framework of a 
closed system wLthLn whLch rLghts ore granted on a recLprocoL 
bosLs should Ln LtseLf exclude non members from cLoLmLng those 
favours Ln the absence of a 'customs unLon exceptLon ' beLng 
Lnserted Ln the orLgLnoL MFN treaty , Ln the absence of a cus -
tomary rule of LnternotLonoL Low oLLowLng on LmpLLed exceptLon 
~o the rule. As hos already been poLnted out, the SpecLoL 
19 . - W. EverLLng : CMLR 4 1966 p 147 : the context LndLcotes 
that the 'tLosed system" Ls a reference to EC and not to 
GATT · the "member states" ore members of the EC, not ' members of GATT . 
.. 
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Rapporteur concluded Ln 1975 that no such rule had evolved . 
If the estabLLshment of a closed system does not of Ltself 
exclude favours granted wLthLn Lt from beLng claLmed under 
a MFN clause , and thLs must follow from the SpecLaL Rapporteur's 
conc l usLon , where else can the basLs for excludLng these rLghts 
from beLng processed under a MFN treaty be found? CertaLnly 
the p r esence of " common LnstLtutLons" cannot of Ltself form 
such a basLs . Does , then , the fact that the rLghts created wLthLn 
a closed system are created on a recLprocal basLs Ln Ltself 
exc l ude the operatLon of the MFN treaty a member has wLth a 
non membe r ? Schwarzenberger appears to agree wLth the ratLonale 
of t h Ls vLew - certaLnly Ln regard to open conventLons . 
" If the conventLon Ls an open one, there Ls much to be 
saLd for the vLew that the benefLcLary should not claLm the 
benefLts of such a conventLon wLthout sharLng the burdens con-
nected wLth Lt , or at Least that Lt should claLm the fulfLLment 
of MFN obLLgatLons only Ln so far as Lt accords Ltself Ln fact to 
the other state the benefLts whLch Lt claLms" 20 . 
In the LLght of Draft ArtLcle 15, estabLLshLng the Lrrele -
vance of the fact that the grantLng state has treated the "thLrd" 
member state gratuLtously or agaLnst compensatLon , thLs can 
hardly serve as a basLs on whLch to exclude those rLghts. In 
any event, as poLnted out by EverLLng, the EC Ls a closed system; 
Schwarzenberger's comment Ls not, therefore, appLLcabLe to Lt . 
It would appear so far that no satLsfactory basLs can be found for 
excludLng customs unLon favours from beLng claLmed under a MFN 
treaty wLth a non member. In thLs regard, Lt should be noted 
that the omLssLon of the SpecLal Rapp o rteur to codLfy a customs 
unLon exceptLon becomes LmmedLateLy relevant: had a Draft ArtLcle 
been Lncluded, as embodyLng a rule of customary Law (Ln whLch 
case the same result would be achLeved anyway) or based on pro -
gressLve development, the respect that the Draft ArtLcLes command 
would have Lent consLderabLe support to the cLaLmed exceptLon , 
and Ln partLcuLar, the reasons behLnd Lt; the absence, on the 
other hand of such general approval Leaves them rather naked and 
20 . - The MFN standard Ln BrLtLsh State PractLse 1945 BYBIL p 109 
Footnote 5 
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unpersuasLve Ln theLr own rLght. 
The fact that the GATT dLd specLfLcaLLy Lnclude a "customs 
unLon exceptLon" Ln ArtLcLe XXIV to the MFN prLncLpLe and that 
so many states subscrLbe to the GATT could provLde the basLs 
for recognLsLng thLs exceptLon beyond the confLnes of the Gene ral 
Agreement . The SpecLaL Rapporteur consLdered thLs possLbLLLty, 
th Lnk Lng a Loud: 
"D oes GATT possess such a "radLatLon effect " whLch would 
Lmpose upon non partLes the rule of ArtLcLe XXIV as one whLch 
passed Lnto the general corpus of LnternatLonaL Law on Lts 
acc eptance by a communLs opLnLo jurLs? " 2'1 . 
Inherent Ln hLs r ejectLon of the emergence of such a rule 
of customary La w was the rejectLon of thLs vLew of GATT : 
"The General Ag re ement , however Lmportant , Ls one agree-
ment among many " 22 . 
Thus the p r ovLsLons of GATT Leave unaltered the reLatLon-
shLp beLng examLned : the Lssue of the EC and the MFN prLncLpLe 
remaLns to be decLded on Lndependent grounds . 
Another possLbLe ground for excLudLng customs unLon rLghts 
from beLng cLaLmed by a non member has been advanced by a dLs -
tLnguLshed group of European economLsts Ln a report produced for 
the lnstLtut fur WeLtwLrtschaft; they noted: 
" Let us emphasLse straLght away, however, that the creatLon 
of the EC dLd Ln no way LnfrLnge on, or vLoLate the prLncLpLe of 
most favoured natLon treatment, as expressed Ln the GATT . No -
thLng Ln the phLLosophLcaL content and hLstorLcaL anaLysLs of 
that prLncLpLe can be construed as a presumptLon agaLnst the 
eLLmLnatLon of tarLffs among a group of countrLes wLLLLng to 
surrender and merge certaLn sLgnLfLcant aspects of theLr natLonaL 
sovereLgnty . The parallels often drawn wLth the creatLon of the 
UnLted States of AmerLca or of modern Germany are quLte LegLtLmate "23. 
If the authors meant the emphasLs of the EC ' s frLendshLp 
wLth the MFN prLncLpLe to be on "as expressed Ln the GATT " then 
clearly thLs Ls correct but only because Lt was accepted , Ln 
practLse , as a customs unLon under ArtLcLe XXIV as an exceptLon 
2'1 . - Yearbook '1975 Vol. 11 p '16 
22 . - LbLd 
23 . EconomLc PoLLcy for the European CommunLty 
Forward p '19 
The Way 
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to the MFN p r LncLpLe . Unfortunately, the subsequent comments 
mode LndLcate that a wLder meonLng Ls Lntended; the cLoLm 
o~peo r s to be that the MFN prLncLpLe LtseLf, LndependentLy of 
the GATT , hos on LnbuLLt exceptLon Ln the sLtuotLon envLsoged . 
CertoLnLy thLs Ls true Ln regard to the creotLon of a new state, 
but the EC, as admLtted Ln the quote, Ls only a parallel to thLs ; 
Lt cannot be r egarded Ln trodLtLonaL terms as a state . If the 
sLtuatLon envLsoged by the authors Ls a reference to a customs 
unLon, then such a concLusLon clearly confLLcts wLth those of 
the SpecLoL Rapporteur, who concluded that Ln terms of phLLo-
sophLcoL content, the prLncLpLe dLd not odmLt such an except-
Lon , and hLsto r LcoLLy , state proctLce was not unLform enough 
nor dLd Lt r eflect the emergence of a communLs opLnLo jurLs . The 
Spec Lo L Rappo r teur drew a contrary presumptLon from a superfLcLoL 
Look at the MFN prLncLpLe : 
" The presumptLon obvLousLy mLLLtotes ogoLnst such on except-
Lon . If states promLse each other most favoured notLon treat-
ment , they ore supposed to carry out theLr promLse . They may 
LLmLt such promLse , but Lf they do not, they hove to bear the 
consequences ", 24 . 
If the ' phLL osophLcoL content' of the rule necessorLLy re-
sults Ln excLudLng customs unLon benefLts, the questLon must be 
asked - what phLL osophLcoL content? The most LLkeLy content Ls 
that of the ejusdem generLs rule, closely oLLLed to the vLews of 
Pescatore : 
" There Ls no common measure between a treaty desLgned sLmpLy 
to focLLLtote trade and the much more ombLtLous and fundamental 
object Lve of a treaty desLgned to brLng about economLc Lntegrot-
Lon Ln the form of a free trade area a customs unLon or on economLc 
unLon " 25 . 
The SpecLoL Rapporteur regarded thLs vLew on unjustLfLed 
extensLon of the ejusdem generLs rule, and undoubtedly he Ls 
correct ; the rule LLmLts the cLoLms a benefLcLory may make under 
a MFN t r eaty to the some subject matter: the favours granted to 
a thL r d state must relate to the some subject matter as the 
24 . - Yearbook '1975 Vol . I I p '16 
25 . - Annu a i re de L' lnstLtut de droLt lnternotLonaL '1969 Vol . 53 
p 209 
..J 
• • • 
109 
orLgLnal MFN treaty before the benefLcLary may claLm them. 
The prLncLple does not of Ltself requLre LdentLty Ln degree 
of frLendLLness between the grantLng state and the thLrd 
state and the benefLcLary. 
treatLes under whLch the rLghts ore created need not necess-
arLLy correspond . As the SpecLaL Rapporteur emphasLsed : 
"Bluntly, Lf the most favoured natLon clause promLses 
MFN treatment solely for fLsh such treatment cannot be claLmed 
under the same clause for meat" 26 . 
SLmLLorly the nature of the 
As poLnted out prevLously, a certaLn LnconsLstency sur-
faces Lf thLs Ls appLLed to the "frontLer traffLc exceptLon" : 
there the rule resulted Ln an exceptLon chLefly Ln relLance 
on the context of the treotLes (whether states were contLguous 
or not) and not the subject matter of the treatLes themselves : 
surely on thLs crLterLon the context of the creatLon of a customs 
unLon could lLkewLse exclude rLghts granted from beLng claLmed 
by those outsLde the bloc? 
AcceptLng though , the SpecLoL Rapporteur's vLew of the 
ejusdem generLs rule, thLs would appear to be o convLncLng 
argument that the phLL osophLcal content of the MFN prLncLple 
does not support a customs unLon exceptLon . ThLs assumes 
throughtout however that Lt Ls a customs unLon that Ls beLng 
referred to; the reference to the "surrender and merger" of 
certoLn sLgnLfLcant aspects of theLr natLonal sovereLgnty 
coupled wLth the analogy wLth the federal states of the UnLted 
States o f AmerLca and Germany LndLcates another basLs on whLch 
the rLghts granted wLthLn the bloc should be excluded from the 
operatLon of the MFN treaty - namely , the new entLty argument . 
The bosLs for excludLng rLghts claLmed under an MF treaty when 
two prevLous ly Lndependent states hove merged stems from the 
fact that the grantLng state Ls no Longer accordLng a favour to 
another state because the two states ore now one . The MFN 
prLncLple Ls founded on the concept of one state grontLng a 
favour to another state as the standard the benefLcLory may 
26 . - Yearbook of the ILC 1973 Vol. 2 P 108 
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cLoLm . The unLtLng of two states therefore does not termLnote 
the MFN treaty; rather Lt excludes from Lts operotLon the 
favours granted by one member of the state to another . If the 
authors vLew Ln the European CommunLtLes a creotLon analogous 
to the USA , then the phLLosophLcaL content of the prLncLpLe may 
exclude those rLghts from beLng cLoLmed by a benefLcLary . As 
hos been shown, the EC does contaLn defLnLte elements whLch are 
analogous to a federal state. As the EC LtseLf poLnted out: 
"These responsLbLLLtLes extend to fLeLds whLch, by theLr 
nature, go beyond the obLLgatLons generally undertaken wLthLn 
a customs unLon; they LncLude, to men~on only one sort of commLt-
ment , o communLty Legal system Ln whLch communLty Law Ls pre-
emLnent and dLrectLy appLLcabLe wLthLn member states under the 
surveL LLon ce of the Court of JustLce of the communLtLes" 27 . 
To thLs extent the federal analogy drown by the authors 
Ls correct; what Ls more doubtful however, Ls the apparent 
equotLon they assume exLsts on the operatLon of the MFN 
prLncLpLe between the creatLon of o federal state and the creot-
Lon o f an entLty that Ls only ana~gous too federal state . It 
Ls by no means certaLn whether at present thLs can be equated; 
thLs questLon Ls examLned shortly . It would appear however that 
the degree of LntegrotLon ochLeved wLthLn the bloc Ls crucLoL 
Lf the analogy wLth a federal state Ls to hold good; thLs Ls 
only LndLrectly relevant on Pescatore's LnterpretotLon of the 
ejusdem generLs rule - Ln fact he Lumps all three degrees of 
LntegrotLon together - free trode area, customs unLon and 
economLc unLon . ThLs Ls surprLsLng; one would have thought that 
varyLng degrees of LntegrotLon would affect the Lock of common 
measure between the MFN treaty and the customs unLon, free trade 
area or economLc unLon treaty. Of course, as far as the 
SpecLaL Rapporteur Ls concerned, the jegrees of LntegratLon 
achLeved ore Lrrelevant as far as the ejusdem generLs rule Ls 
concerned . 
The New EntLty Agreement : 
The new entLty argument roLsed by the 
27 . - Report of the ILC 1978 p 449 
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autho rs warrants careful consLderotLon, however, because Lt 
repr e sents pe rha ps the most forceful bosLs on whLch Lt LS cloLmed 
that MFN rLghts may be excluded. The SLmLlorLty between on 
osso cLotL o n of states as customs unLons, common markets or eco-
nom Lc unLons, and o unLtLng of states constLtutes the bosLs of the 
argum ent; Lf, as Lt Ls accepted , o grontLng state enters Lnto o 
unLo n wLth another state, the rLghts accorded by that state to 
the other member cannot be cloLmed by o benefLcLory state under 
o prLor MFN treaty, the volLd analogy between such o full unLon 
and o portLol unLon, such as the customs unLon , common market or 
eco nomLc unLon roLses the possLbLlLty that Ln the latter cos~, 
the rLghts accorded by one member to another ore not caught by 
the prLor MFN t reotLe s o member hos wLth thLrd states . ConsLde r-
Lng the source of thLs argument, Lt would appear that the degree 
of LntegrotLon ochLeved wLthLn the unLon becomes all Lmportant ; 
Lf the analogy Ls wLth o unLon of states , LmplyLng full Lnte -
grotLo n, l ogLcolly Lt should follow that the more LntegrotLon 
o me re ossocLotLon exhLbLts, the more compellLng becomes the 
analogy and hence, the possLbLlLty of excludLng prLor MFN 
oblLgat Lons . But Lt Ls Lmportant that Lt Ls only on analogy 
beL ng drown; the argument does not strLve to see the assocLotLon 
as o state, but s LmLlar to o state . In the case of the EC, Lt 
Ls not argued that thLs bloc represents a federal state but LS 
SLmLlor too federal state . The analogy LS ogaLn Lnvoked Lf one 
concentrates on the ratLonole for excludLng prLor MFN oblLgotLons 
where two states grant each other favours wLthLn ~ unLon ; they 
ore exlcuded, not because the orLgLnal MFN treaty Ltself LS 
abrogated , but because the trLgger mechanLsm establLshed by the 
treaty Ltself gLvLng the benefLcLory a rLght to claLm equal 
treatment Ls not actLvated by the grant of a rLght by one membe r 
to another for precLsely the reason that by vLrtue of the unLon , 
thLs can no longer be consLdered to be a grant by one state to 
anothe r - sLnce the two are now one . The customs unLon , common 
market or economLc unLon analogy LS drawn because Ln precLsely 
the fLeld envLsaged by the orLgLnul MFN treaty , the two or mo re 
membe r s ore one state . The new en6Lty argument seeks reco gnLtLo n 
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of thLs degree of unLty Ln excludLng prLor MFN treotLes sLnce 
the unLty of the members operates Ln precLsely the areas the 
treotLes set up the standard of the grontLng state's treatment 
of a thLrd most favoured notLon; con a member of a customs 
or other unLon stLL L serLously be regarded as such a "thLrd" 
state? 
The Eur opean CommunLtLes ore portLculorly susceptLble 
to thLs type of t re atment . In oddLtLon , however , the extens -
Lve nature of the rLghts conferred Ln thLs bloc gLve rLse to 
a dLfferent type of recognLtLon called for - ogoLn LLmLted , 
but Ln a dLfferent sense - on whLch prLor MFN obLLgotLons could 
be excluded. The reference poLnt Ls ogoLn where two states hove 
unLted , but Lnsteod of drowLng on analogy between thLs sLtuotLon 
and a portLoL unLon of states, thLs perspectLve Looks at the EC 
as a state Ltself. It accepts that the spheres Lt operates Ln 
ore LLmLted, prLncLpoLLy commercLoL , but calls for recognLtLon 
as a state Ln the areas Lt operates as a state and supplements 
thLs gap between Lt and a fully fledged state by LnvokLng the 
presence of the EC Ln these other fLelds - a power LLmLted only 
because at present they ore Lmmoture and Lnchoote . Con the 
Lnchoote nature of the EC as a state, as opposed to a fully 
fledged stote , serve as on adequate bosLs on whLch MFN obLLgotLons 
by the members may be excluded - occeptLng that the verdLct 
entered on the EC hos a correspondLng effect on the nature of 
the member state ? 
The RLghts whLch would be excluded: 
Before consLderLng whether 
the estobLLshment of the EC, Ln portLculor the Treaty of Rome , 
precludes the oppLLcotLon of MFN obLLgotLons entered Lnto by 
the member states , Lt LS worthwhLLe to consLder LnLtLoLLy pre -
CLseLy what these rLghts ore . It should also be noted that Lt 
Ls only treotLes LncludLng the MFN prLncLple as the oppLLcoble 
standard that ore threatened by the advent of the EC; those 
securLng "notLonoL treatment" as the standard oppLLcoble clearly 
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persLst after the Treaty of Rome - Lndeed, that treaty may 
augment the standard . 
Any MFN treaty a thLrd states hos wLth a member state 
L~ subject to the ejusdem generLs rule; therefore , that 
benef LcLory may only cLoLm the advantages the grontLng state 
accords a member thLrd state wLthLn the subject matter , Ln 
thLs Lnstonce , oLso provLded for under the EEC Treaty . The 
LndLvLduoL subject matters covered by the prLor MFN treotLes 
dLctote what rLghts may be LnLtLoLLy cLoLmed; what the 
benefLcLory Ls entLtLed to , however, depends on the LdentLty 
between thLs and the subject matter of the favour granted by 
the g rontLng state and the " thLrd" member state, and the Lotter 
Ls specLfLed Ln the Treaty of Rome . Therefore , the Treaty of 
Rome LtseLf deLLneotes what rLghts a benefLcLory state Ls en -
tLtLed to - and hence, the extent of rLghts threatened by 
excLusLon . The rLqhts LnvoLved therefore ore rLghts reLotLng 
to the free movement of workers, capLtoL and s ervLces, the rLght 
of estabLLshment of componLes, on taxes and potent rLghts . 
If one accepts that the customs unLon exceptLon Ls not a rule 
of customary LnternotLonoL Law - whLch , Ln LLght of the SpecLoL 
Rapporteu r' s concLusLon , Ls not hard to do - then also the 
tarLff and quota provLsLons reguLatLng Lnter member trade as 
well may be cLoLmed by a thLrd state wLth a suLtabLe MFN treaty . 
The Language of ArtLcLe 234 paragraphs 1 and 3, stondLng on Lts 
own , justLfLes such a concLusLon: aLL EEC rLghts ore Lumped to -
gethe r. The Ge r mon Government Lnterpreted thLs to mean Ln 1957 
that oLL EEC rL ghts ore excepted from the MFN clause ; two early 
decLsLons of theCouncLL , on the other hand, revealed that they 
consLde red the Language of the EEC Treaty Lnadequote to prevent 
the extensLon of EC trade benefLts t o thLrd states under MFN 
treaty 28 ~hence the requLrement of on EEC clause to prevent 
thLs happenLng Ln any trade agreements a member state may wLsh 
to enter . 
ThLs re presents then the extent of rLghts that could be 
cLoLmed under prLor MFN commLtments by member states ; Lt repre-
sents o frLghlenLng potentLoL LLobLLLty on the port of the EC 
Lf MFN clauses ore not excluded . Up tLLL now Lt hos been 
assumed that the questLon becomes crucLaL only where no customs 
28 . 1961 OffLcLoL Journal of the European Co mmunLtLes 1273 
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unLon exceptLon has been Lnserted Ln the MFN treaty; LLkewLse, 
the EC Ls saLd to be protected ogaLnst contractLng partLes to 
th e GATT because of ArtLcLe XXIV . Ce r taLnLy thLs sett les the 
equestLon Ln reLatLon to torLff and quota restrLctLons sL nce 
they ore naturally the subject matter of the "cu stoms unLon 
except Lon" . Ho we ve r, the presence of a " customs unLon except-
Lon" would not of LtseLf exclude oLL the othe r non trade pro-
vLs Lons of the Treaty of Rome , whLch Lt would appea r could be 
cLo Lmed by ContractLng Po r tLes to the GATT as weLL . The con-
tros tLng LncLu sLo n Ln the Netherlands FCN Treaty ArtcLLe XXI I 
(3) wLth the USA of o "regL onaL agreement " exceptLon, and the 
Ge rman Treaty wLth EL Salvador of 1952 LncLudLng o " sup ronotLonoL 
co mmunLty " exceptLo n reLnforce the vLew that o customs un Lon 
exceptLon alone Ls LnsufflcLent to exclude subjects apa rt from 
trad e matters . FLnolLy, Lt should be poLnted out that o bene -
fLcLory may stL LL cLaLm from the grontLng state the favours Lt 
acco rd another member state outsLde the oreas covered by the 
Treaty of Rome, and thLs oppLLes regardless of th~ Lmpoct one 
ott rLbute s to that Treaty on the MFN treotles . Outslde the 
a rea s covered by the Tr eaty , the normal regLme oppLLes ; Lt 
ca nnot be regar ded that those rLghts , when granted by one member 
to another, are excluded, by LnfectLon , because of the assoc -
LatLo n of the grantLng state and thLrd state Ln other areas . 
The MFN rLghts threatened by the EC ore strLctLy Llmlted to the 
areas covered by the Treaty. 
If the customs unLon exceptLon , express or LrnpLLed Ls 
Lnodequote , under what exceptLon con the EC exclude MFN rLghts 
from beLng cLoLmed? The bosLs of thLs exceptLon Ls the new 
entlty argument. Its bosLc outLLne hos already been descrLbed . 
ThLs now needs to be put Ln the context of Lnternotlonol Law, sLnce 
obvLous Ly the excLusLon of MFN treotLes to rLghts created wLth the 
bloc con only stand Lf supported by o proper Legal foundotLon. 
What, then, Ls that Legal foundotlon? 
In matters related to trade (torLffs and quotas) clearly 
the MFN prLncLpLe Ls excluded Ln respect of controctLng portLes 
to the GATT by ArtLcLe XXIV ; thLs stlLL Leaves unresolved the 
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posLtLon of non controctLng portLes and matters unrelated to 
t rade . The bosLs of the argument Ls that the Treaty of Rome 
creates o new economLc entLty as refLect/.tby ArtLcLe 234 of the 
Treaty of Rome , whLch by Lt seLf con~Ltutes on exceptLon to 
the MFN prLncLpLe . But the justLfLcQtLon of such on exceptLon 
must be found by reference to on analogous prLncLpLe of· Lnter -
notLonoL Low; the new econ omLc entLty argument seeks Lt just -
LfLcotLon by reference to the exLstence of on LmpLLed exceptLon 
Ln the case of customs unLon: essentLoLLy Lt Ls on extensLon of 
tha t exceptLon . The problem Ls, that the exLstence of the Lotter 
exceptLon has been expres sly denLed by the SpecLoL Rapporteu r . 
If the SpecLoL Rapporteur ' s stand on the LmpLLed customs unLons 
exceptLon Ls correct (and Lt Ls submLtted that Lt Ls) then 
to rLff and quota rLghts accorded by the members to each othe r 
wLth Ln the unLon ore not p r otected ogoLnst o cloLm by o non 
cont roctLng party wLth o MFN treaty wLth o member . In essence, 
the EC now argues for on LmpLLed economLc unLon exceptLon , whLch 
would exclude oLL the rLgh ts the members states acco rd each 
othe r from beLng cloLmed by prevLous MFN treaty partners . The 
just LfLco t Lon of such o vLew Ls that the exceptLon Ls on extens -
Lon , by r,nology, of the LmpLLed customs unLon exceptLon . The 
demLs e of the Lotter at the hands of the SpecLoL Rapporteur as 
representLng o rule of customary Low Ls not necessorLLy fatal 
to the voLLdLty of the new exceptLon cloLmed , sLnce Lt was 
or~ued that Lt exLsted by analogy only Ln the fLrst place : both 
beLng based o n the consequences of the emergence of o new eco -
nomLc entLty , the monLfestotLon of thLs vLew as on economLc unLon 
exceptLon must be put to the test as well; the Lssue roLsed by 
the LmpLLed customs unLon exceptLon ore resurrected Ln the new 
context . It must be conceded, however , that the SpecLol Rappo rteur ' s 
rejectLon of the LmpLLed customs unLon exceptLon , Ln so for as the 
some Lssues ore r aLsed Ln judgLng the voLLdLty of on LmpLLed eco-
nomLc nL on exceptLon, does Lndeed cost a block cloud over the 
voLLdLty of the Lotter. The orLgLnol objectLons to oLLowLng the 
LmpLLed customs unLon exceptLon ore equally oppLLcobLe ogaLnst 
the extensLon of Lt to Lncorporote the economLc unLon exceptLon . 
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PrLmo focLe, the MFN prLncLpLe does not appear to odmLt on 
LmpLLed economLc unLon exceptLon , as the new economLc entLty 
argume nt would argue Ln favour of , for the SLmpLe reason that 
~:Jt es do not extend benefLts to other economLc entLtLes but 
to other poLLtLcoL entLtLes L. e . states; a benefLcLory state 
may expect the borgoLned for concessLons from Lts treaty part -
ner r egordless - Lndeed dependent - on the Latter ' s economLc 
osso cLotLons . From thLs fLrst prLncLpLe, on Lmpled economLc 
unLo n exceptLo n appears on unLLkeLy proposLtLon ; the fact LS 
that the member states of the EC hove remoLned separate poLLt-
LcoL entLtLe s . 
Hoy confLrms thLs pessLmLsm : 
" FLrst, as a matter of treaty LnterpretotLon , on extensLo n 
of the customs unLon exceptLon to cover the EEC (Ln fact a new 
except Lo n) cannot be LmpLLed. The defect wLth respect to the 
Lmp LLed customs unLon exceptLon was perhaps cured by the emerg -
ence of a rule of customary LnternotLonoL Low recognLsLng such 
exceptLons . No such customary rule of LnternotLonoL Low exLsts 
WLth regard to the acceptance of on LmpLLed economLc unLon 
exceptLon , o r oLternotLveLy, wLth regard to on LmpLLed extensLon 
of a customs unLon exceptLon" 29 . 
In VLew of the SpecLoL Rapporteur's stand on Lmpled customs 
unLons , the defect referred to clearly hos not been cured . But 
the oLternotLve formuLotLon of the economLc unLon exceptLon does 
reveal that Lts bosLs may LLe Ln on extensLon of on express 
customs unLon exceptLon , and SLnce these abound , the voLLdLty of 
extendLng that exceptLon to on economLc unLon must be consLdered 
despLte the concLusLon of the SpecLoL Rapporteur on the LmpLLed 
customs unLon exceptLon . 
The voLLdLty of the LmpLLed customs un(on exceptLon as on 
extensLon of on express cusoms unLon may be tested by whether 
the Lotter wLLL odmLt on extensLon Ln favour of a "r egLonoL 
clause " - on analogous concept. On thLs Schworzenberger states : 
" In the absence of on express reservotLon , a state con de -
mand unde r the MFN standard the benefLts of excLusLve preferent LoL 
t reotLe s , bLLoteroL or muLtLLoteroL , between the promLso r and 
29 . - P . Hoy : UnLversLty of PLttsburgh Low RevLew Vol . 23 1963 
p 679 
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thLrd states . . . " 30 . 
By analogy, therefore, Lt wou l d appear unLLke ly that an 
extensLon of a customs unLon exceptLon could be construed Ln 
favour of an economLc unLon exceptLon Lf those granted wLthLn a 
regLonaL preferentLaL system are susceptLbLe to beLng p roce ssed 
under a MFN clau s e, especLaLLy sLnce a customs unLon exceptLon 
relates to movement of goods; Lf an extensLon of Lt cannot be 
construed Ln fa vou r of a regLonaL exceptLon LLmLted to the 
mov ement of goods, Lt Ls dLffLcuLt to see how Lt could be 
extended Ln favour o f an economLc unLon exceptLon reLatLng to 
the wLder fLeld s suc h as the free flow of capLtaL and the rLght 
of estabLL shme nt of companLes envLsaged by th~ Treaty of Rome . 
Furthe~ claLmLng an Lm p LLe d exceptLon, whether Lt be economLc 
unLo n, customs unLon o r common market ones , rep resents prLma 
fac Le a breach of the rule that bargaLned for advantages shou ld 
not be denLed a treaty partner through the unLLateraL actLon 
of the ot her - except, Lt would appear , where such unLLateral 
act Lon Lead s to the formatLon of a new state . Thus as a matte r 
of treaty Lnterp retatL o n Lt would appear doubtful whethe r an 
extensLon of the customs unLon exceptLon can be LmpLLed Ln 
favour of an economLc unLon . 
BeLng an economLc unLon Leads to another ground (Lndepend-
ent of treaty LnterpretatLon) on whLch MFN obLL9atLons are 
cla Lmed to be excluded - namely that the EC represents a new 
ent Lty whLch of Ltself excludes the operatLon of the MFN prLncLpLe . 
The argument does not go do for as to cLaLm that the EC Ls a 
federal state , but rather that the balance struc between the 
EC and the member states Ls akLn to that exLstLng Ln a federal 
state and consequently , on the basLs of thLs assocLatLon , the 
rLghts granted by one member to another cannot be claLmed by a 
non member because the reLatLonshLp between the two member states 
Ls outsLde that envLsaged by the MFN prLncLpLe LtseLf and also 
from an extensLon of the rule that the prLncLpLe Ls excluded 
whe re two states merge Lnto a full unLon . 
As already poLnted out, the SpecLaL Rapporteur cLted three 
related factors wry MFN rLghts could not be excluded Ln respect 
30 . - The MFN Standard Ln BrLtLsh State PractLse 1945 BI I L p 109 
.. 
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of the EEC, mLLLtotLng ogoLnst vLewLng the EC as a new entLty 31 : 
ihe member states remoLned "Ln dependent and sove reLgn" because 
the EC was not poLLtLcolly unLted. Such a tradLtLonol response 
seems to LndLcote that the new entLty argument could not succeed , 
no matter how extensL ve the degree of LntegrotLon Ln othe r fLelds , 
unless Lt was accompanLed by poLLtLcaL unLon . ThLs appears a 
strange response Ln that the essence of the submLssLo n that the 
EC represents a new entLty Lay Ln acceptLng that the sphe re s the 
EC operated Ln were odmLttedly LLmLted - beLng moLnly economLc -
but wLthLn those spheres, the EC operore Ln exactly the same 
manner as a Federal state, and to thLs extent should be treated 
as such . SLnce the MFN treotLes covered precLsely the EC oper -
ate exclusLvely Ln, the argument goes , the some regLme appLLc -
oble to a full unLon of states should also apply . 
But even Lf one accepts the crLterLo Lnvoked by the 
SpecLal Rapporteur, theLr appLLcatLon to the EC does not nessor-
Lly endorse hLs conclu sLon . They ore only justLfLed by a st rLct 
LnterpretotLon of the concept of sovereLgnty ; the conclusLon that 
th e member states are , after membershLp, stLLL "Ln dependent " and 
" sov ereLgn " Ls open to the objectLon that Ln certoLn specLfLed 
fLelds , maLnly commercLal poLLcy, the member states are anythLng 
by Lndependent whLLe they remaLn bound by the Treaty of Rome . 
It Ls the EC whLch have exclusLve competence to deal Ln the 
commercLaL sphere . It Ls true thot the mPmber states have re-
taLned theLr natLonal odmLnLstratLons , for example , for the 
pu rpo se of collectLng customs dutLes - but whLLe the Treaty of 
Rome contLnues to bLnd them , they cannot be regarded as " Lnde -
pendent " Ln commercLal matters. By the Layman's understondLng 
of the word , t r1e member states are not " Lndependent " Ln commer -
CLol matters . They ore Lndependent, Lt LS true Ln a resLduoL 
sense , Ln that they have retoLned the power, by wLthdrowLng from 
the Treaty of Rome-whLch they ore perfectly entLtled to do - to 
regaLn the rL ght to deal Ln the commercLal sphere . The member 
states are certoLnly Lndependent Ln all spheres outsLde those 
envLsoged by the Treaty of Rome but Ln commercLaL matte rs, they 
exercLse only a resLdual type of Lndependence . ThLs dLstLnctLon 
31 . - Yearbook of the I LC 1975 Vol . 2 P 17 
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between power and rLght domLnotes the Lssue of sovereLgnty as 
we ll . As already poLnted out , Lf sovereLgnty be regarded as 
o power concept, and hence dLVLSLble, one con accept that ln 
the commercLol spheres the EC exerclse soverelgn powers ; thls 
goes ogoLnst the Speclol Rapporteur's conclusLon that the 
member states hove retolned theLr sovereLgnty . Such o vlew 
ls only correct lf one re gards soverelgnty as o quollty whlch 
cannot be Lent out or dLvLded; on thLs vlew , clearly the member 
sta tes ore the only unLts exercLSLng sovereLgn powers SLnce 
th ey retoLn the rLght to dLsmontle the EC, thereby endLng any 
powe r s Lt exercLses . Hoy exploLns thLs VLewpoLnt : 
" Even Ln areas where the EEC LnstLtutLons exercLse exclus-
LVe competence f o r Ln stonce Ln matters of commercLol poLLcy ... 
the Lr competence LS based on o delegotLon and not o transfer 
of sovereLgn powers from the member states . ThLs dLfference 
LS Lllustrote d by the fact that they con dLssolve the communLty 
by mutual agreement " 32 . 
On thLs st rLct LnterpretotLon of " Lndependence " and 
" sov ereLgnty " the SpecLoL Rapporteur ' s conclusLons ore quLte 
justLfLed . UltLmotely, Lt LS the absence of poLLtLcoL unLon 
WLthL n the EC that justLfLes such o conclusLon , though ogoLn , 
thLs absence needs to be quoLLfLed . A degree of poLLtLcoL 
unLon LS envLsoged by the Treaty of Rome , elevated now by the 
advent of dLrect electLons to the Strasbourg PorLLoment . However at 
p resent , the LLmLted powers exercLsed by that body , coupled 
WLt h the contLnuLng domLnotLon of European poLLtLcs at the 
notLonoL Level, justLfLes the conclusLon that poLLtLcolly the 
membe r states ore not unLted . 
It may be wondered whether Ln fact the strLct approach 
adopted by the SpecLol Rapporteur wos worronted ' on the facts' 
of the EC . The extensLve closslfLcotLon undergone Ln relotlon 
to the EC revealed that on olternotLve LnterpretotLon of such 
concepts as "Ln dependence " ~nd " sovereLgnty " wos ovoLLoble , and 
nowhere more opproprLote than Lts oppLLcotLon to the EC Lf such 
estobLLshed concepts ore to take account of the novel condLtLons 
32 . - P . Hoy Supra Footnote 29 p 681 
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created by the EC. If the more fLexLbLe approach to the concept 
of sovereLgnty had been adopted , recognLtLon of the excLusLve 
cont r ol the EC ho~ over the lLmLted fLelds Lt exLsts Ln could 
have f ollowed ; the consequences of creatLng a new state port -
LcuLa rLy Ln Lts Lmpact on the MFN prLncLpLe, could have been 
accept ed Ln the sphe re s that the EC does operate exactly as a 
stat e, portLcuLarLy sLnce these spheres correspond precLseLy 
to those where the member states no Longer can act . If a de -
gre e of Lnoccuracy flows from thLs LLmLted recognLtLon , because 
the member states persLst to be states Ln all other spheres , 
sure ly a degree of Lnaccuracy Ls LLkewLse Lntroduced by vLewLng 
the posLtLon of the member states as Lntact Ln all fLeLds Ln 
LLght of the reaLL ty brought about by the Treaty of Rome? ThLs, 
Lnde ed, was the reactLon of the EC to the Draft ArtLcles Ln 
theL r present form. They stated: 
"In vLew of the requLrements of regLonaL LntegrotLon as 
encounte red by the CommunLty , the CommunLty would LLke to poLnt 
out once agaLn to the lnternatLonoL Law CommLssLon that , Ln 
theL r overall conceptLon, the Draft ArtLcLes ore dLrected 
excLusLveLy at states and appear to Lgnore Lntegrated groups 
of states or groups Ln the process of LntegratLon ... One should 
not underestLmate the fact that, whLLe the trend towards regLon -
aL LntegratLon affects the appLLcatLon of the clause, Lt also 
goes hand Ln hand wLth a transfer of Lts appLLcotLon from the 
state to the regLonaL Level" 33 . 
SpecLfLcaLLy Ln reLatLon to Draft ArtLcLes 15 and 16 , the 
EC poLnted out : 
" The proposed wordLng does not take Lnto account the fact 
that the state members of the CommunLty have reLLnquLshed all 
powers Ln the fLeLd of trade poLLcy to the CommunLty, and , as 
LndLvLdual countrLes , no Longer have the necessary means of 
fuLfLLLLng bLLoteraL commLtments Ln these areas . They no Longer 
have LndLvLduaL customs tarLffs" 34. 
Thus adherence to a tradLtLonaL approach Lgnores the 
fundamental changes brought about by the Treaty, LndLcatLng 
33 . - Report of the ILC 1978 p 448 
34 . - LbLd p 449 
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perhaps that a more fLexlbLe approach recognlslng apportlonment 
between member states and the Communlty may have been more 
approprlate . Slnce the trend today Ln the world LS towards 
reglonaL lntegratlon, the unsultabLLlty of concepts created 
Ln a world that knew only soverelgn states could have provLded 
a ground for progresslve codlfLcatLon. 35 . 
A further polnt should be noted ln the SpeclaL Rapporteur ' s 
treatment of the reLatlonshlp: he Lald great stress on the fact 
that ln treaty matters, the EC appeared to remaln on the plane 
of lntergovernmentaL organlsatlons (l.e. the EC dld not succeed 
to the treatles of the member states) as accepted by the I LC Ln 
preparlng lts Draft ArtLcLes on state successLon. 
It ls slgnlflcant that the ILC on successLon of states, 
whlLe concLudLng uLtlmateLy that the Treaty of Rome remalned 
on the " lntergovernmental plane" recognlsed that a problem was 
posed by the EC : 
"Whlle the EEC ls not commonly vLewed as a unLon of states , 
lt ls at the same tlme not generally regarded as belng slmpLy a 
reglonaL lnternatlonaL organlsatlon . The dlrect effects Ln the 
natlonaL Law of the member states of regulatory and judLclaL 
powers vested ln the Communlty organs glves to the EEC, Lt ls 
sold , a semblance of quasl federal assocLatLon of states" 36 . 
These comments certalnly appear to quallfy the SLgnlflcance 
of the concLuslon that Ln treaty matters the EC remaLned purely 
on the " governmental plane" to the new entLty argument slnce Lt 
recognlses that the EC are more than sLmpLy a reglonal Lnter-
natLonaL organlsatLon . The SpecLaL Rapporteur on MFN clauses 
appears to have lgnored thLs recognLtLon by the ILC Ln evaluatLng 
the relevance of the treaty successLon conclusLon to the argu-
ment presented - that the EC represented a new entlty . He 
appears to have concluded: because theEEC does not succeed to 
treatles, lt cannot be consLdered a new entLty when really the 
ILC's comments only supported the conclusLon: the EC may be a 
new entlty, but Ln treaty matters lt remaLns on the Lntergovern-
mentaL plane . 
35 . ThLs questlon ls dealt wLth more fully Ln Chapter 6 under 
"ReglonaL I ntegratLon and the I LC" . 
36 . - Yearbook 1972 Vol . 2 p 18 
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It Ls of course sLgnLfLcant to one's determLnotLon of 
whethe r a new entLty hos been created whether Lt presents 
Ltself as a unLfLed entLty wLth respect to thLrd portLes . 
Hoy defLnes the Lssue Ln reLatLon to the MFN prLncLpLe : 
" It Ls the CommunLty, rather than the LndLvLduoL 
membe r states , whLch wLLL negotLate trade agreements . .. 
RepresentotLon of the members by the unLon may well take 
place wLth regard to agreements to be negotLated after the 
LnceptLon of the CommunLty , Lf the members so stLpuLate but 
does not , by LtseLf , permLt any concLusLons wLth regard to 
the effect of agreements ontedatLng the CommunLty . The 
problem then Ls sLmpLy whether the fact of economLc assoc-
LotLon a l one , however close, yet foLLLng short of poLLtLcaL 
unLon , r esu l ts Ln a new· entLty to whLch the MFN clause does 
not app l y or to put Lt more strongly, whLch termLnotes Ln 
port prevLousLy exLstLng agreements of the portLcLponts . The 
Language of the oppLLcobLe EEC treaty provLsLon Ltself (ArtLcLe 
234 paragraph 3) does not go thLs for; whLLe recongLsLng the 
exLstence of prLor commLtments, the member states agree that 
concessLons mode by them to each other under the EEC treaty 
form " a n LntegroL port _of the estabLLshment of the CommunLty" . 
The contLnued exLstence of treatLes Ls thus recognLsed, whLLe 
the formotLon of a new entLty, Lt Ls argued, excepts certaLn 
areas from the oppLLcatLon of those treotLes" 37 . 
On thLs poLnt Lt should be noted that the Netherlands 
delegate argued before the Legal CommLttee of the General 
Assembly of the UnLted NatLons that a rule should be estabLLshed 
whLch pro¼ded for successLon by a communLty of states such 
as the EC to member states' obLLgatLons only Ln regard to treaty 
obLLgotLons now governed by that communLty . The ILC declLned 
to LncLude such a draft artLcle despLte the LogLcal appeal and 
consLderabLe support the submLssLon enjoyed on the grounds that 
a " successLon of states means the replacement of one state by 
another Ln the responsLbLLLty for the LnternotLonaL reLotLons of 
terrLto r y . Replacement seems to contemplate complete replace-
ment and not partLaL transfer or conferment of powers to conclude 
37 . - P . Hoy Supra Footnote 29 p 681 
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treotL e s " 38 . ThLs Ls true enough , but does not appear to 
answe r the questLon of why the prLncLpLes of successLon cannot 
apply Ln respect of a portLoL transfer of conferment of powers ; 
the p r LncLpLes themselves would not appear to outomatLcoLLy 
exclude such a possLbLLLty . 
The Lmportont poLnt, however, and one recognLsed by the 
Court of JustLce Ln the ERTA case 39 Ls that sLnce the CommunLty 
Ltself con be bound by agreements whLch prevLousLy bound the 
member states only , the CommunLty does Ln proctLce succeed Lts 
members Ln respect of portLcuLor treotLes,the most conspLcuous 
example beLng the GATT . ThLs goes ogoLnst the SpecLoL 
Rapporteur ' s concLusLon that the Treaty of Rome remoLns on on 
Lnte r gove rn mentoL Level , and Lndeed would appear to except 
the r Lg h ts g r anted from one member to another from beLng cLoLm -
e d b y a b e n e f L c La r y s ta t e u n d e r o n M F N t re o t y b e c a u s e n o IJJ t h e 
EC Ltse l f Ls the 
11
grontLng state"; the stondar Ls the natLon that 
the EC deals wLth , whLch obvLousLy excludes the rLghts granted 
by one member to another . The EC hos Ln fact entered Lnto on 
accord wLth Lebanon LncorporotLng MFN treotment, 40 and Ln 1970 , 
concluded o n MFN t r eaty wLth YugosLovLo . 41 It Ls LnconceLvobLe 
that o membe r state would now conclude o MFN treaty Ln areas 
cove re d by the EC . ThLs fact LndLcotes on element of successLon 
Ln the EC to the bLLoteroL MFN treotLes of the member states . 
The excLusLon of MFN rLghts held by non member states under 
treat Les wLth member states appears th~ LogLcoL consequence of 
concLudLng that the EC succeed to the member states' MFN 
treotLes where the Lotter covers the some subject matter . A 
Legal foundotLon for denyLng the rLghts that o benefLcLory 
state bo r goLned for must be found however; that Legal founrlnt -
Lon con only be that of o change of cLrcumstonces . SouvLgnon 
concludes that the creotLon of o customs unLon does not exclude 
the ope r otLon of the MFN prLncLpLe on thLs ground : 
" even Lf we suppose that the estobLLshment of o muLtL -
Late r oL preferer tLaL -.,ystem consLtutes a fundamental change Ln 
the cL r cumstances and that thLs change hod not een envLsoged 
38 . - Yearbook 1972 Vol . 2 p 18 
39 . - No . 22/70 1971 Ree 263-296 
40 . - CostonLs 5 - Common Market Law RevLew P 426 
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by the partLes to the treaty provLdLng for the most favoured 
natLon treatment, the cLausuLa would stLll not come Lnto play; 
Lt cannot be Lnvoked by a state when the state Ltself brought 
about the changed cLrcumstances ... It rests entLrely wLth the 
grantLng state to ref use to accede to the multLLateraL agree -
ment estabLLshLng the preferentLaL system" 42 . 
Hay agrees wLth thLs concLusLon, LsoLatLng the specLfLc 
flaw of the change of cLrcumstances argument Ln Lts appLLcatLon 
to customs unLon : 
"It seems untenable to maLntaLn that, absent poLLtLcaL 
unLon among the partLcLpants, the changed cLrcumstances of one 
of the partLes should justLfy a modLfLcatLon by LmpLLcatLon. 
ThLs follows from the general rule that any recognLtLon of 
the effect of changed cLrcumstances requLres more than the 
volunt ary and unLLateraL change of cLrcumstances by one of 
the treaty partners " 43 . 
ThL s emphasLses the role played by poLLtLcaL unLon ; Ln 
fact the re gLme under scrutLny produces many of the features 
tradLtLo naLLy flowLng from a poLLtLcoL unLon of states , such 
as the creotLon of LnstLtutLons whose decLsLons are dLrectLy 
bLndL ng on the member states , and results Ln o body of Law 
that Ls dLrectLy appLLcabLe on the LndLvLduoLs of the member 
states . It Ls clear that thLs concLusLon Ls justLfLed only 
on a s trLct LnterpretatLon of the concept of poLLtLcoL unLon . 
Even on thLs LnterpretotLon, Lt seems on oversLmpLLfLcotLon 
to asse rt that poLLtLcal unLon Ls absent from the EC when Ln 
fact a degree of polLtLcoL unLon does exLst Ln the form of 
dLrect eLectLons to the European PorLLament . The net effect 
of the EC, consLderLng the fundamental changes brought about 
by the Treaty of Rome , would appear LnLtLoLLy to support o 
'change of cLrcumstances' approach . To reject thLs descrLp-
tLon Ln part because the changes brought about were voluntary 
and unLLateraL, but allow a change of cLrcumstonce when a full 
unLon Ls ochLeved - though LLkewLse the Lotter may hove been 
volunta ry and unLLoteraL , appears LnconsLstent . 
42 . - Yea rb ook 1975 Vol . 2 p 17 
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ConcLusLon : 
The precedLng argument reveals that the EC pose 
prob lems for the MFN prLncLpLe . These problems stem Largely 
from the unLque nature of the EC whLch the MFN prLncLpLe, geared 
bosL coLLy to reguLotLng the reLotLonshLp of states , hos found 
dLf fLcuLt to come to terms wLth. From whatever angle one 
app roaches the problems, the answers provLded appear LncompLete . 
Two brood soLutLons present themselves. The problems could be 
reso lved Ln favour of the MFN prLncLpLe ; that Ls to soy , recog-
nLs e the novel features of the EC, but moLntoLn that , uLtLmoteLy, 
thes e novel features ho ve no Lmpoct on the prLncLpLe because t he 
pr LncLpLe Ls a demondLng taskmaster - the creotLon of a stote -
LLk e structure, or a LLmLte d federal structure or a sup r onotLonoL 
st ructure Ls LnsuffLcLent to exclude the operotLon of the MFN 
prLn cLpLe for the sLmpLe re ason that , whatever else they ore , the 
EC cannot be reg a rded as a state . The prLncLpLe excels on 
one rous sta nd ard before Lt Ls prepared to step outsLde ; mere ly 
to dLspLoy stote LLke fea tures Ln certoLn fLeLds Ls Lnodequote 
bcCODse the LdentLty of the grontLng state and the thLrd state , 
actLvotLng the MFN clause, generally persLsts . The precedLng 
dLscuss Lo n ho s shown that, however , unjustLfLed thLs may be , 
the MFN clau s e does not Ln LtseLf odmLt recognLtLon of the 
fact that Ln reLo tLon to the subject matter beLng cLoLmed by the 
benef LcLory state , the reLotLonshLp of the grontLng state and 
thLrd state wLthLn the unLon hos altered rodLcoLLy as a result 
of both beLng members of the EC . The second approach Ls sLmpLy 
to odmLt thLs r eoLLty Ln the areas affected by the EC , and 
exclude the operotLon of the prLncLpLe on thLs ground . The 
weakness of thLs approach , however LogLcoL Lt may appear , Ls 
that Lt Locks Legal foundotLon. The reLotLonshLp of the EC 
and the MFN prLncLpLe must therefore be governed by the fLrst 
approach LndLcoted, because that Ls the result reached by the 
appLLcotLon of the Legal rules. The concLusLon must be , the re-
fore , that the creotLon of the EC does not Ln LtseLf exclude 
the operotLon of the MFN prLncLpLe and consequently , the rLghts 
acco r ded by one membe r to another member may be Legally cLaLmed 
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by a non member benefLcLary state under a MFN treaty wLth a 
member . Clearly the ContractLng PortLes to the GATT ore pre -
vented f r om cLaLmLng from the member states the rLghts Ln 
respect to trade and the movement of goods that one member 
grants another , due to the customs unLon exceptLon contaLned 
Ln Ar t Lc Le XX/ V of the General Agreement . ThLs however , 
rep r esents the LLmLt of the rLghts excluded from the operatLon 
of the MFN prLncLpLe : all the other rLghts granted by one membe r 
to anothe r under the Treaty of Rome (the free flow of capLtaL , 
workers and se r vLces , the rLght of estabLLshment of companLes , 
on taxes , patent rLghts) may therefore Legally be cLaLmed by 
the ContractLng PartLes . These non trade rLghts may LLkewLse 
be cLaLmed by a benefLcLary state under an MFN treaty wLth a 
membe r state where the treaty Ls expressly subject to a customs 
unLon exceptLon .
44 
Clearly were such an exceptLon Ls not 
expressly stLpuLated , a benefLcLary not a party to GATT could 
Legally cLaLm all the rLghts accorded by the grantLng member 
state to anothe r, Ln LLght of the SpecLaL Rapporteur's denLaL 
of a n Lmp LLed customs unLon exceptLon. It would appear, there-
for , that no Legal foundatLon exLsted for the EC's decLaratLon 
that the rLghts accorded from one member to another wLLL not be 
extended to non member MFN partLes . 
44 . - ThLs would apply whether the benefLcLary state Ls a membe r 
of GATT or not . 
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RegLonaL lntegratLon and the lnternatLonaL Law CommLssLon : 
The 
problems created by the operatLon of the MFN prLncLpLe Ln the 
context of supranatLonaL groups such as the EC brLngs Lnto quest -
Lon the r efusal of the ILC to Lnclude a Draft ArtLcLe deaLLng 
wLth thLs Lssue dLrectLy . There are, Lt Ls submLtted , two separ -
ate Lssues Lnvolved Ln thLs questLon. 
- whether the Draft ArtLcLes should be extended to Lnclude MFN 
treatLes to whLch supranatLonaL groups as the EC are portLes , 
thereby mokLng the rules contaLned Ln those Draft ArtLcLes 
oppLLcobLe to such treotLes. At present, because the Draft 
ArtLcLes are LLmLted to states, such treotLes ore excluded . 
- whethe r the Draft ArtLcLes should Lncorporote the customs 
unLon exceptLon on the bosLs of "progressLve development". 
The ILC decLded to Lnclude neLther, apart from a provLsLon-
oL ortLcLe deoLLng wLth the Lotter. (ArtLcLe 23 bLs) . The very 
fact that Legally such favours may be cLoLmed by o benefLcLory 
who Ls not o member of the group under on MFN treaty could be 
regarded o LendLng o degree of urgency to such LnterventLon . 
ThLs brLngs us to the determLnotLon of the second questLon 
posed on p q7 If the Legal posLtLon wLLL not odmLt such on 
exceptLon (whLch, as shown, Ls the case) ore there grounds just-
LfyLng the LncLusLon of such on exceptLon on the bosLs of "pro-
gressLve qevelopment " ? On thLs, the SpecLoL Rapporteur Ln '1975 
commented : 
~ The expressLon of such need would Lnvolve o value judgment 
as to the desLrobLLLty of estobLL s hLng cu s toms unLons. Whether 
the formotLon of such groupLngs Ls desLrobLe or not Leads us 
from the fLeld of Law to that of economLcs, whLch the CommLSSLon 
may not wLsh to enter" 'l . 
ThLs seems unsotLsfoctory. The desLrobLLLty of customs 
unLon would appear to be secondary to the fact that they exLst, and 
Ln ever LncreosLng numbers; Lt Ls to thLs reoLLty that any rule 
should dLrect Ltself. The expLonotLon of the ILC's refusal to 
'l. - Yearbook of the I LC '1975 Vol . 2 p '19 
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Lnclude an ArtLcle ,forwarded Ln 1978, seems more Ln poLnt : 
"The CommLssLon , bearLng Ln mLnd the LnconclusLveness of 
the comments made thereon ... " 2 . 
LLkewLse, thLs appears an Lnadequate explanatLon of the 
ILC
1
s refu sal to Lnclude such an exceptLon. As was poLnted 
out Ln the SLxth CommLttee: 
"It was unsatLsfactory for the CommLssLon to have faLled 
to Lnclude a specLfLc artLcle on the customs unLon exceptLon 
be c a u s e of t h e a l leg e d " L n c on c l u s L v e n e s s o f t h e c o mm e n t s'1 t o 
whL ch reference was made Ln paragraph 58 of the report . It 
was o nly faLr to poLnt out that the mojorLty of Lntergovern-
me ntal organLsatLons whLch hod submLtted wrLtten comments were 
favou r able to the LnclusLon of a specLfLc exceptLon for customs 
unLons and free trade areas" 3 . 
There are brooder objectLons , however , to the ILC ' s refusal 
to Lnclude a Draft ArtLcle on customs unLons . As the CommLssLon 
stat ed Ln paragraph 63 of the Lntroductory commentary to the 
Report : 
"It wLshed to take Lnto consLderotLon all modern develop-
me nts whLch may have a beorLng upon the codLfLcotLon or pro -
g ressLve development of rule s pertoLnLng to the operotLon of the 
clause " 4. 
The trend toward regLonol LntegrotLon Ln the world , Ls Lf 
onyth Lng, the most sLgnLfLcont modern development Ln relatLon to 
the operotLon o f the MFN clause . As was observed Ln the SLxth 
Com mLttee: 
" Many developLng countrLes, as well as developed countrLes , 
were members of customs unLons or free trade areas , and Lt would 
clearly be unacceptable Lf states portLcLpotLng Ln such ventures 
Ln re gLonol LntegrotLon were obLLged to extend to thLrd states 
the advantages whLch they accorded to each other as an essentLal 
condLtLon of theLr membershLp of such on ossocLotLon ... such 
assocLotLons exLsted everywhere Ln both the developed and the 
developLng world" 5 . 
2 . - Yearbook of the I LC 1978 Vol . 1 p 21 
3 . - Report of the SLxth CommLttee 1978 p 22 U. N.Document A/33/419 
4 . - Yearbook of the ILC 1978 Vol . 1 p 23 
5 . - Supra Footnote 3 
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The EC argued Ln much the some veLn ogoLnst the reoLLzotLon 
of thLs Legal rLght of o benefLcLory to cloLm such favours : 
"If such on exempt Lon dLd not exLst, Lt would be necessary 
to create Lt; otherwLse , states would never be able to decLde 
to estobLLsh such systems . WLthout Lt, oLL the advantages 
arLsLng from systems of economLc LntegrotLon would hove to be 
shored wLth all the thLrd states to whLch member states were 
bound by treotLes contoLnLng the most favoured notLon clause . 
It LS for thLs re ason that the customary rule hos been estobLLshed 
and LnternotLonol Low should acknowledge Lt,even Lf the rule and 
current proctLse dLd not already exLst" 6 . 
These arguments become all the more compeLLLng Ln LLght 
of ArtLcle 1 2 of the Charter of Economlc Rlghts and Dutles of 
States whLch expressly endorses the rLght of all states to port-
LCLpote Ln subregLonoL , regLonoL and lnterregLonoL cooperotlon ln 
the pursuLt of theLr economLc and socLoL developments . In LLght 
of thLs rLght "Lt was therefore Lncomprehenslble ... that the 
CommLSSLo n should hove foLLed to take a posLtlve declslon on 
that matter" 7. CertaLnLy the Legal rLght of a beneflclary to 
cLoLm the favours granted wLthLn a system of regLonoL cooperotlon 
such os o cu stoms o r economlc unlon, os the EC's comments lndl-
cote , hamper the reoLLzotLon of the rLght provlded under artlcLe 
12, and potentLaLLy render Lts reaLlzatLon lmpossLbLe . On thLs 
POLnt , Lt was Later poLnted out Ln the Slxth Commlttee : 
"There was nothLng Ln the draft artLcLes that went agalnst 
the sove reLgn rLght of states to form themselves lnto reglonoL 
or subreglonaL economLc grouplngs ln accordance wlth the Charter 
of EconomLc RLghts and DutLes of States . The Commlsslon had 
acknow ledged that r Lght of states and r1ocJ Loken a dellberote 
and reasoned decLsLon regordlng the appLlcatlon of the most 
favou red natLon clause. The questlon was not whether states 
could form themselves Lnto economlc grouplngs but rather whethe r 
or not the most favoured natlon clause system oppLled ln those 
CLrcumstonces . The Commlsslon has answered ln the affLrmotlve " 8 . 
6 . - Yearbook of the ILC 1978 Vol. 1 p 451 
7 . - Report of the Slxth Commlttee 1978 P 22 
8 . - lb ld p 25 -· 
• • • 
130. 
It should be poLnted out that the CommLssLon Ln fact 
expressly denLed Ln para. 58 of the Report, that such an answer 
followed from theLr sLLence on the matter. In LLght of the 
fLndLng by the SpecLoL Rapporteur Ln 1975 that the customs 
unLon exceptLon dLd not represent a rule of customary Low, Lt 
Ls submLtted that the concLusLon " The CommLssLon hos answered 
Ln the offLrmotLve" Ls Ln fact correct. It Ls submLtted , how-
eve r, that the justLfLcotLon of the ILC's posLtLon,orgued by 
thLs repre sentotLve, Ln seporotLng the rLght expressed Ln 
ArtLc Le 12 and the operotLon of the MFN clause , Ls unsotLsfoct -
ory Ln two respects. The fLrst Ls that the ILC expressly stated 
Lts LntentLon , Ln paragraph 63 of the Report, to exomLne the 
ope rotLon of MFN clause Ln the context of Lts relotLonshLp 
wLth " modern developments whLch may hove a beorLng ... to the 
operotLon of the clause". The rLght expressed Ln ortLcle 12 
would appear, therefore, to be hLghly relevant to the deter -
mLnotLon of Lts reLotLonshLp to modern developments . The 
reLotLonshLp between ArtLcLe 12 and the operotLon of the MFN 
prLncLpLe Ln such groups cannot be regarded as separate Lssues, 
as the RepresentotLve Ln the SLxth CommLttee suggests, because 
the Lotter hos a very dLrect Lmpoct on the reolLzotLon of the 
rLght proved Ln ortLcle 12: the process of LntegrotLon becomes 
LmpossLble Lf non members of the group may cloLm the benefLts 
accorded by members of the group to each other, Ln the exercLse 
of theLr Legal rLghts . And, as shown, the wLdespreod exLstence 
of customs unLon exceptLons Ln MFN treotLes only offords protect-
Lon to a LLmLted type of favours - specLfLcolly trade and torLffs . 
It Ls unreoLLstLc, therefore, to vLew the Lssues as separate, and 
Ln any event, LnconsLstent wLth the express desLre of the ILC to 
take Lnto account the relotLonshLp of the MFN clause to modern 
developments . The trend to regLonol LntegrotLon Ls perhaps the 
most sLgnLfLcont of such modern developments sanctLoned under 
artLcle 12 of the Charter of EconomLc RLghts and DutLes of States ; 
the Legal posLtLon of benefLcLary states under MFN clause at pre-
.sent Ls out of step wLth thLs development . It Ls the fact of thLs 
.. 
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development, rather than Lts desLrabLLLty, that a Draft ArtLcLe 
on customs unLon exceptLons should address Ltself to . 
sentat Lve Ln the SLxth CommLttee commented : 
One repre-
"A state bound by such a clause mLght be prevented from 
becom Lng a member of a customs unLon ... ThLs would be an unfort -
unat e re su lt for such assocLatLons were regarded as Lnstruments 
of trade lLberaLLzatLon and economLc development" 9 . 
ThLs does not appear to be totally accurate; as the SpecLaL 
Rappo rte u r LndLcated Ln 1975, customs unLons do not necessarLly 
LLbe r aLLze world trade but rather the trade of Lts members . 
CertaLn Ly they ore accepted now as Lnstruments of economLc 
deve lopment, as reflected Ln ArtLcLe 12 of the Charter of 
Eco nomLc RLghts and DutLes of States . If the Draft ArtLcLes 
ore to take account of modern developments, they should, Lt Ls 
submLtted at Lea st be consLstent wLth thLs development recognLsed 
Ln ArtLcle 12, rather than, by LeavLng matters as they stand at 
prese nt, act as a potentLaL'restrLctLon of thLs development . 
ThLs, however, Leads on to the fLnaL objectLon to the ILC ' s 
refusal to Lnclude the EC,or any regLonaL group sLmLLar to L~ Ln 
the scope of the Draft ArtLcLes. SLr FrancLs Vallot argued per -
suas LveLy: 
"EEC Ln fact exLsted, and was now the Largest tradLng entLty 
Ln the wo rld. The problem was therefore a substantLaL one and 
cou ld not be Lgn o red, for Lt would be poLntLess to elaborate a 
set of artLcLes that bore no reLatLon to reaLLty ... The treat Les 
negotLated and concluded wLth states by EEC were certaLnLy 
gove rned by LnternatLonaL Law. The CommLssLon, as a body con -
cerned wLth the codLfLcatLon and progressLve development of 
Lnte rnatLonaL La w, could not afford to Lgnore new problems that 
arose Ln the sphere of LnternatLonaL Law . Moreover, the treatLes 
concluded by EEC were bLndLng on Lts member states ... That was the 
factual and the Legal reaLLty. If the lnternatLonaL Law CommLssLon 
chose to place EE C and sLmLLar organLsatLons outsLde the scope of 
the draft, Lt would deprLve the future Lnstrument on the most 
favoured natLon clause of much of Lts Lmpact Ln matters of trade "10. 
9 . - Report of the SLxth CommLttee 1978 P 23 
10 .- Yearbook of the ILC Vol . 1 1978 p 43 
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If, the r efore , the Draft ArtLcles ore to speak meanLng -
fu lly to t he future , theLr exclusLon of such regLonal groups as 
the EC Ls su r p r LsLng . ThLs would be true Lf the EC were the 
on l y re gLo na l group Ln exLstence, sLnce Lt accounts for over 25% 
of t he wo rl d ' s trade . But as already poLnted out , regLonal Lnte-
g r at Lo n Ls beL ng pu r sued all over the world, and Lf anythLng , 
th Ls tren d Ls LntensLfyLng . As the posLtLon Ln relotLon to the 
EC has al r eady been settled Ln practLse, the utLlLty of such o 
Draft Art Lcle wou l d be reaped by new members joLnLng the EC , 
othe r r egLonol groups and future expcrLments Ln regLonol Lnte -
g r o tL o n, a nd not dL r ectly by the present members of the EC . 
If, Ln the future , o substontLol number of MFN treotLes 
or e ~o Ln c l ude r egLonol groups as the EC (and the present treaty 
relotLo n s of the EC LndLcotes that thLs wLll be so) the utLlLty 
of the p r esent Draft ArtLcles for the future would appear greatly 
LmpoLred because they exclude from theLr scope such groups . 
ThLs fact would appear o strong argument Ln favour of LncludLng 
wLthLn the scope of the draft ArtLcles MFN treatLes entered Lnto 
by sup r a notLonol or regLonol groups, and thLs could be ochLeved 
wLthout necessorLly hovLng to decLde the more Lnflommoble Lssue 
of the customs unLon exceptLon . 
It could be argued that Lf thLs development Ls progressLng 
Ln any event , LnclusLon of such o draft ArtLcle Ls unnecessary . 
ThLs , Lt Ls submLtted , nevertheless does not resolve the questLon 
of the p r oper relotLonshLp of the draft ArtLcles to thLs develop -
ment . Moreover , LnclusLon of such o draft ArtLcle specLfyLng 
o customs unLon exceptLon would conform wLth state proctLse on 
the subject . The realLty Ls that whenever a customs unLon or 
regLonal group has been created, the member states of such 
unLons hove not extended the benefLts granted to each other to non -
member MFN treaty partners . It was soLd Ln the SLxth CommLttee : 
" No one hod been able to cLte o sLngLe case where the 
.treatment whLch states members of o customs unLon granted each 
other hod been cLoLmed to apply to a state benefLcLory of the 
II 
most fovoured - notLon clause" . 
11 , - Report of the SLxth CommLttee 1978 p . 22 
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ThLs Ln fact Ls not accurate; as already poLnted out , 
the SovLet bloc countrLes dLd claLm the favours whLch member 
states of the EC granted to one another under MFN treotLes . 
What Ls true,howeve~ Ls that there Ls no case Ln whLch such 
a claLm hos been granted by members of o custom unLon . It Ls 
fundamental to the process of LntegrotLon that such favours 
ore not extended to non members . The Legal posLtLon at pre-
sent supports such on extensLon. As Long as regLonal groups 
exLst , the favours granted wLthLn them wLLL not be extended 
to non members . The mere fact of thLs proctLse, especLolly 
Lf pu r sued Ln vLolatLon of the treaty partners' rLghts, Ls on 
Lnodequote bosLs on whLch to Lncludeit- Lt would create " Ln 
e ff e c t , a s ta tu tor y L n t e r f e re n c e w Lt h o p r L v a t e .cont r o c t " '1 2 . 
SLr FroncLs Vallot however argued that sofeguordLng the Lnter-
ests of the non member may Ln Ltself be on unsound ground on 
whLch not to Lntervene : 
" The general experLence hod been that states wLth most 
favoured notLon clauses hod not wLshed such clauses to con-
stLtute obstacles to states LntendLng to joLnLng a customs 
unLon or other sLmLLor ossocLotLons of states" '13 . 
The objectLons to LncludLng o regLonol group such os the 
EC from the provLsLons of the Draft ArtLcles may be summorLsed 
as follows: 
- the ConventLon on the Low of TreotLes, to whLch the present 
Draft ArtLcles were desLgned to supplement, hod been LLmLted 
to states 
- the fact that the study of the treaty relotLons between 
states and LnternotLonal orgonLsotLons was beLng conducted 
as on Lndependent topLc by the ILC 
- uncertoLn ty, stemmLng from lts novelty, os to what exactly 
the EC was; some members consLdered Lt on LnternotLonal orgon-
LsotLon others a LLmLted federotLon, others o "supronatLonaL ' 
state " , some a "confederotLon"; how, therefore, was such a 
group ' s LnclusLon to be defLned? 
AgoLn, SLr FroncLs Vallot Led the attack ogoLnst the Lost 
object Lon : 
'12 . - Yearbook of the ILC '1978 Vol '1 p '130 per Mr OuentLn Baxter 
'13 . - Lb Ld p '1 26 
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'' The f a c t th a t o ju r LdLcoL ph e nomenon was new d Ld not 
reLLeve the Co mmLSS Lon of Lts duty to deal wLth Lt . Indeed, 
Lf Lt took the VLe w that Lt must Look backwards r at her than 
to the pre s en t , t hen Lts wo r k would be obsolet e befo re Lt 
hod even s tar t ed " 14 . 
It LS s ub mLt t ed t hat on balance , the arguments Ln f avo ur 
of LncLudLng re g Lono L g r oups Ln the Draft Ar tLcLes ou t weL g he d 
those ogoLn s t Lt . The desL r e to maLntaLn o degree of symmet r y 
wLth the Co nven t Lo n on the Law of TreatLes con only be re Lot Lve 
to the strengt h of th e arguments fo r LncLudLng such r egLo no L 
g r oups . In any e ve nt, as the CommLSSLOn LtseLf poLnted out Ln 
Lts Lntroductory c ommentary , the present ortLcLes ore Lnte nde d 
to c o nstLtute on a u to nomous set concernLng the Legal rules 
reLotLng t o most f avoured notLon clause ; they are not Lntende d 
to form on " a nnex to the VLenno ConventLon " 15 . LLkewLse , t he 
s ec o nd objectL on assumes that such regLonoL groups as the EC 
ore Lntern ot Lo na L o r ganLsotLons and wLLL be covered by the 
Lnde p en dent stud y ; as the wLdely dLvergent VLews on what the 
EC were re vea l ed Ln t he 1978 dLscussLon of the ILC , thLs LS by 
no mean s cer t oLn; t he SpecLoL Rappo r teur hLmseLf stated of the 
[ EC: 
" No r was Lt on LnternotLonoL orgonLsatLon properly speokLng " 16 . 
The t r end of the world LS LncreosLngLy to conduct Lt econom Lc 
reLo tL o ns o n o r egLonaL Level , and not o state Level ; Lt LS o 
t rend wh Lc h once sta r ted , LS LLkeLy to LntensLfy . In theL r p r e -
s ent f o r m, Lt LS certoLn that the Draft ArtLcLes wLLL hove no 
rel evance to MFN t r eotLes LnvoLvLng such groups . The certoLnty 
of thLs LLmLted Lmpact , Lt LS submLtted , LS o persuosLve argument 
Ln favou r of LncLudLng such groups, outweLghLng the more technLco L 
obj e ctLons to such on extensLon . Moreover , LncLusLon of such 
g r oups could hove been ochLeved wLthout tokLng o stand on the 
customs unLon exceptLon . It LS strange , therefore , that of the 
two Lssues LnvoLved Ln thLs questLon , a provLSLOnoL draft o r tLc Le 
shou l d hove been produced on the more controversLoL topLc o f t he 
Gustoms unLon exceptLon . The prLncLpoL objectLon to Lnc Lu s Lo n of 
14 . - LbLd p 53 
15 . - Report of the I LC 1978 p 22 
16 . - Ye a r book of th e ILC 1978 Vo l. 1 p 40 
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thLs exceptLon was to "o voLd LnstLtutLnoLLzLng dLscrLmLnatLon "1 7 ; 
agaLnst thLs Lt can be argued that Ln LLght of state proctLse 
Ln thLs re spect , such dLscrLmLnatLon Ls LLkely to result Ln any 
event, whatever the Draft ArtLcLes provLde for . Moreover , the 
sL Lence of the Draft ArtLcLes on thLs exceptLon Leaves the 
problem of bLLateraL MFN treotLes of countrLes formLng such a 
unLon unresolved and remaLn to be determLned by customary 
LnternatLonaL Low "wLth oLL the uncertoLnty that LmpLLed" '18. 
If, as the majorLty of members felt, a benefLcLory may Legally 
cLaLm the favours granted by members of a customs unLon under 
bLLateraL MFN treotLes, such a Legal rLght can only prove a 
source of frLctLon Lf Ln proctLce, thLs rLght Ls not, Ln the over -
wheLmLng membe r s of cases cLoLmed, and certoLnLy never granted . 
ThLs practLce suggests that perhaps the customs unLon should 
have been codLfLed. 
AgaLnst thLs Ls the fact that even Ln LLght 
of thLs proctLc9 , the exLstence of a Legal rLght Ls relevant to 
the determLnatLon of compensatLon due to the benefLcLary when 
denLed favours granted by the member of a unLon to another when 
Legally entLtLed to such favours. To abrogate thLs rLght purely 
Ln the Lnterests of the convenLence of prospectLve members of 
customs unLons seemsunboLonced. 
was a poLLtLcaL one : whLchever posLtLon the ILC adopted, Lt was 
bound to dLspLease one sLde . Hence Lt adopted a neutral stand , 
and offended the supporters of the exceptLon. GLven the LnevLt-
abLLLty of the poLLtLcaL unacceptabLLLty of whLchever posLtLon Lt 
adopted , perhaps the ILC could hove dLsregorded the poLLtLcoL 
In any event , the moLn problem 
consequences of theLr posLtLon . 
The dLscussLons reveal , however, 
a fundamental dLvergence of vLews on thLs exceptLon; the LncLusLon 
of a provLsLonaL artLcLe on the customs unLon exceptLon , wLth the 
Draft ArtLcLes remaLnLng sLLent,perhops accurately reflects the 
dLvLsLon.of vLews . 
'17 . - LbLd p '128 per Mr Tsuruoko 
'18 . - LbLd p 53 per SLr FrancLs Vallot 
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The Most Favoured NatLon clause and the lnternotLonoL Low 
CommLSSLon : 
The ILC completed Lts Draft ArtLcLes on t e F 
clause Ln 1978 . One may wonder, Ln retrospect, , et er t e 
LnvoLvement of the ILC Ln thLs topLc was justLfLed, consLderLng 
that, though the topLc consLsts of a mLxture oft e t~o, the 
economLc aspects of the prLncLpLe proved more compeLLLng than 
Lts Legal aspects . To evaluate the proprLety of the ILC's 
LnvoLvement, Lt LS necessary to return to the reasons (why and 
how) Lt got LnvoLved Ln the fLrst place . 
AttentLon was fLrst focused on the MFN clause by the ILC 
LtseLf Ln 1964 as o byproduct of Lts dLscussLon on the Low of 
treotLes - specLfLcoLLy, Ln response to o proposal mode by Mr 
Junenez de Arechago that the MFN clause should be an exceptLon 
to the Draft ArtLcLes on StLpuLatLons Ln favour of thLrd partLes 
It was agreed that MFN clauses represented such on extensLve 
topLc that o study of them could not be conducted wLthLn the 
tl I general codLfLcotLon of treaty Low - combLned wLth a feeLLng 
that Lt represented o separate topLc Ln any event, In port 
due to the context Ln whLch Lt arose, Lt LS clear that the ILC 
at thLs stage clearly regarded the MFN clause as predomLnontLy 
a Legal questLon, related to the questLon of treotLes - apart 
from SLr Humphrey WaLdock's warnLngs about customs unLons and 
the GATT . Thus the possLbLLLty of studyLng Lt as o separate 
topLc hod already been mooted WLthLn the ILC LtseLf, becomLng 
a reoLLty after several representotLves Ln the SLxth CommLttee 
at the 21st SessLon of the General Assembly called for o study 
of Lt . 
bLrth . 
Both organs octLng on each other contrLbuted to Lts 
However, when Lt was decLded fLnaLLy to study Lt, non 
Legal consLderotLons surfaced Ln expLanotLon : 
" In VLew of the more manageable scope of the topLc , of the 
Lnterest expressed Ln Lt, and of the fact that cLorLfLcotLon 
of Lts Legal aspects mLght be of assLstonce to the UnLted NotLons 
CommLSSLon on lnternatLonoL Trade Low" 19 . 
ThLs hos the trodLtLonol LngredLents of a SULtobLe topLc; 
19 . - Yearbook 1967 Vol. I I p 369 
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the scope of Lt appeared manageable and able to be codLfLed, 
and Lnterest on the poLLtLcoL Level of the UnLted NotLons hod 
been expressed . However , the I LC here appears almost to re-
cognLse that the Legal aspects of the clause ore subsLdLory 
to the context that Lt operates Ln - recognLsLng that Lts 
economLc aspects constLtute Lts moLn thrust . 
It would appear , however, that the study goLned Lts own 
momentum . The Draft ArtLcles produced Ln 1978 g o well beyond 
"clorLfLcotLon of Lts Legal aspects" that "mLght be of ossLst-
once to UNC I TRAL" . They represent a full fledged code on the 
MFN clause . In Lts report Ln 1976 , Lt stated : 
" The CommLssLon consLdered that Lt should focus on the 
Lega l character of the clause and the Legal condLtLons govern -
Lng Lts oppLLcotLon and that Lt should clorLfy the scope and 
effect of the clause as a Legal LnstLtutLon Ln the context of 
all aspects of Lts proctLcoL oppLLcotLon . It wLshed to base 
Lts studLes on the broadest possLble foundotLons wLthout , how -
eve r, enterLng fLelds outsLde Lts functLons" 20 . 
The CommLssLon contacted several orgonLsotLons and Lnter -
ested ogencLes whLch hod proctLcoL experLence wLth the MFN 
prLncLple , such as UNCTAD and GATT . Loter the CommLssLon de-
fLned Lts posLtLon more precLsely : 
" The CommLssLon hos attempted to moLntoLn the LLne whLch 
Lt set for Ltself between Low and economLcs, so as not to try 
to resolve questLons of a technLcol economLc nature ... whLch be -
long to fLelds specLfLcolly entrusted to other LnternotLonoL 
orgonsLotLons . On the other hand ... Lt wLshed to take Lnto con -
sLderotLon all modern developments whLch may hove a beorLng upon 
the codLfLcotLon or progressLve development of rules to the oper -
otLon of the clause " 21 . 
Thus the SpecLoL Rapporteur trod a LLne that become Lncreos-
Lngly fLne between LegLtLmote Lnterests of the ILC as a body , and 
those properly belongLng to another UnLted NotLons body . The 
frequency wLth whLch the SpecLoL Rapporteur become embroLLed Ln 
thLs deLLcote boloncLng act Ls LndLcotLve perhaps that the ILC 
20 . - 1976 Yearbook Val 11 Port 11 p 5 
21 . - LbLd p 7 
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was not the opproprLote body responsLbLe for producLng the 
defLnLtLve statement on the MFN clause . The problem was that 
hovLng commL~ed LtseLf to codLfyLng the MFN clause, Lt become 
apparent that the most meonLngfuL contrLbutLon that could be 
mode depended Largely on a poLLtLco-economLc verdLct whLch, 
onc e mode 1 would determLne Lts Legal monLfestotLon . As for as 
the Legal aspects of the MFN rule ore concerned , clearly the 
ILC was emLnentLy quoLLfLed to rule , and Lt dLd so wLth choroct -
erLstLc competence . For two rea sons , however, thLs produces 
a LLmLted judgment. The fLrst stems from the nature of the 
Legal aspects of the MFN clause LtseLf; as LndLcoted Ln Draft 
ArtLcLe 7 , the MFN prLncLpLe Ls not a rule of customary Lnter-
notLonoL Low; the rule s re gu LotLng Lt therefore apply one when 
o MFN promLse hos been mode . ThLs LnvorLobLy wLLL be contoLned 
Ln a treaty . Clearly , therefore, much of the Low reguLotLng the 
MFN's ope rotL on wLLL be provLded by the 1969 VLenno ConventLon 
on the Low of TreotLes . But occeptLng the SpecLoL Rapporteur 's 
cLoLm that the MFN octLcLes constLtute on autonomous set of 
Legal rules, and not on "annex " to that ConventLon , 22 the MFN 
Draft ArtLcLes ore LLmLted Ln another sense ; they hove very 
LLmLted substontLoL Lmpoct, by the nature of the MFN prLncLpLe 
Ltself; not only ore the portLes free to decLde whether they wLLL 
grant MFN treatment , but also they ore totally free to determLne 
the terms of the promLse and , hovLng mode the commLtment , Left 
free to determLne the substance of the promLse entered Lnto . In 
all these crucLoL areas , the Draft ArtLcLes remoLn sLLent - by 
the nature of the MFN prLncLpLe Ltself . In thLs aspect , they 
ore more LLmLted than on ordLnory treaty whLch Ltself sets out 
the substance of the promLses mode . The Legal rules of the MFN 
clause necessorLLy operate at the edges of that clause . They ore , 
moreover , LLmLted Ln another sense: Mr Jogoto poLnted out : 
" The Draft ArtLcLes ... LoLd down only resLduoL rules , Ln 
other words , rules that would apply where the portLes dLd not 
agree ... on dLfferent provLsLons concernLng the oppLLcotLon of 
Ghe clause , as provLded by ArtLcLe 26 of the draft ... Lt was thus 
22 . - Report of the ILC 1978 p 22 
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recognLsed that Lf any problem arose whLch called for specLaL 
treatment o r consLderatLon, the partLes were free ... to deal 
wLth the problem as they saw fLt " 23 . 
The second objectLon to the ILC ' s Lnvolvment Ls , LrOnLc -
aLLy enough , that the rules for the operatLon of the MFN prLnCLpLe 
are rLpe for a collected defLnLtLve pronouncement LnvoLvLng a 
strong f LavourLng of progressLve development - but that the ILC 
was not the approprLate organ to do thLs . By far the most Lmport -
ant functLon of the MFN prLncLpLe Ls Ln Lts LnfLuence on Lnter -
natLonaL tradLng patterns - and all that flows from that . To 
the extent that Lt also operates Ln other fLeLds, the ILC ' s 
LnvoLvement was justLfLed ; had Lt LLmLted Ltself to the purely 
Lega l aspects of the prLncLpLe , however , Lt ran the rLsk of pro -
ducL ng a meanLngLess document . It attempted , therefore, to Lncor -
po r ate wLthLn Lts code answers to the " burnLng " problems that the 
prLncLpLe was Lnvolved Ln . The problem Ls that these problems 
were essentLaLLy economLc Lssues or , at the very Least , requLred 
a g r eat deal of economLc judgement . The two most conspLcuous 
examples of thLs type of judgment are the " customs unLon except -
Lon " a nd the "deveLopLng natLons exceptLon ". About the Latter 
the Sp e cLaL Rappo r teur commented : 
" In dLscussLng the questLon of the operatLon of the most 
favoured natLon clause Ln trade re l a tLons between states at 
dLffere n t Levels of economLc development , the CommLssLon was 
aware that Lt could not enter Lnto fLeLds outsLde Lts functLons 
and was not Ln a posLtLon to deal wLth economLc matters and 
suggest r ules for the o r ganLsatLon of LnternatLonaL trade . 
Nevertheless , Lt recognLsed that the operatLon of the clause 
Ln the sphere of economLc reLatLons wLth partLcuLar reference 
to the deveLopLng countrLes posed serLous problems , some of 
whLch r elated to the CommLssLon ' s work on the topLc ... The 
CommLssLon found thLs fLeLd Ls not one whLch affords an opport -
unLty fo r codLfLcatLon of LnternatLonaL Law because the requLre -
ments fo r thLs process ... namely extensLve state practLse , pre -
cedents and doctrLne are not easLLy dLscern~bLe . The CommLssLon 
23 . - Yearbook of the ILC 1978 Vol . 1 p 43 
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hos therefore attempted to enter Lnto the fLeld of progressLve 
development and hos adopted ArtLcle 2'1" 24 . 
ThLs judgment LS essentLolly o poLLtLcoL-economLc one; Lt 
may seem somewhat surprLsLng therefore that o Legal body mode 
Lt . The ILC, however, was not the babe Ln the economLc woods 
they may hove been assumed to be, workLng Ln close cooperotLon 
wLth UNCTAD . AdmLttedly, the consequences of ArtLcle 23 and 30, 
Ln actually helpLng developLng notLons, ore LLmLted; certoLnly 
such o statement WLLL help them Ln ollowLng developed countrLes 
to grant preferentLol treatment wLthout fear of that beLng 
cloLmed by o developed benefLcLory state. In any event, Lts 
judgment LS justLfLed Lf one consLders the possLble harm o foLLure 
to stLpulote such on exceptLon may hove hod on developLng 
notLons . It hod to take o stand, therefore, once Lt was 
Lnvolved Ln codLfyLng the MFN prLncLple; Lt does hLghLLght the 
questLon of whether the ILC should hove got Lnvolved Ln the 
fLrst place . In any event, what LS clear LS that the I LC Ln 
thLs Lnstonce dLd get Lnvolved Ln o fLeld outsLde the strLctly 
Legal - on economLc matter . 
The ' customs unLon exceptLon' LS another example . The 
CommLSSLon consLdered that thLs dLd not represent o rule of 
customary LnternotLonoL Low. It hod to face the questLon of 
whether the customs unLons exceptLon constLtuted o condLdote 
for progressLve development . On thLs the SpecLol Rapporteur 
confessed: 
" The expressLon of such need would Lnvolve o value judg-
ment as to the des;robLLLty of estobLLshLng customs unLons etc . 
Whether the formotLon of such groups LS desLroble or not Leads 
us from the fLeld of Low to that of economLcs whLch the 
CommLSSLon may not wLsh to enter" 25 . 
The SpecLol Rapporteur and the CommLSSLOn ul Lmately de-
cLLned to take o stand; the Draft ArtLcles themselves consequently 
remoLned SLLent on the customs unLon Lssue . The SpecLol Rapporteur's 
reasons for thLs ottLtude Ln '1975 vorLed . CertoLnly he VLewed 
the economLc Lssues as "formLdoble"; as on economLc Ls sue, the 
24 . - Yearbook '1976 Vol . 
25 . - Yearbook '1975 Vol . 
I I Port I I p 9 
I I p '19 
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customs unL o n Lssued posed unLque problems , Ln that economLsts 
could not agree whether they were o " good thLng" for the LLber-
oLLzotLon of world trade, and perhaps more sLgnLfLcont , the 
degree of consensus that dLd exLst suggested that Lt was 
LmpossLble to predLct whether the creotLon of customs unLons 
would ho ve on exponsLonory or controctLonory effect on overa ll 
world trade; thLs depended entL reLy on the economLes of the 
Lnd LVLduoL countrLes formLng the customs unLon . In both these 
respects, the economLc desLrobLLLty of unLons remoLned unsettled . 
Hod Lt been estobLLshed that customs unLons clearly we re desLr-
obLe, thLs would hove been relevant to the determLnotLon of the 
questLon whether on exceptLon from the operotLon of the MFN -, 
prLnc LpLe should be LncLuded on the bosLs of " progressLve 
development ". The SpecLoL Rapporteur felt unable to orrLve at 
such o concLusLon. Was thLs LndecLsLon o product of the I LC's 
relotLve Lock of expertLse Ln on economLc fLeld? It LS submLt -
ted that the answer to thLs questLon must be Ln the negotLve : 
as for as hLs refusal to take o stand con be related to economLc 
questLons , thLs decLsLon stemmed from the nature of the topLc 
Ltself: Lt dLd not Lend LtseLf 1 for the reasons suggested above , 
to clear cut answers , and certoLnly not to the creotLon of 
general rules. 
In any event, the refusal to take o stand one way or the 
other stemmed uLtLmotely from poLLtLcoL, and not economLc con -
SLde rotLon s . Mr QuenLLn Baxter descrLbed the dLLemmo confront-
Lng the I LC on thLs Lssue : 
" The CommLSSLon was Ln effect beLng asked to pronounce 
for or ogoLnst customs unLons, and the Latent onxLety of the 
mLnds of most members was that the draft would be put to the 
torch by whLchever SLde Lts answer dl..spleosed " 26 . 
ThLs then was the prLncLpoL problem roLsed by the customs 
unLon exceptLon , and Lndeed proved to be the prLncLpoL problem 
created by the whole Draft ArtLcLes on the MFN clause . Whatever 
posLtLon the I LC adopted Ln relotLon to the customs unLon except-
~on , Lt was foreseeable that o substontLoL number of states would 
oppose Lt . In rec ognLtLon of thLs Lnherent poLLtLcoL confLLct 
26 . - Yearbook of the ILC 1978 Vol . p 130 
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the ILC adopted a neutral stand Ln 1978 whLle provLdLng a por-
VLSLonal Draft ArtLcle (ArtLcle 23 bLs) suggestLng the form a 
customs unLon exceptLon could take Lf agreed to by states : 
" The sLlence of the Draft ArtLcles could not be Lnterpreted 
as on LmplLcLt recognLtLon of the exLstence or non exLstence of 
such a rule , but should rather be Lnterpreted to mean that the 
I 
ultLmote decLSLon Ls one to be token by the states to whLch thLs 
draft Ls submLtted , at the fLnol stage o~ the codLfLcotLon of 
thLs topLc " 27 . 
In lLght of the polLtLcol conflLct lLkely to be engendered 
by thLs Lssue whatever posLtLon the I LC adopted, Lt LS dLffLcult 
to see what olternotLve was open to Lt . GLven the LnevLtobLlLty 
of polLtLcol conflLct on th LS Lssue , Lt would appear that the 
omLSSLO n of a Draft ArtLcle on the customs unLon exceptLon was 
not SLgnLfLcont Ln determLnLng whether such on exceptLon wLll 
be Lncluded Ln a ConventLon on the Draft ArtLcLes,or to the more 
LmmedLote questLon of whether a conference consLderLng the Draft 
ArtLcles wLll be held at all . Moreover, Lt LS quLte clear that 
the lLkelLhood of polLtLcol conflLct over thLs Lssue exLsted 
whatever organ of the UnLted NotLons consLdered the questLon . 28 . 
In no respects therefore can the problems generated by the customs 
unLon exceptLon be traced bock to the fact that the ILC LS pre-
domLnontLy a Legal , and not on economLc body. 
What sLgnLfLconce , therefore, can be attached to the omLSSLon 
of the ILC to Lnclude a Draft ArtLcLe on the customs unLon except -
Lon? Perhaps the most Lmportont statement to emerge from Lts 
treatment of the Lssue LS that the customs unLon exceptLon does 
not r epresent a rule of customary Low . ThLs clearly was the vLew 
of both Mr Ustor Ln 1975 , and Mr Ushokov Ln 1978, and was confLrm -
ed by on overwheLmLng mojorLty of the members of the CommLSSLon . 
ThLs statement must be accepted as hLgh authorLty for the propos-
LtLon that the customs unLon exceptLon LS not a rule of customary 
27 . - Report of the I LC 1978 p 21 
28 . - The Lmportonce of thLs should not be underestLmated ; as was 
poLnted out Ln the SLxth CommLttee : 
" It was regrettable that the absence of any exemptLon cove r-
Lng customs unLons among developed countrLes seemed to hove 
Led such countrLes to on almost total rejectLon of the Draft 
ArtLcLes" - Report of the SLxth CommLtte 1978 p 25 
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Low , 29 and the fact that the Lntroductory commentary 1978 LS ot 
poLns to negate such on Lnference beLng drown from the sLLence 
of the Draft ArtLcles on thLs Lssue does not alter the very 
expLLcLt statements mode Ln 1978 by the overwhelmLng mojorLty 
of members that such o rule dLd not exLst . The explonotLon for 
the statement mode Ln paragraph 58 of the Lntroductory comment -
a r y to the Draft ArtLcles , Lt LS submLtted , LLes Ln the 
emphosLs beLng mode that thLs Lssue LS o poLLtLcol one to be 
determLned by states rather than reflectLng the I LC's posLtLon 
on thLs Lssue . 
The SpecLol Rapporteur Ln 1975 certoLnly thought Lt ade -
quate to " Leave matters where they ore " 30 , mLnLmLSLng the SLgn -
LfLconce of the omLSSLOn to Lnclude o customs unLon exceptLon , 
because most countrLes expressly Lnclude a customs unLon except -
Lon , and because of ArtLcle XXIV of GATT . In 1976, some members 
of the ILC consLdered "thLs omLSSLOn on LmpLLCLt recognLtLon of 
the fact ... that Lts odoptLon Ln the future LS not desLroble " 31 . 
WLLL such on LnterpretotLon be placed on the omLSSLOn to 
Lnclude o customs unLon exceptLon on the bosLs of progressLve 
development? To some extent , thLs wLLL LnevLtobly follow from 
the SpecLol Rapporteur ' s conclusLon " that there LS no compeLLLng 
evLdence os to the desLrobLLLty of substLtutLng o general rule " 31 . 
It would appear dLffLcult , however, Ln LLght of the sharply 
dLvergent VLews expressed by members of the ILC Ln 1978 to 
extract any conclusLon on whether the ILC consLdered odoptLon of 
such on exceptLon desLroble or not. If the SLLence of the Draft 
ArtLcles on the Lssue cannot be Lnterpreted as on " LmpLLCLt 
recognLtLon of the exLstence or non exLstence of such o rule " , 
Lt would appear dLffLcult to argue that such SLLence LmpLLed that 
such o rule was undesLrable . The wLdespreod LncorporatLon of 
29 . - As the North Seo ContLnentol Shelf Coses (ICJ Reports 1969 
p 13) Lllustrote , the I nternotLonol Court of JustLce , though 
referrLng to the comments of Governments , LnternotLonoL orgo n-
LsotLons, the General Assembly and the codLfLcotLon confe r-
ences Ln Lts determLnotLon of whether o rule contoLned Ln o 
conventLon represents customary LnternotLonoL Low , Lt reLLes 
heovLLy on the VLews of the ILC : 
" The status of the rule Ln the conventLon therefore depends 
moLnly on the processes that Led the CommLSSLOn to p r opess 
Lt .. , LbLd p 38 para 62 
- Yearbook of the I LC 1975 Vol . 2 p 19 
- Year ook o the Ill 1976 Vol . 2 Port 2 r 47 
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express customs unLon exceptLons Ln MFN treotLes certoLnLy re-
duces the sLgnLfLconce of on omLSSLon to codLfy the exceptLon . 
ThLs may be one proctLcoL reason why the ILC was not prepared 
to Lntervene, Ln oddLtLon to the other dLffLcuLtLes, whereas 
Ln regard to deveLopLng notLons - another economLc sphere - Lt 
felt compelled to do so on the bosLs of progressLve development . 
PossLbLy the dLffLcuLty of defLnLng a customs unLon exceptLon, 
as revealed Ln the GATT1 hod Lts LnfLuence . Mo re Lmportont, 
however, was the general consensus of opLnLon on the Lssue of 
the economLc needs of deveLopLng notLons, Ln contrast to the 
sharply dLVLded VLews on customs unLons; the odoptLon of the 
one and not of the other reflected the degree of consensus 
that exLsted on the economLc questLons . Equally Lmportont, 
and portly connected to the economLc questLon LS the over-
wheLmLng support deveLopLng notLons command Ln the poLLtLcoL 
arena , Ln contrast ogoLn wLth the growLng suspLcLon wLth whLch 
regLonoLs groups ore VLews - Ln LtseLf LorgeL~ a product of the 
EEC experLence . Here , therefore , th o LnstLnct of the I LC t o 
LdentLfy regLonoL groups WLth the example of the EC LnfLuenced 
Lts uLtLmote concLusLon on the customs unLon exceptLon; Lt was 
thLs ossocLotLon that proved crucLoL to LS verdLct that customs 
unLons were not necessorLLy a " good thLng" for LnternotLonoL 
trade wLthout serLousLy LookLng at the questLon of the Lmpoct 
of a deveLopLng notLons customs unLon . The SpecLoL Rapporteur 
was only prepared to recognLse a specLfLc ex ce ptLon to the MFN 
rule Ln theLr favour : 
" Thus the SpecLoL Rapporteur ' s choLce LS not to propose to 
create customs and other unLons exceptLons to the general rule. 
ThLs he submLts wLth one reservotLon; the matter wLLL be revLewed 
Ln the course of the further study on the functLonLng of the 
clauses Ln reLotLon to the developi...ng countri...es" 33 . 
ObvLousLy Lt become LnvoLved because the topLc LtseLf de-
manded ottentLon to thLs aspect; to thLs extent, therefore, Lts 
LnvoLvement was LnevLtobLe . CertoLnLy thLs LnvoLvement LS on 
(nodequote reason for not emborkLng on the codLfLcotLon of the 
MFN rule LtseLf . Equally clearly, Lt does not mean that the I LC 
should not get LnvoL ved Ln ec onom~c matters Ln general, or any 
non Legal sphere for that matter . It would obvLousLy be goLng 
33 . - 1975 Yearbook VoL 11 p 20 
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too far, on thLs basLs, to claLm that the ILC should never have 
embarked on the study of the MFN prLncLple sLmply because thLs 
LnevLtably Led Lt Lnto areas beyond the strLctly Legal; as 
the study of the MFN rule LndLcates, Lt proved LmpossLble to 
codLfy these Legal rules Ln LsolatLon from the context Lt oper -
ated Ln - Ln partLcular Lts economLc aspects . Should the ILC 
therefore, have refraLned from embarkLng on the study of the 
MFN clause because Lt contaLns a strong flavour of economLcs? 
The answer to thLs, Lt Ls submLtted, must be Ln the negatLve . 
ThLs Ls so for two reasons. 
The fLrst Ls that, though the economLc Lssues determLne 
the formulatLon of the Legal rules Ln the most controversLaL 
and Lmportant areas of Lts operatLon (L . e . customs unLons, 
developLng natLons) the MFN prLncLple operates Ln an extensLve 
range of areas that are exclusLvely Legal . LLkewLse, one cannot 
dLsregard the sLgnLfLcance of formulatLng the Legal rules even 
Ln the economLc sphere . Ramcharan Lndeed cLtes the MFN clause 
as a " tradLtLonaL area of LnternatLonaL Law" 34, and certaLnly 
thLs verdLct Ls endorsed Ln the 1971 SecretarLaL Survey of 
lnte rna tLonaL Law. As such,Lt Ls completely natural that Lt 
should be the I LC whLch conducts the codLfLcatLon of Lts 
prLncLples . DespLte the strategLc sLgnLfLcance of the eco-
nomLc Lssues , Lt was approprLate that the ILC should Lead the 
study because , on balance , the Legal Lssues domLnatec:tthe overall 
t op L c . I f t h e p L c t u re o f a Leg a L b o d y p r on o u n,L n g o n e c o no m L c 
Lssues Ls an absurd one, the pLcture of any of the bodLes such 
as ECOSOC, GATT , UNCTAD or UNCITRAL producLng the complete 
Draft ArtLcles that were produced, Ls an even more absurd one . 
One has to admLt that the LeadershLp of the ILC, workLng Ln 
conjunctLon wLth the ot er organLsatLons havLng practLcaL 
experLence of the clause , was entLrely opproprLote - and ln -
deed, LnevLtable . In thLs Lnstance , therefore, the prLncLpal 
objectLon to the ILC gettLng Lnvolved Ln the economLc sphere -
namely that other bodLes are already heavlly Lnvolved Ln Lt , 
and Lts Lnvolvement , hence , may be dLplomatLcally LnexpedLent -
34 . - " The lnternatLonaL Law CommLssLon" 1977 B. G. Ramcharan 
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Ls LnappLLcabLe . 
because no other body had, or could have undertaken,a general 
study of Lt; the MFN prLncLpLe Ls a "natural" topLc for the 
ILC to take up . Perhaps the prestLge accorded to Ls pronounce-
ments on the economLc Draft ArtLcLes wLLL be somewhat reduced 
because they are not a product of " economLc experts" . Ago 
cLtes another practLcaL reason agaLnst the I LC's LnvoLvement 
The rLsk of dupLLcatLon dLd not exLst here 
Ln thLs sphere : 
"I t would be unwLse to take up the study, however Lnter -
estLng Lt mLght be, of questLons such as the Law reLatLng to 
economLc development ... whLch requLre hLghLy specLaLLzed know-
ledge and for whLch other bodLes mLght be better quaLLfLed " 35 . 
In fact, the maLn problems experLenced Ln the MFN study were more 
poLLtLcaL than economLc Ls sue s . The above crLtLcLsm appLLes regardles! 
of the context the economLc aspect has a r Ls e11 i..r1 - wn eltler Lti c 
topLc Ls predomLnantLy a tradLtLonaL "economLc" one or a Legal 
one; Lt affects handLLng of economLc Lssues whenever they arLse . 
Most of the arguments agaLnst LnvoLvement are more compeLLLng 
Ln reLatLon to a fLeLd that Ls predomLnantLy an economLc one 
and Less so where that aspect arLses LncLdentaLLy Ln pursuLt 
of Legal Lssues . It can be argued convLncLngLy, as Ustor does , 
cLtLng Lts success Ln a technLcaL fLeLd such as the Law of the 
Sea , that the ILC does have the LnteLLectuaL and practLcaL 
abLLLty to enter the economLc sphere 36 . ThLs concLu s Lon Ls 
supported Ln regard to the MFN codLfLcatLon ; Ln any event , resort 
may be had to agencLe s Lth s pecLaLL s ed expertL s e . 
On the c onceptual Le vel, t o v Le w the IL C a s LLmLted to 
consLderLng purely the Legal aspects o f a topLc Ls to mLsunder-
stand the ILC LtseLf, for that Ls neLther how Lt s ees Lts role, 
nor does Lt accord wLth what Lts role Ls supposed to be . 
that the ' maLn thru s t of Lts Lnterest and competence ore essent-
LoLLy those of LnternotLonaL Low, Lt Ls clear that the mandate 
Lt operates under (3~ Ls not only suffLcLentLy brood and fLexLbLe 
Accept-
to Lnclude non Legal Lssues, but Lt contoLns on express command 
3 0 . - Yearbook 1973 VoL 1 p 166 
36 . Lb Ld p 163 
37 . - ArtLcLe 1 of the Statute of the lnternotLonoL Low CommLssLon 
states : P"- ,'I;.,.., \ "' · 
" The I nt-ernn Lo noL Low CommL ss Lon s o LL ove for Lts object 
the promotLon of the ro gressLve development of LnternotLonoL 
and Lts codLfLcotLon" - "The I nternotLonoL Low Co · ss· o " liL:;-
• • • 
to create Low that Ls very much of thLs world . 
poLnts out : A s Ram c ha r on 
" The dutLes Lnclude suggestLng modLfLcotLons and c onges 
Ln the Low to brLng Lt Lnto LLne wLth the needs of present day 
LnternotLonoL socLety and suggestLng new Low where none exLsted 
before, or where the Low hod been unclear hLtherto" 38 . 
For from codLfyLng Ln a Legal goldfLsh pond, the ILC hos 
developed Ln accordance wLth thLs general mandate to Lnvolve 
Ltself Ln the secular world: 
" The Comm.LssLon' s bosLc approach Ls on emperLcoL or prog-
motLc one . It seeks to oscertoLn rules whLch ore LLkely to be 
useful to states Ln the conduct of theLr reLotLons, bears Ln 
mLnd what r ules and formulotLons states ore LLkely to agree to 
and , on the bosLs of Lts opprecLotLons on these two questLons, 
Lt p r oceeds to examLne and deal wLth each topLc ... Apart from 
topLcs ossLgned to Lt by the General Assembly, Lt hos concern-
ed Ltself prLncLpoLLy wLth the moLn chapters of LnternotLonoL 
Low , odoptLng them and extendLng them to present condLtLons 
and needs " 39 . 
GLven thLs b r ood mandate , Lt was quLte natural and proper 
fo r the I LC to enter on "oLLen " fLeld such as economLcs Ln deol -
Lng wLth the MFN clause ; the wLdth of Lts mandate LLkewLse 
LegLtLmLzed any poLLtLcoL judgments Lt found Lt necessary to 
make . 
However , Lt may be a mLstoke to contLnue to accept the 
dLstLnctLon between Low and economLcs and regordLng the Lotter 
as " oLLen " Ln LLght of the fast growLng body of economLc Low . 
It would appear from the 1971 SecretorLoL Survey that at present 
the domLnont vLew of the ILC Ls that Lt should not generally 
enter thLs fLeLd - though many supported t Ls move . In any event , 
such a verdLct con hardly be consLdered oppLLcoble to treatment 
of on economLc Lssue when Lt presents Ltself as a byproduct of 
the Legal ones . The growLng offLnLty between Low and economLcs 
does show that Ln thLs sLtuotLon the ILC should hove no hesLtotLon 
Ln resolvLng the economLc Lssues - Lf they con - as they orLse . 
38 . - " The lnternotLonoL Low CommLssLon 1977 p 1 
39 . - LbLd p 3 : as revealed by the customs unLon Lssue, the lLke -
LLhood of a rule beLng poLLtLcoLLy unacceptable to enough 
states acts as a very real Lnfluence on the decLsLons of the 
ILC as to whether a rule Ls adopted by the ILC or not . 
• • • 
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